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Abstract
The global financial crisis was the greatest economic crisis since the Great De-
pression of the 1930s. The crisis, which had its origins in the United States’ housing
market crash of 2007, led to global impacts including rising unemployment and un-
deremployment, home foreclosures, fewer opportunities for young people, and a loss
of retirement savings. Previous research has examined the role of economic condi-
tions in influencing various types of political behaviors and attitudes, however this
has primarily pertained to fluctuations in economic performance during ordinary
times. The magnitude of the recent crisis presents an unprecedented opportunity
to examine how citizen political engagement in democratic societies is affected by a
major economic shock. This thesis investigates how the global financial crisis has
affected citizen political behavior—including voting behavior, civic engagement, and
political protest—as well as democratic attitudes.
To investigate the impact of the crisis, the study uses cross-national survey data
fielded before and after the crisis in countries affected by the crisis to varying de-
grees. This enables a comparison both over time and across countries. Data from
the previous two waves of the World Values Survey in 18 democratic countries is
used to investigate the crisis impacts on civic engagement, political protest, and
democratic support, while data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
in 13 countries facilitates an analysis of electoral behavior. Multilevel modeling
and other quantitative methods are used to assess how factors at the country and
individual level affected citizen political engagement before and after the crisis hit.
The thesis tests a number of theories regarding the relationship between economic
conditions and political behavior, including grievances and resources approaches.
The analysis finds that countries harder hit by the crisis were more likely to expe-
rience declines in voter turnout, civic engagement, political protest and democratic
support, suggesting the crisis had a demobilizing effect on participation. Similarly,
at the individual level there was no evidence of a mobilization amongst those most
vulnerable to the crisis, rather it continued to be those with resources that were
most likely to participate in politics. The study contributes to our understanding
of how economic conditions influence political attitudes and behaviors, and more
broadly speaks to the political ramifications of major economic shocks.
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Introduction
The recent global financial crisis, or Great Recession, is widely considered the great-
est economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The crisis, which began
in 2007, led to severe recessions across a range of nations. In OECD countries an-
nual GDP growth dropped to 0.2 percent in 2008, and -3.5 percent in 2009 (OECD,
2014). The economic crisis resulted in a range of social repercussions including
rising unemployment, loss of retirement savings, home foreclosures, and decreasing
opportunities for young people. The exact nature, timing, and magnitude of the
crisis varied across countries. Some nations, such as Australia, emerged virtually
unscathed, or weathered the crisis well, such as Germany, while in others the effects
were both severe and long-lasting. In the United States over eight million people
lost their jobs, millions more homes were foreclosed each year (U.S. Department of
the Treasury, 2012); in Spain youth unemployment rose to over 50 percent (OECD,
2016c); in Iceland the economy contracted by almost ten percent over 2008 to 2010
(O´lafsson, 2011, p. 6). The severity of the crisis presents questions regarding the
political repercussions. This thesis investigates these political repercussions.
Existing research demonstrates a strong relationship between economic con-
ditions and various aspects of politics, ranging from how citizens participate in
the political process to the overall process of democratic consolidation (see for re-
views, Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007; Przeworski and
Limongi, 1997). Our understanding of how political behavior is conditioned by a
major financial crisis, beyond regular fluctuations in economic performance, is how-
ever limited as we have not experienced a crisis on this scale since the 1930s. What
we do know from the Great Depression suggests a major economic crisis can have
wide-reaching political impacts. The depression triggered the end of the Weimar
Republic and the rise of the Nazis in Germany (King et al., 2008). In the United
States it led to a shift in political support from the Republicans to the Democrats,
which lasted another twenty years (Bermeo and Bartels, 2014, p. 1).
With advances in survey data collection over the past few decades, the global
financial crisis provides an unprecedented opportunity to re-examine the relation-
ship between the economy and political behavior under crisis conditions. This thesis
investigates how the recent financial crisis has affected citizens’ engagement in demo-
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cratic politics. Firstly, it examines the impact of the global financial crisis on three
forms of political behavior: voting, civic engagement and protest. Secondly, the the-
sis considers the impact of the crisis on support for democratic governance. There
are several reasons for taking this approach. Citizen engagement in democratic pol-
itics is not confined to the electoral arena (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Dalton, 2014;
Norris, 2002). By investigating political engagement across the different modes of
participation, from the most to least conventional, it is possible to develop a com-
prehensive understanding of how citizen participation is affected by a major crisis.
Extending the analyses to incorporate support for a democratic political system,
provides an attitudinal, in addition to a behavioral, barometer as to the health of
democratic society in the context of a major economic shock.
This project contributes to our understanding of the political ramifications of
the global financial crisis—the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s. The social
impacts of the crisis were immense, including rising unemployment – particularly
among young people, home foreclosures, declining house prices, and reduced social
services under austerity policies. We have little understanding of how citizens re-
sponded politically to these massive social changes.1 How did the crisis affect their
vote choices? Were citizens more or less likely to participate in protest and voluntary
associations? And was support for a democratic political system shaken given its
failure to deliver economic prosperity? This project seeks to answer these questions
and more in a cross-national comparative study of democratic countries, shedding
light on theories regarding economic conditions and politics, and helping make sense
of one of the most significant occurrences in recent world history.
This thesis proceeds across eight chapters. The first three chapters set the scene
in terms of the context of the global financial crisis, the theoretical framework,
and the methodological approach. Chapters four to seven seek to test the theories
identified across three dimensions of political behavior, and an attitudinal measure
of democratic support. Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion on the implications
for democratic governance. What follows here is an overview of each of the chapters.
The first chapter provides the detailed context of the global financial crisis. It
begins with a summary of the crisis origins in the United States’ subprime mortgage
crisis. The chapter then unpacks how a crisis of the US housing sector turned into a
global financial and economic crisis, hitting different countries at different times and
in different ways. It covers the government responses to the crisis from bank bailouts
and fiscal stimulus packages, through to austerity policies. The second part of the
chapter discusses the social and economic impacts of the crisis, including implications
for citizens in terms of housing, employment and retirement. Understanding the
1Although a growing body of literature is examining similar questions (see Bermeo and Bartels,
2014; Lewis-Beck et al., 2012).
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economic and social impacts of the crisis sets the stage for examining the political
consequences of these effects.
The second chapter outlines the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, in terms
of how citizens might be expected to respond to a major financial crisis. This incor-
porates potential political behavior responses, including voting, civic engagement
and political protest, in addition to attitudinal shifts regarding support for a demo-
cratic political system. The theoretical approach draws heavily on extensive existing
research on the connection between economic conditions and political behaviors and
attitudes, seeking to test these theories in the context of a major crisis.
The third chapter outlines the methodological approach to the study. This in-
cludes the sources of evidence employed, the selection of cases, operationalizations
of key variables at the country and individual level, and the methods of analysis.
The World Values Survey (WVS), particularly the fifth and sixth waves which re-
spectively precede and follow the onset of the economic crisis, provide data for the
majority of analyses conducted herein across 18 democratic countries. Complement-
ing this analysis, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides a
source of evidence for questions of electoral behavior, both turnout and vote choice,
in 13 democracies. Additional to these two datasets, where necessary to test certain
hypotheses or to provide variables at the contextual level, data from a range of other
sources is incorporated. This includes aggregate turnout data from the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), protest event data from
the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS), and additional data on demo-
cratic satisfaction and support from the European Social Survey (ESS).
The fourth chapter tests theories of voting behavior under crisis conditions, in-
cluding voter mobilization and vote choice. Existing research leads to competing
predictions as to how voter turnout might be affected by a major financial crisis.
On the one hand, salient elections tend to mobilize voter turnout (Franklin, 2004).
Given the salience of economic issues it could be expected that the crisis would
mobilize turnout. However, other research suggests that economic globalization de-
presses turnout (Steiner, 2010; Steiner and Martin, 2012), which would lead to the
prediction that voters would be demobilized in the context of a crisis enabled by
economic globalization. The analyses find support for the latter hypothesis that the
crisis would depress turnout, although the individual level data shows that the pro-
file of voters remains similar. The second part of the chapter explores vote choice,
testing theories of economic voting in the context of a major economic crisis. The
expectation that voters would punish incumbents for the crisis is supported by the
data, which shows that incumbent vote shares declined to a greater extent in coun-
tries that were hit harder by the crisis. Analyses of the individual level data suggests
that voters punished incumbents based on the economic performance of the country,
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rather than their personal financial circumstances.
The fifth chapter investigates the impact of the crisis on civic engagement. Civic
engagement, defined here as participation in voluntary organizations, plays a number
of important roles in a democracy. It provides checks and balances on power, plays
a role in the political socialization of citizens, creates social capital, allows for inter-
est articulation, and aids democratic consolidation (see for instance Diamond, 1994;
Putnam, 2000; Schlozman et al., 1999). Yet, previous studies have shown that there
is a bias in who participates in civic groups; those with greater resources, including
education and income, tend to have more influence in civic affairs (Schlozman et al.,
1999; Dalton, 2014, p. 73). The chapter investigates how the financial crisis has
affected civic engagement, including participation in old social movement organi-
zations, new social movement organizations, and recreational groups. Competing
hypotheses suggest the crisis may have mobilized participation in civic associations,
or led to a retreat as people turn their focus to meeting material needs during a time
of resource scarcity. The results show support for the latter, as civic engagement
declined in countries hit harder by the financial crisis. This decline was evident
across the various types of association.
In the sixth chapter the impact of the crisis on protest behavior is explored.
On the one hand, the world saw a number of popular protest movements, linked
to economic issues and inequality, gain traction during the global financial crisis—
from Spain’s indignados (indignants) to Occupy Wall Street, which spread from
New York to hundreds of other cities worldwide (Calhoun, 2013; Castan˜eda, 2012).
This might suggest the crisis had a mobilizing effect on protest participation. Yet it
is well established that it is disproportionately those who are better off in society,
with higher incomes, and higher education levels, who participate in all forms of
politics, particularly protest, due to the time, skills and resources required to take
part (Dalton, 2014; Rucht, 2007). This would suggest that as more citizens faced
material hardship during the crisis, fewer may have the time and resources to protest.
This chapter examines trends in protest behavior from before and after the financial
crisis and finds that the crisis had a demobilizing effect on protest participation in
countries harder hit by the crisis. Whilst overall participation declined following the
crisis, there is evidence that the introduction of austerity policies led to an increase
in protest demonstrations.
The seventh chapter examines the effect of the financial crisis on support for
democracy. Public support for democracy is what gives legitimacy to political
regimes and helps ensure their survival (Linz and Stepan, 1996a). Support for a
democratic political system tends to be relatively stable over time, compared to
more specific aspects of political support such as satisfaction with how democracy
works in practice (see Easton, 1975; Norris, 2011). Moreover, democratic support is
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expected to be resilient to economic shocks in established democracies, but fragile
in consolidating democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1996a). For these reasons, demo-
cratic support is a good indicator of how well democracy has fared in the crisis. The
chapter investigates how the global financial crisis affected support for a democratic
political regime across new and old democracies. It finds that countries harder hit
by the crisis were more likely to experience declines in democratic support, across
both old and new democracies. Younger people and and those with lower levels of
education became less supportive of democracy since the crisis. The IMF and EU
bailouts during the Eurozone crisis led to a decline in democratic satisfaction in the
affected countries, although the findings on democratic support in this context are
more mixed.
The final chapter provides an overview of the study findings and reflections on
the implications for democratic governance. The thesis finds that the crisis had a
demobilizing effect on participation. In countries harder hit by the crisis, turnout,
civic engagement and protest were more likely to have declined. Support for a
democratic political system also declined in countries affected to a greater extent by
the crisis. At the individual level, there was no evidence that those aggrieved by the
crisis were mobilized to engage in politics, those with fewer resources remained less
likely to participate and less supportive of democracy. We know a citizenry active
in political life has tangible benefits for democratic society (Almond and Verba,
1963). Moreover, a wellspring of public support for democracy is what sustains the
legitimacy of the democratic political order (Linz and Stepan, 1996a). What then
are the consequences of the changes identified in political behavior and democratic
support? This final chapter contemplates the broader ramifications and significance
of the study’s findings for the health of democratic societies.
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Chapter 1
The Global Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis had a huge impact on the economic circumstances of coun-
tries, and on the lives of individuals. This chapter outlines how the crisis unfolded
over time and across countries. It begins with the housing crisis in the United States
which triggered a financial, and then economic, crisis, that affected every corner of
the globe. The chapter then explores the policy responses of governments, including
bank bailouts, fiscal stimulus and austerity measures. The final section of the chap-
ter investigates some of the social and economic impacts of the crisis, in particular
with respect to homeownership, unemployment, retirement, health, and broader im-
pacts in developing countries. Within these overall trends, the chapter touches on
research that explores how these impacts affected some within society more than
others, whether by race, gender, socio-economic status or age group. In examining
how the crisis came about and what the repercussions were, this chapter provides
a foundation for the following chapters that will investigate how citizens responded
politically to this major economic shock.
1.1 Understanding the Global Financial Crisis
Origins of the Crisis
The global financial crisis had its origins in the United States. In the summer of
2007 problems in the housing market became apparent following a rise in sub-prime
lending. The housing bubble burst, millions of Americans faced home foreclosures,
and the shock reverberated throughout the economy, which had become heavily
reliant on the mortgage market. The causes of the crisis are many, and blame has
been pointed towards, among others: regulators for lax regulation of the financial
sector; the Federal Reserve, for keeping interest rates low; mortgage originators,
for pushing loans onto those that could not afford them; borrowers, for taking on
loans they could not afford; bankers, for creating innovative financial instruments
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which obscured risk; and the rating agencies, for giving subprime mortgage products
triple-A ratings (see Stiglitz, 2010, pp. 6–12).
The seeds of the crisis were sown in the aftermath of the dot-com crash in 2000
(Fligstein and Goldstein, 2011, pp. 39–40; Stiglitz, 2010, p. 4). Interest rates
were lowered to support the economic recovery by encouraging investment. Banks
could borrow money from each other at low interest rates, 1 percent from 2001
to 2004 (Desai, 2011), and then lend it out at much higher rates (Fligstein and
Goldstein, 2011, p. 40). This sparked investment in the mortgage market, which
over subsequent years led to another bubble.
The early 2000s saw a dramatic transformation in the mortgage market. The
rate at which new mortgages were created increased by 400 percent over four years
while house prices kept on rising (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2011, p. 40). Not only
had investment increased in the mortgage market, but this investment shifted from
conventional home loans to unconventional subprime loans. To qualify for a con-
ventional mortgage an applicant needed to place a 20 percent deposit and have a
good credit rating, whereas subprime loans were provided to those who did not meet
these requirements and thus were considered at higher risk of defaulting on their
loans (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2011, p. 37). Between 2003 and 2005 origination
of unconventional or non-prime mortgages almost doubled, from 1.1 million to 1.9
million (Mayer et al., 2009, p. 28). By 2006, 70 percent of the mortgages given
out were unconventional (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2011, p. 37). There were a range
of subprime mortgage products on offer, which typically involved higher interest
rates due to the greater level of risk. This included 100 percent mortgages where
borrowers did not put down a deposit. The flexible rate fees were high, and the
greater the house value the higher the fees, so mortgage originators had incentives
to encourage borrowers to take on homes larger than they could possibly afford to
maximize their profits (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 86). There was also growth in ‘low-doc’ or
‘no-doc’ loans where applicants’ income details were not subject to the usual verifi-
cation processes to ensure stated incomes and assets were reflective of reality. These
were also known as ‘liar loans’ as applicants were encouraged to inflate their stated
incomes to increase the likelihood of approval (Blackburn and Vermilyea, 2012, pp.
151–152).
Part of the reason for the upsurge in subprime loans had to do with change in the
structure of the mortgage market. Previously when banks provided home loans they
would assess whether the buyer would be able to repay the loan, and would only
provide loans to those who demonstrated the ability to repay. If the banks loaned
to someone who would not repay, the losses would be entirely on the bank, so they
had stringent requirements in place to ensure this would not happen. By the 2000s
this process had transformed beyond recognition. Mortgage originators negotiated
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mortgages with homebuyers for a fee. They then sold on the mortgage to a third
party, a substantial portion went to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-
sponsored enterprises tasked with encouraging home ownership by providing finance
to loan originators (Frame and White, 2005). As mortgage originators did not hold
onto the risk of the buyer defaulting on their loan, and received a fee for each
mortgage generated, there were incentives in place for these mortgage originators to
issue as many mortgages as they could, irrespective of borrowers’ ability to repay.
Moreover the riskier subprime loans generated higher fees for the mortgage originator
so it was in their interests to steer borrowers towards these riskier loans, even if they
qualified for a mortgage with lower rates (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 89).
After being sold onto a third party, the mortgages were packaged up into mort-
gage backed securities (MBSs) and sold on to investors. A further level of complexity
was then added with the creation of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), consist-
ing of mortgage backed securities bundled together and sold on again. As described
by Crotty ‘several thousand mortgages may go into a single MBS and as many as
150 MBSs can be packaged into a single CDO’ (2009, p. 566). Continuing the
convoluted process, bundles of CDOs could also be sold on as another collateralized
debt obligation (Allen, 2013a, p. 106). Alongside the increase in subprime mort-
gages, CDO issuances also rose rapidly, reaching to over $500 billion issuances in
2007, up from $157 billion in 2004 (Crotty, 2009, p. 566). Tett explains ‘the chain
that linked a synthetic CDO of ABS [a collateralised debt obligation of asset-backed
securities], say, with a “real” person was so convoluted it was almost impossible for
anybody to fit that into a single cognitive map–be they anthropologist, economist
or credit whizz’ (2010, p. 299). These complex mortgage backed financial products
served to obscure the risk inherent in the underlying mortgages. Meanwhile every-
one along the chain was making money, from the mortgage originators through to
the investment banks.
The rating agencies also played a role in this, providing triple-A ratings to these
inherently risky mortgage products. No less than 90 percent of mortgage products
received the triple-A rating (Allen, 2013a, p. 106). To understand why the ma-
jor rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch were handing
out triple-A ratings in spite of the underlying risk of subprime mortgages, it is im-
portant to understand how the rating agencies generated their income. Financial
institutions paid the rating agencies to provide the ratings and if they did not pro-
vide the desired rating they risked losing business to a competitor (Allen, 2013a, p.
107; White, 2009). For the rating agencies the threat of a large investment bank
switching all of their business over to another rating agency was enough for them
to remain compliant (White, 2009).1 Despite their shaky foundations, the triple-A
1A recent lawsuit uncovered internal emails from Standard & Poor’s executives which revealed
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ratings provided reassurance to those buying mortgage products that these were
solid investments, oiling the wheels of mortgage based finance.
These rapid changes in the mortgage market over a short period of time are fre-
quently attributed to a lack of government regulation over lending practices (Bhide´,
2009; Crotty, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010). As to why the government would fail to ade-
quately regulate to avoid financial crises, existing research suggests the role of money
in politics may be to blame. Financial institutions invested $2.2 billion in politi-
cal campaign contributions and $3.5 million in political lobbying (Center for Public
Integrity, 2009, p. 42). Lobbying activities went specifically towards avoiding legis-
lation over the predatory lending practices that came to flourish in the early 2000s
which underpinned the crisis towards the end of the decade (Igan et al., 2012, p.
95).
As long as house prices continued to rise, there was little risk. The sub-prime
model was based on the assumption of ever-increasing house prices. Borrowers took
on flexible rate loans with a view to refinancing their loan based on the increased
equity from rising house prices. On taking out the loans borrowers thought they
had nothing to lose. As property prices started to decline in 2007, however, it was
no longer possible to refinance the loans, rates jumped, and many defaulted on their
loans leading to foreclosures. Walking away from their homes was a viable option for
many given they had often avoided putting down a deposit, and as prices declined
the mortgage was greater than the value of the house—exacerbated by mortgage
originators’ practices that led to systemic overvaluing of homes in the first place
(Stiglitz, 2010, pp. 87-89). The number of foreclosure filings in the US more than
doubled between 2005 and 2007, rising to over one million properties; by 2008, there
were over two million properties with foreclosure filings (see Figure 1.1). Over the
course of the crisis from 2007 to 2011 there were over 8.2 million foreclosure starts
and over 4 million completed foreclosures (Blomquist, 2012).
The Global Financial and Economic Crisis
As foreclosures mounted, ramifications for the financial sector gradually became
apparent from 2007 onwards. New Century Financial, the US’ second largest origi-
nator of sub-prime loans, filed for bankruptcy in April 2007 (Lindquist et al., 2015).
By July 2007 investment bank Bear Stearns announced that two of their hedge
funds which had heavily invested in mortgage-backed securities had lost virtually
all their value (Reuters, 2008a). That a major investment bank was so close to
collapse hinted at the fragility of the financial system to what had up to that point
the shady operation underpinning ratings issued by the agency (see Taibbi, 2013).
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings
Source: RealtyTrac (2013, 2015, 2016)
been a housing crisis. The credit rating agencies were next to show signs reflecting
the impending crisis. In July 2007 Standard and Poor’s downgraded $7.3 billion in
asset-backed securities, followed by Moody’s and Fitch in subsequent weeks (Crouhy
et al., 2008). As the year progressed the agencies continued to downgrade ratings
on mortgage-backed securities (Crouhy et al., 2008). Meanwhile the banking sec-
tor continued to show signs of stress, in October Citigroup announced a 57 percent
drop in quarter three profits (Reuters, 2008b) and the CEO of Merrill Lynch resigned
following losses of $8 billion (BBC News, 2009).
From mid-2007 the problems in the United States mortgage market also came
to be felt by the banking sector outside its borders. Foreign banks had heavily
invested in the US mortgage market as it was considered a safe investment, aided
by the triple-A ratings. In August 2007 French Bank BNP Paribas suspended funds
for three of their mutual funds which invested in mortgage backed securities. In
September 2007 there was a run on UK bank Northern Rock after it emerged that
the bank had received emergency assistance from the Bank of England (Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010; Shin, 2009). The bank run continued until the
government agreed to guarantee deposits. A few months later in early 2008 the
bank went into national ownership—a move to save the troubled bank. Swiss bank
UBS announced losses in the order of $3.4 billion in October 2007 (BBC News,
2009).
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In light of the mounting crisis, in December 2007 the Central Banks from the
United States, the European Union, England, Canada and Switzerland announced
unprecedented coordinated action to provide banks with billions of dollars in loans
(Chailloux et al., 2008, p. 51). Yet the crisis continued to escalate in early 2008. In
March, JPMorgan Chase took over a collapsing Bear Stearns for just one percent
of what it had been worth a year earlier; the rescue was financed in part by the
Federal Reserve (Longstaff, 2010; Reuters, 2008a). IndyMac, a California based
bank and one of America’s largest mortgage originators, went bankrupt over the
summer (Fligstein and Goldstein, 2011).
The worst was not to come until the fall of 2008. On the 7th of September Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac went into US government conservatorship. The government
justified the bailout by arguing that these government sponsored enterprises, which
owned or guaranteed around half of American home loans, were critical to the func-
tioning of the U.S. economy (Dumontaux and Pop, 2013; Swagel, 2009, p. 34).
A week later investment giant Merrill Lynch agreed to be taken over by Bank of
America for $50 billion. On the 15th of September, in a watershed moment that
came to define the crisis, America’s fourth largest investment bank Lehman Broth-
ers filed for bankruptcy after an unsuccessful search for a buyer. The collapse of
Lehman, which held assets of $639 billion, was the largest bankruptcy in US history,
demonstrating that no bank was too big to fail (Dumontaux and Pop, 2013). The
collapse brought about immediate panic in financial markets, hitting stock markets
and particularly affecting other financial institutions exposed to subprime mortgage
products (Dumontaux and Pop, 2013, pp. 276-279).
Whilst Lehman Brothers had been allowed to fail, insurance giant AIG was not
allowed to fail when it faced collapse the following day. The Federal Reserve pro-
vided an emergency $85 billion loan to keep the company afloat fearing calamitous
impacts for the U.S. economy if it did not given AIG’s position as the nation’s largest
insurance company with over $1 trillion in assets (Swagel, 2009, pp. 41-42). The
government took an 80 percent stake in AIG in exchange for the bailout. Towards
the end of the month, following a bank run on Washington Mutual, the savings
and loan bank was shut down by regulators and promptly purchased by JPMorgan
Chase, forming the largest bank failure to date in the United States (Grind, 2012).
Wells Fargo purchased financial services firm Wachovia in early October to avoid
another failure. In the midst of the rapidly escalating crisis pressure was on the US
government to respond. On the 29th of September a $700 billion rescue package
was put before the US House of Representatives and was rejected. Failure to pass
the legislation led global stock markets to plummet. The Dow Jones index dropped
over 770 points in one day, or by 7 percent, the greatest one day drop in history
(BBC News, 2009).
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The crisis was causing turmoil in European banks as well. On the 17th of Septem-
ber Lloyds TSB took over HBOS, Britain’s largest mortgage provider (BBC News,
2009). Fortis, financial services giant of the Benelux region, was partially nation-
alized in late September to avoid collapse, in early October the Belgian part was
sold to BNP Paribas (Fassin and Gosselin, 2011). British bank Bradford & Bingley
was nationalized on the 29th of September, with its savings arm sold on to Spanish
banking giant Santander. Iceland’s three biggest banks collapsed in October 2008,
during which time Iceland’s stock market index lost over 75 percent of its value
(Benediktsdottir et al., 2011, p. 196). The crisis as it manifested in Iceland is con-
sidered the greatest banking collapse in history relative to the size of its economy
(The Economist, 2008).
The initial hit to the financial sector began to have broader economic ramifica-
tions. In October 2008 the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 13 percent, dropping
below 10,000 for the first time since 2004. Meanwhile, the average growth rate in the
OECD region dropped to below -2 percent in late 2008 whilst unemployment began
to escalate, increasing from 5.7 percent in the second quarter of 2008 to 8.2 percent
a year later (OECD, 2016a,b). By late 2008 many OECD nations had fallen into
recession, including the United States and the Eurozone, workers were being laid
off, and a range of industries beyond the financial sector where the crisis originated
had been affected, including the automobile industry and the construction sector.
The financial crisis had transformed into an economic crisis, and whilst its origins
were in the United States, impacts were soon felt around the world. The manner and
timing in which countries were affected varied considerably. Claessens et al. argue
this is due to three distinct channels through which countries came to be affected by
the crisis (2010). First hit were countries that were exposed to toxic U.S. financial
products, second were those who had allowed their own bubbles to develop locally
such as Ireland and Spain, finally the rest of the world came to be affected through a
decline in global trade, particularly smaller economies heavily reliant on exports and
trade (Claessens et al., 2010, p. 281). Stiglitz argued the crisis spread rapidly as ‘the
United States had exported its deregulatory philosophy—without that, foreigners
might not have bought so many of its toxic mortgages’ (2010, p. 21). Thus while
developed countries were hit first, developing countries were also affected, albeit later
and through different channels. The more connected to western financial markets,
the harder countries were hit. Thus parts of Europe and Latin America were hard
hit whereas the impact was less severe for sub-Saharan Africa (Stewart, 2012, p.
101).
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Government Responses to the Crisis
With the financial sector in meltdown and the stock market plummeting, govern-
ments around the world recognized the need to act and sought to address the crisis
through a combination of bailouts, to stop major financial players from going bust,
and fiscal stimulus packages which aimed to keep the economy moving in difficult
times. Later, austerity programs were introduced as a means to overcome mounting
deficits. These approaches shall be covered in turn.
In order to prevent bankruptcies and systemic economic collapse, governments
around the world continued to provide billions in bailouts to troubled financial in-
stitutions. The $700 billion US bailout package went before the House of Repre-
sentatives again on the 3rd of October with some amendments and this time was
passed. In November the US government provided a $20 billion bailout for Citigroup
following a 60 percent drop in their shares over one week (BBC News, 2009). The
UK government stepped in to save the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds TSB,
and HBOS providing 37 billion to keep them afloat (BBC News, 2009). Germany
provided a e50 billion bailout to Hypo Real Estate in October 2008 (BBC News,
2009). Following the collapse of its major banks Iceland received a $2.1 billion loan
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the first time a Western European
country received an IMF loan since the 1970s (BBC News, 2009). There are many
more examples of governments stepping in to bail out financial institutions in an
effort to avoid further damage to the economy.
These bailouts were controversial as ultimately the taxpayer was covering the
cost of the banks’ high risk activity. After receiving government bailouts banks
continued to pay out large bonuses, in the case of some parting CEOs in the order of
over a hundred million dollars (Kirkpatrick, 2009). While ordinary citizens suffered
with foreclosures, unemployment, and many other negative consequences, they had
effectively bailed out the banks, while bankers continued to receive multi-million
dollar bonuses despite being party to the risky behavior that contributed to the
crisis.
Alongside often massive bank bailouts many governments set about getting the
economy going via fiscal stimulus packages. This approach was recommended at
the time by the OECD and the IMF and was viewed as a revival of Keynesian
economics—whereby rather than tightening the purse strings, governments increased
spending in an effort to stimulate the economy (Allen, 2013b). At the G20 meeting
in November 2008 major world economies agreed to collectively take a Keynesian
approach, on the basis that in an inter-connected world countries acting alone could
find their efforts offset should other connected countries fail to take similar measures.
Globally $1.98 trillion was spent on stimulus measures with the majority (almost
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90 percent) coming from G20 countries (Khatiwada, 2009, p. 1). The most devel-
oped countries on average provided stimulus packages in the order of 1.4 percent of
GDP (Allen, 2013b, p. 138). The largest stimulus packages relative to GDP came
from the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia (Khatiwada, 2009, p. 1). Almost
all G20 countries provided a stimulus, though their size and nature varied. In gen-
eral stimulus packages were modest in comparison to the large bailouts provided to
the banks (Allen, 2013b). Efforts were focussed on increased government spending,
tax cuts, or most often some combination of both (Allen, 2013b; Prasad and Sorkin,
2009). The United States provided a larger stimulus than most developed economies,
at 5 percent of GDP (Allen, 2013b, p. 138). France provided a e26 billion stimulus
including support for the automobile industry. Germany was initially hesitant to
provide a large stimulus, providing a modest e12 billion, however by February 2009
as the scale of the crisis became apparent the German government provided a further
e50 billion (Vail, 2014, p. 76). Australia also provided a $42 billion stimulus which
some credited with Australia coping exceptionally well through the crisis, as one of
few developed nations to avoid falling into recession during the crisis (for example
see Stiglitz, 2010, p. 62).
Stimulus measures varied considerably, including payments to societies’ poor-
est via disability and unemployment schemes, tax cuts—for example the United
Kingdom temporarily reduced the VAT rate from 17.5 to 15 percent to encour-
age consumer spending, infrastructure projects (see Stoney and Krawchenko, 2012),
and a range of ‘cash for clunker’ schemes to encourage purchase of new automobiles
in the United States, Germany, France, Japan, and many other countries (Allen,
2013b, pp. 142–143). Stimulus packages were not limited to wealthy developed
countries. China implemented a $586 billion stimulus targeted at infrastructure and
social projects as well as corporate tax cuts (Khatiwada, 2009, p. 29). Indonesia
had a $7.1 billion package incorporating poverty reduction programs, infrastructure
projects, and VAT exemptions for a range of industries (Khatiwada, 2009, p. 33).
India, Mexico, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia also had stimulus packages, though
for many of the poorest nations large-scale fiscal stimulus simply was not an option
(Stiglitz, 2010, p. 24).
Over time the initial Keynesian response to the crisis gave way to a new wave of
austerity policies. A number of factors related to the crisis gave rise to a significant
increase in public debt. The government had dipped into the public purse to bail out
troubled banks, to provide fiscal stimuli, and to meet increased demand for social
services such as unemployment benefits, all the while tax revenues had decreased
as a result of heightened unemployment. This mix of heightened expenditure and
lower tax revenues led almost all OECD countries to increase their deficits over
the course of the crisis (Scha¨fer and Streeck, 2013, pp. 2–3). In some cases debt
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more than doubled, with eight countries having deficits exceeding 100 percent of
GDP by 2012 (Scha¨fer and Streeck, 2013, pp. 2–3). Austerity policies thus came
to be viewed as a necessary measure to reduce public debt (Karanikolos et al.,
2013). Some governments adopted austerity policies voluntarily, for example the
UK following the election of David Cameron in 2010—albeit with significant public
resistance evident through large public protests (della Porta, 2015; Peterson et al.,
2015). Other governments, such as in Greece and Portugal, were required to adopt
austerity measures as conditions for receiving loans from the International Monetary
Fund and the European Union.
The implementation of austerity policies varied cross-nationally and included
cuts to health care, social security, education, and a broad range of government
services and programs. In the UK following David Cameron’s ascent to power, he
proposed reducing government spending by 20 percent over subsequent years, by
cutting almost 500,000 government jobs, eliminating a number of government pro-
grams, and restricting benefits provisions (Borges et al., 2013). This was all part of
an agenda Cameron promoted as ‘the big society’ whereby increased voluntarism at
the local level was to compensate for a reduction in public services. Greek auster-
ity packages included tax rises, caps on government employee salaries and bonuses,
and cuts to pensions, among other broad measures to reduce public spending (see
Matsaganis, 2011, 2012).
Whilst the public did give some recognition of the need to reduce the deficit
(Borges et al., 2013; Stanley, 2014), there was tremendous opposition to austerity
policies. In the case of Iceland a referendum was held on austerity and was rejected
by 93 percent of the population (McKee et al., 2012, p. 347). Now that sufficient
time has passed to be able to assess the impacts of austerity policies, many have
considered the approach a failure. The IMF, which imposed austerity policies upon
loan recipient countries, after witnessing the results of these policies has admitted
that the policies were not entirely successful; a 2013 report on Greece recognizes
‘market confidence was not restored, the banking system lost 30 percent of its de-
posits and the economy encountered a much deeper than expected recession with
exceptionally high unemployment’ (International Monetary Fund, 2013, p. 1). Oth-
ers have pointed to countries that focussed more on stimulus than austerity, such
as the United States, and then made better recoveries than countries focussed on
austerity, as evidence in favour of the Keynesian approach (Krugman, 2015; McKee
et al., 2012, p. 349).
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The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
The events of the global financial crisis had far reaching consequences beyond the
initial fall out in the financial sector over 2008 to 2009, affecting different countries
and world regions in different ways. One such consequence is what has come to
be known as the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, or Eurozone Crisis. European
governments had provided large bailouts to banks during the financial crisis. The
size of these banks, and thus the size of the bailouts, were much larger relative
to the size of European national economies compared to bailouts taking place in
the United States (Shambaugh, 2012, p. 162). As a result of these significant
expenditures, combined with high spending from the boom period that preceded
the crisis and in some cases poor fiscal management, government debt levels rose to
unsustainable levels.
The group of countries most affected, concentrated mainly in Southern Europe,
came to be known as the ‘PIIGS’—Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Each
experienced the crisis at different times and in different ways (see Zamponi and Bosi,
2016). By late 2009, it became apparent that there were significant increases in the
deficit to GDP ratio of a number of countries (Lane, 2012, p. 56). Ireland and Spain
had suffered from a sudden halt to the construction boom that had preceded the
crisis (Lane, 2012, p. 55). The situation in Greece caused the most concern when,
in late 2009, the new socialist government reported that the deficit estimate for the
year was, at 12.7 percent of GDP, more than double the previous estimate. It was
later revised upwards again to 15.8 percent, and it became apparent that deficits
from previous years were also higher than what had been reported (Matsaganis,
2012). Rating agencies including Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s downgraded
Greece (Amini, 2015), making it difficult for Greece to be able to borrow funds
which led to fears of the Greek government defaulting on its loans which had the
potential to cause economic stress across the Eurozone as a whole.
Amidst the crisis leaders of EU member states debated the appropriate response.
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created in June 2010 as a tem-
porary solution to provide emergency bailout funding to embattled member states.
Greece was the first to require a bailout in May 2010, followed by Ireland in Novem-
ber 2010, Portugal in May 2011, and by June 2011 Greece required a second bailout
(Lane, 2012, pp. 56-58). Loans were provided by the so-called troika – the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
The European Union provided funding as the level of support required far exceeded
what IMF would typically provide (Lane, 2012, pp. 57-58). In October 2012 a more
permanent solution came into effect, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),
which would serve as the institution for dealing with requests for financial assis-
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tance from member states (European Stability Mechanism, 2017). The ESM has so
far provided finance to Spain, Cyprus and Greece (European Stability Mechanism,
2017). The loans were provided with conditions attached including the require-
ments to adopt austerity policies aimed at reducing the level of government debt,
raise taxes, and make structural reforms.
Germany, as the wealthiest member state in the Eurozone and thus a large
contributor to any bailouts, played a leading role in the response to the crisis.
Whilst German citizens were not supportive of Germany providing bailout funds
to Greece, the German government had an incentive to keep Greece from defaulting
on its loans due to the potential contagion for other European economies, including
Germany, in the case of a Greek default, and as a result of German banks’ heavy
exposure to Greek debts (Fuhrmans and Moffett, 2010; Gocaj and Meunier, 2013, p.
244). France, as the second largest economy in the Eurozone, found itself similarly
exposed to bad Greek debts through its major banks (Gocaj and Meunier, 2013, p.
244).
1.2 Social and Economic Impacts of the Crisis
Housing
The crisis had wide reaching ramifications with respect to home ownership. In the
United States many were directly and indirectly affected by home foreclosures. From
2007 to 2011 there were over four million completed foreclosures and an additional
four million foreclosure starts (Blomquist, 2012). Foreclosures were much more com-
mon among those who had taken out subprime loans which had much higher rates.
As subprime loans had been disproportionately pushed on women generally, African
Americans, Hispanics and in particular African American women, even when con-
trolling for income and other factors, the foreclosure crisis had a distinct racialized
and gendered dimension (Baker, 2014; Phillips, 2012; Rugh and Massey, 2010).
Those that did not suffer foreclosures themselves were affected in other ways.
With housing forming a major component of household wealth, a decline in house
prices meant a drop in household wealth. According to a Pew Recession Impacts
study in the United States, 48 percent of homeowners said their home had declined in
value since the start of the recession, compared to only 12 percent who thought their
property value had increased (2010, p. 79). Moreover a fifth of homeowners reported
that they were underwater, owing more on their homes than they could sell their
property for in the current market (Pew Research Center, 2010, p. 81). The drop in
house prices varied geographically, with proximity to foreclosed properties associated
with greater declines in house value (Harding et al., 2009; Schuetz et al., 2008).
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Rising foreclosures had other indirect impacts within neighbourhoods, including
lowering the tax base for local government and increasing crime rates, particularly
in areas where there was a high density of foreclosed properties (Ellen et al., 2013;
Schuetz et al., 2008).
The United States was not the only country to suffer from problems in the real
estate market. Spain too had allowed a property bubble to emerge and as a result
faced ‘the near-total collapse of its real estate market’ (Stiglitz, 2010, pp. 21-22).
As in the US, many were forced from their homes, though unlike the United States,
borrowers were still required to make payments even after their homes had been
repossessed by the bank (Sabate´, 2016). Following the crisis there was an oversupply
of housing which reduced prices substantially, for instance prices dropped 12 percent
in Barcelona, and over 17 percent in Valencia over 2007 to 2009 (Garc´ıa, 2010, p.
975).
Schelkle argues the United Kingdom and France had larger housing bubbles than
the United States, though the fall out in terms of foreclosures was not as severe due to
differences in social policy (2012). In the UK one in ten households were underwater
by the first quarter of 2009, compared to one in six households in the United States
at the end of 2008 (Schelkle, 2012, p. 62). Schwartz highlights that the crisis had
impacts beyond home ownership to also affect the rental market and particularly
low-income housing in the United States and United Kingdom, which suffered as
funding sources were reliant on better market conditions (2011).
Unemployment
One major impact of the economic crisis was rising unemployment and underemploy-
ment. As credit dried up and spending decreased jobs were lost through a number
of pathways. In the United States firms collapsing was the biggest initial hit to the
labor market; surviving firms downsizing to remain afloat also took its toll (Hout
et al., 2011, p. 60). Reinforcing feedback loops served to exacerbate the crisis, as
Hout et al. describe, ‘job losses reduce spending, which kills more jobs, reducing
spending even more’ (2011, p. 59). Average unemployment in OECD countries rose
from 5.7 percent in the second of quarter of 2008 to 8.2 percent at the same time
the following year (OECD, 2016b, see Figure 1.2). Unemployment remained over
8 percent throughout 2009 and 2010 before beginning a gradual decline, though at
the time of writing in 2016 unemployment is yet to return to pre-crisis levels.
These unemployment trends were not uniform across countries. While some
countries were particularly hard hit, such as Greece and Spain, others emerged
virtually unscathed including Australia and Japan (see Figure 1.3). Not only the
magnitude but also the timing of the unemployment crisis varied. The United
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Figure 1.2: Average GDP Growth Rate and Unemployment Rate in OECD nations
Source: OECD (2016a,b)
States was hit hard early on with unemployment rising from 4.7 percent in 2007 to
9.4 percent in 2009, then making a gradual recovery after peaking in 2010. In total
8.5 million jobs in the US were lost during the recession (Hout et al., 2011, p. 77).
In Spain and Greece on the other hand unemployment kept on rising up to over 25
percent by 2012 to 2013 as problems increased in the Eurozone (Cazes et al., 2013;
World Bank, 2016b).
Young people were disproportionately affected by the rise in unemployment (see
Figure 1.4). In Spain and Greece youth unemployment levels have sat above 50
percent since 2012 (World Bank, 2016c). In the United States youth unemployment
peaked at 18.7 percent in 2010, almost double that for all adults (World Bank,
2016c). Germany was the exception, with youth unemployment actually decreasing
over 2007 to 2009 (World Bank, 2016c). Whilst youth unemployment has always
been higher than the adult unemployment rate, the ratio between these figures in
OECD countries increased to its highest level since the 1970s during the Great
Recession (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011, p. 245).
The effects of the recession on unemployment were not uniform for men and
women. Initially men were harder hit by job losses, as male-dominated sectors
including construction, manufacturing, and finance were the first to be affected,
prompting some to label the crisis a ‘mancession’ (Peacock, 2011). Over time how-
ever this trend reversed as cuts were made to the public sector where the majority of
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Figure 1.3: Unemployment Rate in Selected Countries
Source: World Bank (2016b)
workers are women, and to social services which play a key role in enabling women’s
workforce participation through providing care services which are otherwise more
likely to be taken on by women (Karamessini and Rubery, 2014). Albelda finds in
the United States the crisis reinforced inequalities as African American women and
women with lower education levels were affected to a greater degree by the rise in
unemployment (2014). In Greece on the other hand, it was well-educated women
who were most affected by job losses (Karamessini, 2014).
Looking at unemployment alone masks the full extent of the problem. Stud-
ies conducted in a range of countries demonstrate that underemployment also rose
during the crisis, creating difficulties for individuals and families’ ability to get by.
For example the United States’ Pew study finds 42 percent of those in employment
experienced pay cuts, a reduction of hours, a transition to part-time work, or invol-
untary unpaid leave (Pew Research Center, 2010, p. 57). They also find 55 percent
were affected by either unemployment or underemployment at some point during the
crisis (Pew Research Center, 2010, p. 58). Whilst all demographics were affected,
minorities and those with a high school education or less faced these difficulties in
greater numbers than whites and the college educated (Pew Research Center, 2010,
pp. 57–68).
Findings are similar from other OECD nations. Whilst Australia fared well dur-
ing the crisis in terms of overall labor force participation rates, Jefferson and Preston
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Figure 1.4: Youth Unemployment Rate in Selected Countries
Source: World Bank (2016c)
identified a shift from full time to part time work, a growth in long-term unemploy-
ment, and divergent outcomes for men and women in Australia in different types
of work (2010). In the UK Warren finds, contrary to arguments of this being the
first major crisis for the middle class, that it was the working class that was most
affected in terms of the reduction in working hours (2015). Some sectors in the UK
were particularly hard hit, with manufacturing and construction suffering the great-
est losses (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010, p. 6). The unemployment rate also does
not account for those who have opted to engage in further study, take a disability
pension, or retire early as result of the recession and decreasing opportunities for
paid work (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010, pp. 15–16).
Retirement
People’s retirement plans were also affected in several ways, particularly for those
approaching retirement who had more to lose and less time to recover losses prior
to retirement (Whitehouse, 2009). The household wealth of older workers declined
substantially through a drop in both property prices and the value of pension funds.
In 2008 pension investments in OECD countries lost 23 percent of their value, or
US $5.4 trillion (Whitehouse, 2009, p. 536). Whilst, as Whitehouse describes ‘no
pension scheme and no country is immune from the effects of the crisis’ (2009, p.
536), the citizens of some countries were affected more than others. Within the
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OECD the pension funds of Ireland, Australia and the United States were hardest
hit each losing over 25 percent of their value during 2008, 38 percent in the case
of Ireland. Germany, the Czech Republic and Mexico fared better losing less than
10 percent (Whitehouse, 2009, p. 538). The differences between countries reflected
the type of investments favoured by pension funds within each country, with greater
exposure to equities increasing the losses (Whitehouse, 2009, p. 537). Both private
and public pension schemes were affected (Natali, 2011, pp. 9–13). Women were
harder hit than men as they had lower lifetime pension contributions to begin with,
stemming from lower earnings and a greater likelihood of career breaks (Foster,
2014).
This rapid loss of wealth caused older workers to reconsider their retirement
plans, with many preferring to work longer than they had planned so as to retire in
a better position. This preference was met however with countervailing pressures on
the employment market (Munnell and Rutledge, 2013). In many cases older workers
were disproportionately affected by the rise in unemployment and thus whilst many
hoped to work longer, not all were able to do so. The evidence as to whether older
workers more often retired early or worked longer as a result of the crisis is mixed
cross-nationally. In the United States Munnell and Rutledge find a slight drop in
the proportion of older people working in the United States (2013, pp. 124-125).
In England Crawford finds the crisis had little effect on the planned retirement age
of those over 50 (2013). In Australia, where retirement funds were hit hard while
the job market remained healthy relative to the United States and Europe, baby
boomers increased their workforce participation (Kendig et al., 2013). In Poland and
Greece there was an increase in workers claiming retirement benefits early (Natali,
2011, p. 11).
Health
A number of studies link the global financial and economic crisis with negative
health outcomes, whether as a result of declining economic conditions or as a result
of the government response in the form of austerity policies involving cuts to the
health sector and other social services. Kentikelenis et al. outline a number of cuts
made to the health sector in Greece, including a 26 percent cut in the public hos-
pital budget, a reduction of one third in pharmaceutical expenditure, and cuts to
programs on mental health and drug use (Kentikelenis et al., 2014). As a result of
these cuts they identify negative repercussions including increases in the HIV and
tuberculosis infection rates, and the reappearance of malaria for the first time in 40
years (Kentikelenis et al., 2014). Vandoros et al. find the magnitude of the crisis
to be associated with negative self-reported health outcomes in Greece, through a
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differences-in-differences comparison with Poland which did not fall into recession
following the crisis (2013). Rising suicide rates were documented in Europe and par-
ticularly Greece following the onset of the economic crisis (Antonakakis and Collins,
2014; Karanikolos et al., 2013). Karanikolos et al. find declining health in Europe as
a result of the crisis was not uniform across countries, the effects could be amplified
by cuts to health services, or mitigated through adequate social protections (2013).
Iceland, which rejected austerity policies, did not experience negative health effects
following the financial crisis, unlike Greece, Spain and Portugal which implemented
major cuts to health services (Karanikolos et al., 2013). This would suggest austerity
policies played a greater role in negative health outcomes, than declining economic
conditions and rising unemployment.
Impacts in Developing Countries
The crisis impact was not contained within the developed world, with the shock
reverberating globally. Whilst developing countries were typically less exposed to the
international financial markets, the crisis, centered in the United States and Europe,
began to ricochet more widely. Stewart describes a number of channels through
which developing countries were affected, including international trade, remittances,
commodity prices, foreign direct investment, and aid (2012). Global trade volumes
had dropped by 22 percent by early 2009 (World Bank, 2010, p. 36), and remittances
were down by 6 percent or USD $28 billion in 2009, relative to the previous year
(World Bank, 2016a). Budget cuts in donor nations also often meant a drop in aid
for the poorest nations, for example over 2008 to 2009 Ireland announced cuts of 20
percent, Italy of 56 percent, and Latvia 100 percent (Hanfstaengl, 2010, p. 26).
Whilst the precise impacts of the financial crisis on poverty, health, and other
outcomes are difficult to measure, a number of studies identify or predict negative
consequences of the crisis in developing countries. Chen and Ravallion (2009) esti-
mated that the crisis would increase the number of people living in poverty (under
$2 a day) by 64 million. Friedman and Schady (2009) predicted that infant mor-
tality would rise by 30,000 to 50,000 additional infant deaths in sub-Saharan Africa
as a result of the crisis. Other impacts for developing countries as a result of crisis
conditions include declining nutrition for mothers and children, and declining school
enrolments (Darnton-Hill and Cogill, 2010; Ferreira and Schady, 2009).
1.3 Conclusion
The global financial crisis began with the United States housing crisis triggered by
the bursting of the housing bubble. Ramifications were soon felt in the financial
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sector which had heavily invested in complex financial products based on subprime
mortgages. Major financial institutions in the United States and Europe lost billions,
in some cases facing takeovers, government bailouts, or bankruptcy—culminating in
September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and a global stock market
crash with 7 percent wiped off the Dow Jones index in one day. Whilst wealthy
developed countries were the first to feel the impact of the crisis, albeit to varying
extents, developing countries were hit a little later and through different channels.
Developing countries faced falls in remittances, cuts to overseas development aid
from donor countries feeling the pinch, declining international trade, and reduced
private capital flows.
Governments responded through a number of measures including taxpayer funded
bailouts of large banks, fiscal stimulus packages to get the economy going at a time
where most developed economies were heading into recession, monetary policy to
stimulate investment, and in subsequent years through austerity policies which in-
volved considerable cuts to public spending.
This dramatic turn of events which shook world financial markets and sent many
nations into recession had significant impacts for the lives of ordinary citizens around
the world. Impacts varied between and within countries and included the loss of
homes through rising foreclosures, rising unemployment and underemployment par-
ticularly amongst young people, a loss of retirement savings causing older workers
to re-evaluate their retirement plans, deteriorating health as a result of public sector
cuts, and increasing levels of poverty.
Subsequent chapters turn to how this major economic crisis, the most severe
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, has affected citizen political action and
democratic support around the world. On the one hand, it might be expected
that the crisis would have a mobilizing effect on political participation. Everyday
citizens bore the brunt of the crisis, while the financial institutions that engaged in
the risky practices leading to the crisis received large bailouts from the government.
On the other hand, after the crisis many citizens faced financial troubles and just
getting by may have become a bigger priority than political activism. The next
chapter develops the theoretical framework for this study, fleshing out potential
citizen responses to the crisis.
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Chapter 2
Theorizing Citizen Responses to
Crisis
The severity of the global financial and economic crisis that began in the late 2000s
raises questions regarding citizens’ political responses to the crisis. Did citizens
decide to express their discontent over the greatest economic crisis of their lifetimes
by altering the nature of their involvement in politics? Or did they merely carry on as
usual? Moreover, to the extent that citizen political involvement changed following
the crisis, was it a result of their efforts to directly influence the political process,
or did changes manifest themselves indirectly as a result of increasing hardship, or
some combination of the two?
Existing research presents a number of theories regarding the relationship be-
tween economic conditions and citizen engagement in politics, though we have rel-
atively little understanding of how these relationships manifest in the case of a
major economic crisis. This chapter builds a theoretical framework for understand-
ing citizen responses to economic crisis, drawing upon existing theories regarding
the economy as it relates to political behavior and democratic values, and theories
regarding crises, more broadly defined.
Citizen political participation is conceptualized to incorporate two dimensions:
electoral and non-electoral; as well as conventional and unconventional (Barnes and
Kaase, 1979). This produces three categories of political behavior (see Table 2.1):
voting behavior—both vote choice as well as turnout (conventional electoral), civic
engagement (conventional non-electoral), and political protest (unconventional non-
electoral). This draws upon Barnes and Kaase’s Political Action study that showed
conventional and unconventional political activity were complementary means of
influencing the political process (see Chapter 5 Kaase and Marsh, 1979b). Beyond
political behavior the attitudinal dimension of democratic support is considered
as an important indicator of the health of democratic societies (Linz and Stepan,
1996b).
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This chapter first maps out the range of ways citizens might respond politically
to a major economic crisis. Then each of these aspects of political behavior and
democratic values are explored in turn; each of these sections first provides a general
overview of the literature which seeks to explain that form of political engagement,
and then connects these theories to what this might mean in the context of a major
crisis, setting some overarching hypotheses to guide the study.
Table 2.1: Categorizing Political Behavior
Conventional Unconventional
Electoral
Voting behavior
- Voter turnout
- Vote choice
Non-electoral
Civic engagement Political protest
- Voluntary association - Petitions
membership - Public demonstrations
- Boycotts
2.1 Citizen Responses to Crisis
How might citizens respond to a major economic shock? There are a range of po-
tential avenues through which citizens may seek to express their discontent with
government or influence policy responses to the crisis. This ranges from casting
one’s vote in a national election, to protest activities such as occupying a building
or public space. In this section I provide an overview of the different ways citizens
might respond. In developing a model for the ways citizens might respond to a cri-
sis, I draw upon work categorizing different types of political participation. Whilst
initially political participation was considered synonymous with voting, conceptual-
izations soon began to reflect a wider range of activities citizens engage in to influence
the political process. Verba et al. (1971, 1978) incorporated four modes of activity,
including voting, campaign activity, cooperative activity, and citizen-initiated con-
tacts. This categorization has since been broadened further, with Barnes and Kaase
(1979) incorporating ‘unconventional’ protest activities, and Dalton (2014) adding
internet activism. It is widely accepted these days that political participation in-
cludes both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation, and conventional and
unconventional forms, to the point where it is often argued that ‘unconventional’
protest activities can no longer be classed as such, as a sizeable proportion of the
population participates in these activities (Dalton, 2014; Norris, 2002).
Drawing upon these categorizations, or what Verba and Nie (1972) describe
as the modes of participation, this study focuses on three main areas of political
39
participation—voting, civic engagement,1 and protest. Verba et al. (1978) differ-
entiate modes of participation across several dimensions, including: the type of
influence exerted, incorporating both the level of pressure exerted and the informa-
tion conveyed; whether partaking involves conflict with other actors; the level of
initiative required to participate; and whether it is an activity that one undertakes
in cooperation with others (p. 53). For the three modes of activity covered here,
Table 2.2 shows the characteristics of these modes of participation across the differ-
ent dimensions. I now turn to discuss the characteristics of each of these, and how
citizens’ might use that form of participation to respond to a major economic crisis.
After that, the characteristics of democratic support will be discussed, including the
reasons for complementing these behavioral indicators with an attitudinal one.
Table 2.2: Modes of Political Activity
Mode of
activity
Type of influence Conflict Initiative
required
Cooperation
with others
Voting High pressure /
low information
Partisan
conflict
Little Little
Civic
Engagement
Low to high
pressure / high
information
Varies Some or
much
Some or
much
Protest High pressure /
high information
Very
conflictual
Some or
much
Some or
much
Source: Reproduced from Verba et al. (1978, p. 55) and Dalton (2014, p. 39) with minor
adjustments.
Looking first at voting, the most conventional form of political engagement,
involving casting a ballot to choose between competing candidates or parties. A
high degree of influence can be exerted through voting as voters determine who will
govern. Whilst the collective influence of voting is great, the influence of any single
voter is minimal as it is a rare case where a single vote is decisive in an electoral
outcome. The level of information conveyed by voting is low as voters can only
choose between candidates and parties, each of which represent policy positions
across a range of issues (Verba et al., 1978, p. 53). The voter has no way of
communicating which specific policies they do and do not support. Voting involves
a degree of conflict between those supporting different parties or candidates, as gains
for one group mean losses for another, particularly where an election is competitive
(Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 52).
The level of initiative and other resources required to vote are relatively minimal
1Civic engagement broadly reflects what Verba et al. (1971) refer to as communal activity.
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compared with other forms of political engagement. One needs to be enrolled to
vote, have a means of getting to the polling place on election day and the time to
do so, and have the cognitive skills to be able to decide between the parties and
candidates running for office. Voting is the lowest cost way for citizens to have an
input into the political process—it does not require any ongoing commitment of
time or effort, just that one periodically casts their vote when elections are held.
Nor does it involve much initiative or skills on the part of the voter (Verba et al.,
1971, p. 17). Voting does not entail cooperation with others, it is an activity where
one acts alone (Verba et al., 1971, p. 17).
In the context of a crisis, there are a number of ways in which a person might
seek to use their vote to exert influence. They might, blaming the incumbent for the
crisis occurring in the first place, vote against them (retrospective economic vote).
Alternatively they might have a view as to which party or candidate is better placed
to handle the crisis and vote accordingly (prospective economic vote), whether as
a result of the candidate’s policy position, or perceived competence in economic
matters. If the voter perceives the major parties, both the incumbent and the
major opposition party, to have contributed to the to the crisis, they might vote for
a minor party, signalling their dissatisfaction with the major parties.
Another avenue through which citizens might respond to the crisis is through
participation in a voluntary association, or civic engagement. This involves joining
and participating in some type of association, whether it be a trade union, a political
party, a humanitarian organization, or some other group. Through participation in
civic associations citizens can, in groups, seek to influence the government on issues
important to them. The degree of pressure exerted can vary depending on the
activities of the group. The level of information conveyed tends to be high as a
group focussed on a particular issue area can convey specific policy preferences in
its attempts to influence the government. It is not normally a high conflict activity,
though at times citizen groups’ may be advocating for interests that go against the
interests of other groups in society (Verba and Nie, 1972).
Participating in an association requires a greater level of initiative and other
resources than voting. Firstly, it requires the existence of a range of potential groups
that one could join, or the initiative to start a group and recruit other members.
There are also cultural prerequisites for joining, for example one must be trusting
of others to participate in a collaborative association (Uslaner, 2003). One must
have the time to participate in an association, such as attending meetings. At times
participation may require financial resources, for example a membership fee. The
level of initiative required can vary a good degree, depending on whether one is a
participant or organizer of a group (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 53).
There are a number of ways participation in civic associations may be used to
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pressure the government, or respond in some other way to the crisis. One could join
a labor union to advocate for workers’ rights at a time of increasing job insecurity.
One could join a political party to have a say in the party’s response to the crisis.
With rising levels of hardship in society, including unemployment, homelessness and
poverty, one could seek to help during the crisis by volunteering with an organization
providing services for the needy, such as a soup kitchen or homeless shelter. Or, say
a recent college graduate is unable to find paid work, they might participate in
a voluntary group to develop professional skills that may help in demonstrating
experience when they apply for jobs.
Whilst all these indicate heightened reasons to join a voluntary group during
the crisis, there might be other reasons one might be more likely to withdraw from
a voluntary association during a crisis, or less likely to join one in the first place.
This might be particularly true for the more leisure-based associations. Say one
normally is part of a social sports group, or a book club, and then loses their job
or home. One might expect that facing extreme hardship, participation in leisure
associations becomes a lower priority than managing basic needs including an income
and housing. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs indicates that people focus on higher level
priorities, which would include participation in leisure groups, only once lower level
priorities including basic survival are met (1962). The crisis brought hardship upon
many so it might be expected that they turn their focus towards their own immediate
needs, rather than participation in voluntary groups.
Now turning to protest, which can take many forms, all characterized by an
attempt to influence political decision making outside of the electoral process, and
outside of traditional mobilizing agencies such as unions (Norris, 2002). Protest
actions might include signing a petition, either in person or online, taking part in a
public demonstration, boycotts, strikes, and occupying buildings or spaces. Protest
actions can exert a high level of pressure and provide a high level of information, as
protests are generally targeted at a particular policy (Dalton, 2014, p. 39). Protest
is inherently conflictual, though as Dalton stresses this conflict falls within the scope
of democratic politics, with incidences of violent protest extremely rare (2014, pp.
56–57). As Dalton stresses, ‘contemporary democratic citizens want to protest the
actions of their government, not destroy them’ (Dalton, 2014, p. 57).
Different forms of protest vary in the amount of initiative and resources required
to participate. The level of initiative is greater for those who organize protest ac-
tions, compared to those who join in. Signing a petition requires the least resources.
One might be approached, via email, social media, or in person, and asked to sign
a petition that they can then choose to sign or not to sign. In recent years petition-
ing has become increasingly professionalized online, with various platforms such as
change.org enabling citizens to get their petitions out to a large number of people
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without the need to canvass in person.
Other types of protest, such as public demonstrations, require a good deal of
initiative and resources. This is particularly so for organizers, who need to determine
what actions to take, who to target, when a protest action will be most effective,
and must have the skills to plan and promote an event for maximum attendance
and impact on the policy area in question. There can be costs involved, such as
hiring sound equipment for speakers, or printing banners. For attendees of protest
demonstrations less is involved, though much more than the ordinary and expected
act of voting. Attending a protest event, one must have the cognitive skills to
determine whether the protest objectives align with one’s own policy views, the
initiative to join in, the time to protest, and a means of getting to the protest
location. Whilst in some cases joining a protest might involve attending a march
for an hour on the weekend, protest can at times be much more time intensive—for
example one protester lived for over a year atop a Tasmanian tree in her efforts to
protect the surrounding forest from logging (Gibson, 2013).
In the case of a major economic crisis what pressures might be applied? Protest
actions could be targeted against certain policy responses to the crisis, for example
against an austerity response to the crisis. Citizens could protest against the insti-
tution one feels is responsible for causing the crisis, whether that be the government,
Wall St, an international organization like the European Union, or some other actor.
These protest actions, if successful, may influence policy responses to the crisis, or
may more broadly influence public opinion on the crisis.
Whilst there may be reasons for heightened participation to directly respond to
the crisis, there also could be reasons to retreat from some forms of protest. Say one
had previously attended protest demonstrations advocating for action on climate
change, or increased aid to developing countries, which were popular causes in the
years’ preceding the economic crisis.2 If this individual were to lose their job or home,
is protesting about climate change and international development still a priority, or
is their focus turned to getting by? Moreover the organizations that mobilize such
protest movements might be facing cuts to their funding and a reduced capacity
to organize, not to mention a changed climate in which to advocate for issues like
overseas development aid.
This summary of voting, civic engagement and protest covers the main dimen-
sions of political participation that might be affected by an economic crisis. These
behavioral measures provide important indicators to assess the health of democratic
society, as it has long been established that democratic society is a participatory one.
Participation is not the only component of a healthy democracy however, attitudinal
2For example the Make Poverty History campaign, or the environmental movement’s Global
Day of Action on climate change, both of which held big protest events in 2005.
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measures also underpin democratic society. Almond and Verba’s pioneering study,
The Civic Culture, argued that ‘the development of a stable and effective democratic
government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it
depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process—upon the
political culture’ (1963, p. 498). Further work has underscored the importance of
democratic support. Linz and Stepan consider it the attitudinal pillar of democratic
consolidation, the process by which democracy becomes embedded within a society
(1996b).
Democratic support might be shaken in the case of a major economic crisis, as
citizens may blame poor economic conditions on the political system. According
to the existing literature, this would more likely be the case in newer democracies,
where citizens might have favourable memories of good economic performance under
a former non-democratic regime (McAllister and White, 2011). In older democracies
on the other hand, citizens have no experience of an alternative political system, and
thus are more likely to blame the incumbent party than they are the political system
it operates within (McAllister and White, 2011).
2.2 Voting Behavior
There are two aspects of citizen voting behavior that could be affected by an eco-
nomic crisis, the first is the decision of whether or not to cast a vote in the first
place, the second is for which party or candidate a citizen chooses to cast their vote.
Each of these will be discussed in turn.
A considerable body of work has examined what drives aggregate turnout cross-
nationally.3 Across countries differences in the institutional set-up, level of economic
development, and party system have been used to explain turnout (Blais, 2007,
p. 625). Compulsory voting has been found to increase turnout by around 10 to
15 percent (Blais, 2007, p. 625; Franklin, 1999). In proportional representation
(PR) systems voter turnout is higher (Blais and Carty, 1990; Jackman, 1987; Karp
and Banducci, 1999). The explanation for this is that PR systems lead to fewer
wasted votes. Citizens supporting minor parties have a greater chance of influencing
electoral outcomes in a PR system, than in a majoritarian systems (Jackman, 1987).
Economic development has been associated with higher levels of turnout (Blais and
Dobrzynska, 1998; Norris, 2002). In terms of the party system, more competitive
elections are expected to lead to higher turnout (Blais, 2007, p. 628; Franklin, 2004).
Individual level research has explored what motivates individuals to cast a vote,
which is distinct from the contextual forces driving aggregate turnout. Explanations
have been put forward concerning the resources of voters, to what degree citizens
3See Blais (2007) for an overview.
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are mobilized to vote, and the instrumental motivations of voters (Franklin, 1999, p.
206). Those with greater resources are more likely to vote; particularly those with
a higher level of education (Blais, 2000; Norris, 2002; Wolfinger and Rosenstone,
1980). Older people vote more than younger people (Blais, 2000; Wolfinger and
Rosenstone, 1980). This is due to a combination of life cycle and generational
affects, with younger people today less likely to vote than young people of previous
generations (Franklin, 2004). Other work has argued that people turn out to vote
because they are mobilized to do so, whether by campaigns, organizations or social
networks (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). The decision to cast a vote has also been
explained by the instrumental motivations of voters. In particular voters may cast a
ballot so that they can influence policy in a direction favourable to them (Franklin,
1999). Although, rational choice explanations have their limitations as the likelihood
of casting a decisive vote in an election is extremely small (Blais, 2000).
How might an economic crisis affect voter turnout? On the one hand, global-
ization reduces governments’ control over policy issues, which means that voters
have less incentive to participate (Steiner, 2010). A range of studies have found
evidence to support this assumption, identifying a relationship between economic
globalization and lower turnout (Gray and Caul, 2000; Karp and Milazzo, 2016;
Steiner, 2010, 2016; Steiner and Martin, 2012). Given that the global nature of
the crisis can be viewed as a reflection of globalization trends, there are reasons to
expect that the crisis could result in lower turnout (H1.1). Citizens may perceive
that their votes have little impact on the economic condition of their country as
the crisis spread through the forces of globalization. Other studies would lead to
the opposite prediction (H1.2). Franklin (2004) argued that the ‘character’ of elec-
tions determines voter turnout, with higher turnout in elections that matter more.
As economic issues are highly salient, an economic crisis may mobilize citizens to
participate (Franklin, 2004).
There are also questions regarding the dynamics of electoral participation at the
individual level. On one hand those experiencing the greatest personal disadvantage
may be mobilized to participate, as they would have more reason to be invested in
any policies to address the crisis (H1.3). This would align with instrumental ex-
planations of voter turnout (see Blais, 2000). On the other hand those struggling
with their personal financial circumstances may be less inclined to get involved in
politics as they are focussed on just getting by during a difficult time (H1.4). This
would align with resources explanations that demonstrate those with fewer resources
participate less (Blais, 2000; Norris, 2002). Karp and Milazzo (2016) find support
for the latter hypothesis—in a comparative study of 10 countries they discover that
the crisis mobilized turnout, however demobilized those most vulnerable in society,
increasing the inequality of participation in political life. In summary, the unique
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conditions of a major international economic crisis point to a number of competing
hypotheses about how citizens’ might respond. Divergent theories could point to
either voter mobilization or demobilization, at the country and individual level.
H1.1: After the crisis voter turnout will be more likely to decline, particularly
within countries harder hit by the crisis.
H1.2: After the crisis voter turnout will be more likely to increase, particularly
within countries harder hit by the crisis.
H1.3: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to vote after the crisis.
H1.4: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be less likely
to vote after the crisis.
Aside from the decision of whether or not to cast a vote, there is the question
of which party or candidate to vote for. In the context of a major economic crisis,
we might expect citizens to use their vote to respond. Economic voting theory
assumes that voters are instrumental and predicts that they are more likely to
punish governments by voting for opposition parties when economic conditions are
bad (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). While a longstanding debate has existed on
whether citizens are more concerned with their own personal economic circumstances
or the national economy, the theory nevertheless assumes that economic conditions
matter, which now forms much of the conventional thinking on the subject.
Early studies of economic voting assumed that citizens vote on the basis of their
own personal economic circumstances (Tufte, 1978). While this may seem intuitive,
the empirical evidence for voting based on one’s own circumstances, pocketbook
voting, has been mixed (see for instance Clarke et al., 2000; Kinder and Kiewiet,
1979; Lewis-Beck, 1983, p. 356). Many scholars have found little empirical evidence
to support so called pocketbook voting leading them to question whether citizens
vote on an instrumental basis (Alvarez and Nagler, 1995; Kiewiet, 1983; Lewis-Beck,
1988). These scholars have placed greater emphasis on sociotropic voting, arguing
that citizens are more concerned with the perceived state of the national economy
than their own individual circumstance. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier conclude that
the majority of studies demonstrate support for sociotropic economic voting effects,
over any pocketbook effects (2007, p. 519). On the basis of these conclusions, we
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would expect to see a strong economic voting response to the widespread economic
decline triggered by the global financial crisis. Recent aggregate level research lends
limited support to this thesis; LeDuc and Pammet’s analysis of electoral outcomes
in Europe identifies a decline in vote-share for incumbent parties following the crisis,
albeit one that is only marginally greater than in earlier elections (2013).
As studies have branched out from the US and other single country case studies
(see for instance Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2000; Studlar et al., 1990) to compar-
ative studies (see Ge´lineau, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013; Paldam, 1991) an
increasing understanding has emerged of how the political and institutional context
mediates the economic vote. A strong theme is that citizens will hold governments
responsible for economic outcomes when there is clarity of responsibility (Powell and
Whitten, 1993). Powell and Whitten argue that voters evaluate whether the incum-
bent government is to blame for poor economic performance based on institutional
factors that can obscure accountability for the state of the economy (1993, pp. 398–
402). Multi-party coalitions, minority governments, and bicameral opposition are
all argued to blur the lines of responsibility, with the party of the Prime Minister or
President better able to deflect blame to other actors when responsibility is diffuse
(Powell and Whitten, 1993, pp. 398-402).
Other scholars have emphasized how globalization affects citizens’ evaluations of
economic performance. Hellwig shows that in nations where the economy is highly
integrated into global markets, ‘sophisticated voters’ attribute less responsibility to
the national government for the economy, than in less integrated economies (2001,
p. 1160). Further, in a comparative study of French and British survey data he
demonstrates that ‘economic perceptions matter less when voters believe their pol-
icy makers to be constrained by globalization’ (Hellwig, 2008, p. 1139). Kayser
and Peress also argue that the international context matters, as citizens will ‘bench-
mark across borders’, by comparing performance of the national economy against
other nations, punishing the government when it performs poorly in international
comparison (2012).
These findings regarding the political and economic context suggest the attribu-
tion of blame to governments during a major international economic crisis might not
be as clear cut as the economic voting hypothesis would suggest. National economic
performance has evidently been influenced by the international context in this crisis
of global reach. Moreover some countries, such as Germany, went into recession
during the crisis, though fared well in comparison to other countries in the region.
The question remains whether citizens blamed incumbent governments, or regarded
international factors as responsible for the crisis.
Building on the existing literature discussed above on economic voting a number
of hypotheses can be developed. Given the importance of national economic condi-
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tions in shaping the economic vote, after the economic crisis hit it would be expected
that incumbents would lose vote-shares and seats in parliament (H1.5). Following
Kayser and Peress (2012) one might expect this effect to be stronger in countries
that were harder hit by the crisis, and weaker in those countries that performed
relatively well, even if those countries performed poorly relative to the pre-crisis era
(H1.6). It could also be expected that parties on the right may be punished to a
greater extent than parties on the left. To the extent that the right is associated
with the free market ideology that enabled the crisis to spread, it would be expected
that parties on the right would more likely be voted out of office (H1.7).4 If peo-
ple vote with their pocketbooks, then we would expect those more vulnerable to
the crisis, including those on low incomes and the unemployed, to be more likely
to vote against incumbents than those who fared better during the crisis (H1.8).
In countries harder hit by the crisis, it could be expected that citizens would vote
against incumbents to a greater degree than those in countries that were less hard
hit (H1.9). A stronger vote against incumbents would also be expected in countries
with clarity of responsibility (H1.10) (Powell and Whitten, 1993).
H1.5: After the crisis incumbents will be likely to experience a loss of voter sup-
port, evident through either being voted out of office, a loss of vote-shares, or a
loss of seats in parliament.
H1.6: In countries hit harder by the crisis, incumbent vote shares will be more
likely to decline than in countries that were less hard hit.
H1.7: After the crisis, parties on the right will be more likely to be voted out than
parties on the left.
H1.8: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to vote against incumbent parties after the crisis.
H1.9: In countries hit harder by the crisis, voters will be more likely to vote
against incumbent parties than in countries that were less hard hit.
H1.10: In countries with greater clarity of responsibility voters will be more likely
to vote against incumbent parties after the crisis.
4Although Lindvall (2012) argued that the benefits for left-wing parties came several years
down the track rather than in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
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2.3 Civic Engagement
The second dimension of political behavior which could be affected by an economic
crisis is civic engagement. Civic engagement, whilst a concept subject to multiple
operational definitions, typically reflects citizen participation in voluntary organi-
zations (see Norris, 2002; Putnam, 2000; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001).
A range of civic groups have emerged catering to a diversity of citizen interests.
Citizens may choose to take part in a range of clubs and associations for leisure,
such as a sporting group or book club, in association with their religion, or to pursue
an educational goal. While some groups exist primarily for personal enrichment or
social interaction, others can be more political in their orientation.
There are the more traditional organizations through which citizens engage with
the state—unions, professional associations, and political parties—which can be clas-
sified as old social movement organizations (see Norris, 2002, pp. 168–187; Schofer
and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). These bodies, in various ways, act as conduits
for interest articulation and aggregation. Additionally, since the 1960s we have
witnessed the emergence of new social movement organizations, which are oriented
towards post-materialist concerns, such as the environment and humanitarian causes
(Norris, 2002, p. 137). These organizations can similarly seek to influence political
outcomes, though their approaches might be less conventional, such as organizing
petitions, participating in public demonstrations, or occupying spaces (Barnes and
Kaase, 1979). Thus while the former are conducive to conventional political involve-
ment through parties or unions, the latter can tend towards protest politics, with
both contributing to citizen engagement in the political sphere.
A thriving civil society has long been considered a positive attribute of demo-
cratic societies. Theorists from de Tocqueville to John Stuart Mill have highlighted
the virtues of a citizenry active in public life. Participation in civic groups is widely
viewed as beneficial, both for the individuals who participate, and for the societies
in which these individuals live (Putnam, 2000; Putnam et al., 1993). It has long
been established that the more politically oriented civil society groups can directly
enhance the functioning of democracy. De Tocqueville, on travelling to America in
the nineteenth century, espoused the virtues of an active citizenry, working together
in groups to improve their communities (1966). Almond and Verba’s pioneering
empirical study argued that a ‘civic culture’ was conducive to democratic politics,
characterised by citizens’ active participation in public life, including voluntary as-
sociations (1963). More recently Putnam has argued that participation in group
associations that go beyond the political realm, such as bowling leagues and the
Parent Teacher Association, generate social capital, which contributes to both the
democratic health and economic wellbeing of a society (Putnam, 2000; Putnam
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et al., 1993).
Civic engagement strengthens democracy in a range of ways. It plays a role
in the political socialization of citizens, who through participation in associations
may develop an understanding of democratic norms such as co-operation and par-
ticipation (Putnam et al., 1993). Citizens’ involvement in civic groups may also
equip them with the skills and experience to run for political office, thus provid-
ing a training ground for future political leaders (Diamond, 1994, pp. 7–8). More
politically oriented voluntary organizations can enhance the democratic process by
placing checks and balances on the power of the state (Diamond, 1994, p. 7). For
instance, NGOs might bring human rights violations by the government to public at-
tention and pressure the government to make changes. They also provide a space for
interest aggregation and articulation outside of political parties (Diamond, 1994, p.
8). Voluntary organizations may disseminate information, often providing a counter
perspective to that provided by the government, or bring issues to public attention
that would otherwise go unnoticed. This means people with specific interests or
concerns can group together and mobilize on their concerns, which is particularly
relevant for marginalized groups in society who are less likely to be represented by
major political parties.
Whilst civic engagement is widely considered a positive attribute of societies,
it is well established that there exists a bias in who participates in voluntary or-
ganizations. It tends to be wealthier, better educated citizens – those with higher
human capital – who participate more, and thus have a greater influence in civic
affairs. Existing literature points to a range of factors at the individual level that
are associated with higher degrees of civic engagement. Men are more likely to
participate than women (Curtis et al., 1992; Knoke, 1986). Those with higher lev-
els of education, and higher socio-economic status are more likely to participate
(Schlozman et al., 1999). Age is argued to have a curvilinear relationship with civic
involvement, with the middle aged more likely to participate than either the young
or the old (Curtis, et al., 1992). Religious people, those more trusting of others,
and postmaterialists, are all more likely to participate, when controlling for a range
of other factors (Moyser and Parry, 1997; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001).
There is thus, as Schlozman, Verba and Brady describe it, a problem of inequality in
civic participation (1999; 2012; 1995); whilst a thriving civil society has benefits for
both the individuals who participate, and society at large, the benefits are skewed
towards those already privileged in society.
Aside from individual level factors, ‘country of residence’ is a powerful predic-
tor of civic engagement, suggesting there are characteristics of states which lead
individuals within them to be more or less active in civic life (Curtis et al., 1992,
p. 150; Putnam et al., 1993). Previous examinations of cross-national trends have
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found a number of factors at the national level are associated with higher levels of
citizen participation in voluntary groups. This includes religion—in particular it is
frequently argued that historically Protestant societies have facilitated a work ethic
that encourages citizens to work together for the improvement of their community,
providing fertile ground for the emergence of civil society, in comparison to more
hierarchical religions such as Catholicism and Confucianism (Curtis et al., 2001, p.
785; Inglehart and Baker, 2000, p. 49). Democratic experience is also considered
important—the longer a country has been democratic, the more a civic culture,
which requires freedom of association, has an opportunity to flourish (for example
see Curtis et al., 2001, p. 798). In particular the post-communist countries of East-
ern Europe have consistently weaker levels of civic engagement in comparison with
more established democracies (Howard, 2002; Mondak and Gearing, 1998).
Work on national level predictors also explores the role of economic conditions
in shaping civic engagement. Lipset’s work on the social requisites of democracy,
found that greater societal wealth was associated with ‘the presence of intermediary
organizations and institutions which can act as sources of countervailing power, and
recruiters of participants in the political process’ (1959, p. 84). Inglehart and Baker,
in an extensive cross-national analysis, find economic development is associated with
cultural shifts towards norms of social trust and participation (2000, p. 19). Curtis
et al. argue individuals within more economically developed societies have a richer
network of civic activity (2001). These findings provide strong support for the
proposition that the presence of civic associations, and citizens’ participation within
them, is related to economic conditions. This gives rise to questions of whether an
economic shock, in the form of an economic crisis, might have some effect on civic
engagement.
What effect might a major financial crisis have on civic engagement on the basis
of these theories? Building on the existing research, I develop two hypotheses. On
the one hand we might expect citizens to retreat from engagement in voluntary
associations, whereas on the other citizens might be mobilized to participate more
in civic life in response to an economic crisis. The reasoning is outlined as follows.
In the context of economic crisis, where we see economic decline, we might ex-
pect a contraction of civil society, reflected in citizens’ retreat from participation in
voluntary associations (H2.1). The existing work on inequality in civic life would
lend support to a retreat hypothesis at the individual level. It is well established
that those with fewer resources, in terms of money, education, and class background
are less likely to participate in voluntary groups (Schlozman et al., 1999). Moreover
Karp and Milazzo (2016), examining the impacts of the economic crisis on voter
turnout, find the crisis demobilized the most vulnerable in society compared to elec-
tions before the crisis. Thus, as more citizens find themselves in financial hardship
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during a crisis, through unemployment, underemployment, or other circumstances,
it could be expected that these vulnerable subsets of the population engage less
with civic groups (H2.2). As these vulnerable individuals who tend to participate
less would be more numerous during a crisis, this might also lead to effects at the
national level, where countries more affected by the crisis, see a greater decline in
civic engagement (as per H2.1).
H2.1: In countries hit harder by the crisis, civic engagement will be more likely
to decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H2.2: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be less likely
to participate in voluntary associations after the crisis.
Whilst various strands of research indicate citizens may retreat from civic en-
gagement during times of economic crisis, other theories could point to a mobiliza-
tion response, particularly in certain types of associations. The more politically
oriented voluntary associations, both old and new social movement organizations,
provide a channel for interest articulation and aggregation (Diamond, 1994, p. 8).
In times of economic crisis, there may be a greater need for the functions fulfilled
by various groups, including unions—which advocate on behalf of workers, politi-
cal parties—which can aggregate and articulate interests, and NGOs—which could
fulfill functions ranging from providing resources and support for those at greatest
disadvantage in society (e.g. soup kitchens), through to providing an avenue for
opposing government policy responses to the crisis, such as austerity measures.
Recent research examining responses to the great recession, lends some support
to the mobilization hypothesis. In some cases the crisis has led to a rise in sup-
port for extremist parties in Europe, such as the far-right Golden Dawn in Greece
(see for instance Klapsis, 2014; Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013). Other work shows
citizens have been mobilized to participate in anti-austerity protests in response to
the way governments have handled the crisis, particularly in Europe (Beissinger and
Sasse, 2014; Kriesi, 2014). Whilst participating in a protest does not necessarily
entail membership in a formal association, protest movements are often associated
with more formal organizations that draw in participants. At the aggregate level,
a mobilization response would mean that on the whole civic engagement could be
expected to rise following the crisis in those countries which were negatively affected
by the crisis (H2.3). At the individual level, if those who were disproportionately
affected were more likely to be mobilized, we might see the unemployed and other
disadvantaged groups participate more than they would in non-crisis periods (H2.4).
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H2.3: In countries hit harder by the crisis, civic engagement will be more likely
to increase after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H2.4: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to participate in voluntary associations after the crisis.
If there is a mobilization response, one might also expect to see differences across
the different types of association, depending on whether citizens respond to the crisis
through the more conventional old social movement organizations, including parties
or unions, or by turning to protest politics facilitated by new social movement or-
ganizations. Furthermore, with many citizens facing extreme hardship, one might
expect a decline in membership of leisure-based associations, such as sporting, art, or
cultural groups, as these provide no means of response to the crisis, and perhaps be-
come a lower priority for those struggling with job insecurity, unemployment, home
foreclosures, or simply less disposable income. If citizens are mobilized by the crisis
to participate in associations, it would be expected that this would pertain only to
associations with a political orientation—which may provide an avenue of response
to the crisis (H2.5). Although, if there is no political mobilization as a result of
the crisis, it could be expected that resource constraints would lead to declines in
participation across the various association types (H2.6).
H2.5: After the crisis, membership in politically oriented voluntary associations
would increase, while it would decrease in recreational associations.
H2.6: After the crisis, voluntary association membership would decline across
all types of associations.
2.4 Political Protest
Political protest forms an important part of democratic politics, as one way in
which citizens may participate in the political process between elections. A few
decades ago, protest was classified as unconventional political behavior, which Kaase
and Marsh defined as ‘behavior that does not correspond to the norms of law and
custom that regulate political participation under a particular regime’ (1979a, p.
41). More recently, as more and more citizens participate in some form of protest,
with petitions being the most widely adopted, this ‘unconventional’ classification is
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no longer entirely reflective of the ubiquity of protest politics (Norris, 2002). Protest
is particularly a means of expression for the young, who tend to be less engaged in
the conventional forms of political activity including voting, though more likely to
engage in protest (Dalton, 2008).
Protest incorporates a wide range of political actions outside of the electoral
arena, ranging from petitions through to strikes, boycotts, and public demonstra-
tions. Of these activities some are more conventional than others, with a majority of
citizens in many advanced democracies having at some point signed a petition; fewer
citizens have joined a demonstration, one in four Americans for example, and fewer
still partake in more extreme actions like occupying buildings (Dalton, 2014, pp.
54–56). Protest provides an opportunity for citizens to feed into policy-making in
between elections by expressing discontent over government policy or performance,
or advocating for a particular cause.
How might political protest be affected by a major economic crisis? Existing
theoretical frameworks provide a number of potential explanations. The question of
who participates in protest has long interested researchers, and a range of approaches
have emerged to investigate the question (see Dalton et al., 2010; van Stekelenburg
and Klandermans, 2013, for an overview). Theoretical frameworks cover macro
explanations of the contextual factors that lead to the emergence of protest within
societies, as well as micro explanations of the characteristics of individuals who are
more likely to protest (Dalton et al., 2010; Norris, 2002). Models based on grievances,
resources, political opportunity structures, and values predominate, these will each
be discussed in turn.
Grievance theory views protest participation as a means for underprivileged
members of society to express their grievances. Gurr applied this argument firstly
at the contextual level, suggesting ‘the more widespread and intense deprivation
is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife’ (1968,
p. 1104), with his definition of ‘strife’ incorporating demonstrations, riots, strikes
and other political clashes. Then, in Why Men Rebel (1970) he makes the case at
the individual level, arguing that those who experience relative deprivation, defined
broadly as ‘perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their
value capabilities’ (p. 24)—in other words the feeling one receives less than that to
which they believe they are entitled—will increase the likelihood an individual will
participate in protest or violent rebellion. Lipsky similarly argued that protest was
‘a strategy utilized by relatively powerless groups in order to increase their bargain-
ing ability’ (1968, p. 1157). This theory has been challenged, with a range of studies
showing that those who protest are no more disadvantaged than those who do not,
and in many cases quite the reverse (see for example Norris et al., 2005; Dalton,
2014, pp. 74–75). If grievance theory is correct, the greater level of deprivation in
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the society as a whole following the onset of the economic crisis would result in a
greater prevalence of protest activity (H3.1). At the individual level, more citizens
would be experiencing relative deprivation and thus would be more likely to partic-
ipate in protest (H3.2).
H3.1: In countries hit harder by the crisis, political protest will be more likely to
increase after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H3.2: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to participate in political protest after the crisis.
Contrary to the grievances model above, resource theories argue that protest is
simply another political resource people may use in meeting their goals (Dalton,
2014). Within this framework it is those who are better off in society who partici-
pate more across a range of forms of participation, whether it be voting, engagement
in civic associations or political protest (Dalton, 2014; Norris, 2002; Verba et al.,
1995). Resources such as time, money, networks, and organizational skills developed
through education and professional occupations facilitate involvement in protest, as
with voting and campaign activity. Evidence from across a range of contexts sup-
ports this idea that protestors are highly educated and financially better off citizens
(Caren et al., 2011; Dalton, 2014; Inglehart, 1990; Norris et al., 2006). The resources
thesis challenges the stereotype of protestors as disaffected radicals developed dur-
ing the protest era of the sixties and seventies. Contrary to popular perceptions
of protestors as anti-system radicals, protest positively correlates with voting, and
various forms of civic participation including party membership, and belonging to
clubs (Norris, 2002, p. 195).
If resources theory is correct, following the onset of the crisis, more citizens will
be suffering the resource constraints typically associated with a lower likelihood of
protest participation. Therefore we might expect a downturn in political protest as
a function of disadvantage—the crisis caused greater levels of disadvantage, which
in turn could have led to a drop in protest activity (H3.3). At the individual level it
would be expected that the relationship between resources including education and
income would be positively related to participation in protest both before and after
the crisis (H3.4).
H3.3: In countries hit harder by the crisis, political protest will be more likely to
decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
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H3.4: Individuals with greater resources, such as those on higher incomes and
those with higher levels of education, will be more likely to participate in political
protest, before and after the crisis.
The next area to explore is the political opportunities approach. Within the
body of literature on social movements, scholars have argued that outbreaks of po-
litical protest within societies can be linked to variation in the political opportunity
structures. Tarrow makes the case that grievances are far more enduring than the
protest movements emerging as a result of them, thus grievances alone cannot be
said to explain for outbreaks of protest (1998, p. 71). Rather he argues:
What does vary widely from time to time and place to place are the
levels and types of opportunities people experience, the constraints on
their freedom of action, and the threats they perceive to their interests and
values... I argue that contention is more closely related to opportunities
for – and limited by constraints upon – collective action than by the
persistent social or economic factors that people experience. (Tarrow,
1998, p. 71)
The concept of political opportunity structures was initially introduced by Eisinger
(1973), and has been further developed by Tilly (1978), Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi et al.
(1995), Tarrow (1998), della Porta and Diani (1999), among numerous others. The
literature is divided however on what specific institutional arrangements are most
conducive to mobilization. Some argue open political structures, where protest is an
accepted form of political activity, and is tolerated by elites are most conducive to the
emergence of protest (Dalton et al., 2010; Tarrow, 1998). Others have argued that
closed systems are more conducive as the less access there is to conventional forms of
influencing the political process the more citizens will turn to unconventional forms
of political action such as protest (Kitschelt, 1986). A third group meanwhile has
suggested the relationship is actually curvilinear with a combination of open and
closed structures best facilitating the emergence of protest (Eisinger, 1973).
How might protest be affected by a financial crisis within the political opportu-
nities approach? One possibility would be government policy responses to the crisis
opening up opportunities for protest (Giugni and Lorenzini, 2014, p. 66). Amidst
the hardship that followed the crisis, governments across a range of countries in-
troduced austerity policies, cutting social services at a time when they were under
greater demand. Existing work on the crisis suggests it was the introduction of aus-
terity policies, rather than the crisis per se that led to specific protest mobilizations
(Bermeo and Bartels, 2014; Kriesi, 2014). If the introduction of these policies cre-
ated an opening of political opportunities, we would expect to see a greater degree
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of protest in countries that introduced austerity policies (H3.5).
H3.5: In countries that introduced austerity policies, political protest will be more
likely to increase.
The final approach to consider is the role of values in shaping protest participa-
tion. Inglehart’s value change thesis argues that citizens’ value orientations are
shaped by economic conditions, and that changing value orientations have flow
on effects for political behavior, including protest (1971; 1977; 1981; 1997). As
economies grew, Inglehart identified a global shift away from materialist values—
centered around survival, security, and fulfilling basic needs, towards postmaterialist
values—where material concerns are taken for granted and focus is given to higher-
level concerns such as ‘freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life’ (Abramson
and Inglehart, 1995, p. 1). This body of work suggests that economic develop-
ment is conducive to the spread of postmaterialist values, and economic decline, the
reverse (Inglehart, 1981, p. 881). A rise in postmaterialism has been linked to a
rise in protest, as postmaterialists tend to have more time and energy available for
political action, are more challenging of the status quo, and their concerns tend to
be neglected by governments (Inglehart, 1981, p. 890).
Given the links between economic conditions, postmaterialist values, and protest
activity, this relationship is worth re-examining in the context of a major economic
crisis. If levels of postmaterialism have been affected by the global financial crisis,
as might be expected from the theory, this would presumably have flow on effects to
protest activity. If we assume that there will be a drop in postmaterialism (H3.6),
we can construct two sets of hypotheses for the flow on effects to political protest.
If postmaterialism remains similarly correlated with protest activity after the crisis,
we could expect to see a drop in protest activity to accompany the drop in postma-
terialist values. In this scenario, as more people adopt materialist value orientations,
they prioritise matters of survival and security and have less energy available to de-
vote to political activities such as protest (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1979, p. 345).
Thus it remains the diminishing numbers of postmaterialists that are more likely to
protest, and as their numbers decline so does participation in protest (H3.7-3.8).
H3.6: In countries hit harder by the crisis, postmaterialism will be more likely to
decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H3.7: Those with postmaterialist values will be more likely to participate in
protest, before and after the crisis.
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H3.8: In countries hit harder by the crisis, protest would be more likely to decline
after the crisis as a function of a decline in postmaterialism.
In contrast, an alternate hypothesis would suggest that growing numbers of ma-
terialists would become more likely to protest following the financial crisis, and that
protest becomes more widespread as a result. One of the reasons Inglehart gives
for the relationship between postmaterialism and protest, is that governments have
tended to prioritise materialist concerns—meaning materialists’ concerns are more
often addressed by government (1979, p. 345). It was therefore postmaterialists that
needed to go outside of conventional modes of participation to have a voice (1979,
p. 345). Under the conditions of a major economic crisis resulting in rising unem-
ployment, home foreclosures, and a loss of economic security it could be said that
materialists’ concerns are not being met by governments. In these circumstances
it is foreseeable that materialists may be more likely to go outside of the electoral
process to express their discontent (H3.9). Previous research shows protest activ-
ity to be strongly correlated with postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 312–315),
but if materialists increasingly turn to protest we would expect this relationship to
weaken. Further, we might see a rise in protest activity as numbers of dissatisfied
materialists increase in response to conditions such as unemployment and loss of
financial security (H3.10).
H3.9: Those with materialist values will be more likely to participate in protest
after the crisis, compared to before the crisis.
H3.10: In countries hit harder by the crisis, political protest will be more likely to
increase after the crisis as result of those with materialist values protesting more.
2.5 Democratic Support
The final aspect of citizen politics to be examined is attitudinal rather than behav-
ioral, specifically, citizen support for a democratic political system. Public support
for democracy is an important indicator of the health of democratic societies, as ac-
ceptance of and support for the political system lends it legitimacy and contributes
to democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996a). A major economic crisis may
diminish public support for democracy in a number of ways, particularly in newer
democracies where democracy may not yet be considered ‘the only game in town’
(Linz and Stepan, 1996b, p. 15). Maintaining democratic support matters as it
is public support for the regime, that lends democracies legitimacy and prevents
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democratic reversals.
A wide body of literature examines the relationship between economic condi-
tions and democracy (see for instance Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Burkhart and
Lewis-Beck, 1994; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Whilst empirical
findings are mixed as to whether economic development causes democracy, it is
generally established that economic development sustains democracy (Przeworski
and Limongi, 1997). Economic prosperity lends legitimacy to regimes, whereas eco-
nomic shocks have the potential to undermine support for the system, whatever that
system may be. Many authoritarian regimes have enjoyed legitimacy bestowed by
economic progress, such as the Soviet Union and Indonesia under Suharto. When
financial crises hit this legitimacy can be lost, as happened during the Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis that helped usher in Indonesia’s transition to democracy (Pepinsky,
2009). There are many other examples where economic crises have triggered demo-
cratic transitions including Argentina, Bolivia, and the Philippines (Teorell, 2010,
pp. 70–76).
Similarly, good economic conditions provide legitimacy to democracies, and eco-
nomic crises can undermine support for democracy, particularly in newer democra-
cies as citizens may blame poor economic conditions on the political system rather
than the incumbent government (Fish and Wittenberg, 2009; Linz and Stepan,
1996a, p. 254). A severe example of this is Germany’s Weimar Republic. In the
context of the Great Depression Germans gave increasing support to Hitler’s Nazi
party, which ultimately led to the democratic Weimer Republic’s collapse and the
tragedy of the Holocaust. Over the same time period amidst the depression there
were several other democratic reversals in Europe and South America (Diamond,
2011). In a large scale cross-national analysis Przeworski and colleagues find that a
drop in economic growth is associated with a threefold increase in the likelihood of
a democratic reversal (2000).
One way in which economic crises can undermine democracy, is through under-
mining public support for a democratic political system. This support is essential
for sustaining democracy, forming one of the three pillars of democratic consolida-
tion as described by Linz and Stepan (1996a). They outline behavioral, attitudinal,
and constitutional dimensions of democratic consolidation, the process by which
democracy comes to be considered ‘the only game in town’ (1996a). The attitudinal
dimension of democratic support is defined as follows:
Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority
of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institu-
tions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society
such as theirs and when the support for anti-system alternatives is quite
small. (Linz and Stepan, 1996a, p. 6)
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As the greatest economic shock since the ‘third wave’ of democratization (Hunting-
ton, 1991), the global financial crisis poses a threat to democratic consolidation in
newer democracies.
Understanding the concept of democratic support draws upon a rich body of lit-
erature. Easton’s work began to map out different dimensions of political support—
distinguishing specific and diffuse political support (1975). Specific support relates
to confidence in specific government authorities, including public officials and in-
stitutions, whereas diffuse support refers to ‘support that underlies the regime as
a whole and the political community’ (Easton, 1975, p. 445). So one can be dis-
satisfied with the performance of parliament, for example, but still be supportive
of the democratic political regime. He argued that diffuse support was less sus-
ceptible to short term changes (Easton, 1975, p. 444). A range of studies have
built upon this framework (for example Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2011, 1999c). Norris
(1999c) set objects of support on a continuum from the most specific to the most
diffuse, including political actors, regime institutions, regime performance, regime
principles, and the political community (p. 10). The distinction between specific
support and diffuse support has been validated through various empirical studies
which find either no correlation or at most a weak relationship between democratic
satisfaction and democratic support (Huang et al., 2008; Klingemann, 1999, 2014).
It is the more enduring dimension of democratic support (a type of diffuse support)
that this thesis is focussed on.
As well as distinguishing types of political support researchers have sought to
explain support for a democratic political system through a number of different
approaches. This includes an institutional approach which suggests the design of
democratic institutions may facilitate or limit support for democracy (Anderson and
Guillory, 1997; Huang et al., 2008; Norris, 1999a). Anderson and Guillory (1997)
find that those who lose out from electoral competition are less satisfied with democ-
racy, and the gap between winners and losers is greater in majoritarian systems than
in consensual systems. Norris (1999a) similarly concluded that political institutions
and support of incumbents mattered for institutional confidence. The role of insti-
tutions was also explored by Huang et al. (2008), who found that the presence of
political institutions, and political participation within them, over time played an
educative role boosting support (p. 59).
There are also cultural approaches that suggest democratic attitudes are some-
thing that is built up over long periods of time, through processes of socialization
and economic development (Huang et al., 2008; Inglehart, 1997). The broad societal
changes as a country develops, including rising standards of living, and increasing
access to education, lead the way for democratic attitudes to emerge and become
stable over time (Inglehart, 1997). In line with this theory, much of the research
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shows democratic support and related measures such as confidence in democratic in-
stitutions, tend to be highest in countries that have been democratic for the longest
time period (Norris, 2011, p. 95; McAllister, 1999; Shin and Wells, 2005).
Another approach is concerned with the effect of government performance on
democratic support. This would be the relevant theory to test in the context of a
major economic crisis. Government performance can be narrowly defined as pertain-
ing to economic performance, or more broadly defined to incorporate other aspects
of government performance such as ‘political goods’ (Norris, 1999a, p. 218; Huang
et al., 2008, p. 59). Much of the existing work suggests that economic conditions
have minimal impact on democratic support (Dalton, 2004; Huang et al., 2008), and
institutional confidence (McAllister, 1999), though these analyses were conducted
during periods of relatively ordinary fluctuations in economic conditions, minimizing
variation in the extent of economic differences. Other studies find that in terms of
government performance it is the provision of political goods, including democratic
freedoms, government effectiveness and the absence of corruption, rather than eco-
nomic goods that helps explain support for democracy (Anderson and Tverdova,
2003; Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Huang et al., 2008;
Magalha˜es, 2014). In all, it is political experience, including the length of a coun-
try’s experience of democracy, that tends to be a bigger factor in democratic support
(Evans and Whitefield, 1995; McAllister, 1999).
A few recent studies investigate the role of government economic performance
in the crisis context. Rose and Mishler (2010) find that in Russia the economic
shock of the financial crisis, led to drop in regime support of 10 percentage points,
which they assessed was what would be expected based on the relationship between
economic evaluations and regime support in ordinary times (pp. 54-55). McAllister
and White (2011) using different measures, find that economic performance had
limited effects on democratic support in Russia, which may be related to specifics
of the Russian case such as a history of economic crises.
The research on democratic support, and more broadly political support, can
be hard to compare as studies use a wide range of measures which do not lead to
consistent results. Moreover, there are challenges fielding the same questions in a
range of country contexts, translated into different languages (Chu et al., 2008, p.
241). Various studies show that when support for democracy is operationalized as
the favorability of democracy as an abstract concept, the proportion of respondents
who are supportive is similarly high in countries across all world regions, and covering
different types of political systems from established democracies right through to
autocracies (Norris, 2011, p. 93; Klingemann, 1999, p. 45). Measures of democratic
support that incorporate rejection of anti-democratic alternatives, allow for specific
comparisons between democracy and a previous non-democratic regime, or take
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account of support for procedural aspects of democracy, reveal a more nuanced
picture (Norris, 2011, p. 95; Mishler and Rose, 1999, p. 82; Shin and Wells, 2005).
When more robust measures are used differences emerge showing that citizens of
older democracies are much more supportive of democracy, than those living in
newer democracies or autocracies.
Given what we know about the economy and democratic support, what would
the implications be in the context of the global financial crisis? Blame attribution
is one mechanism by which economic decline may undermine support for democ-
racy (McAllister and White, 2011). In established democracies people tend towards
blaming the incumbent government for economic conditions rather than democ-
racy per se, as democracy has become consolidated to the point where it enjoys
widespread support and acceptance. In newer democracies on the other hand, older
citizens may still have memories of the former regime, and when economic strife
occurs, they may question whether democracy really is the best system of gover-
nance and look favourably upon the former regime (McAllister and White, 2011,
p. 489; Mishler and Rose, 1999). In newer democracies, even absent any financial
challenges, support for democracy is lower than in the established democracies and
this support is more vulnerable to poor economic conditions (McAllister and White,
2011, pp. 488–489). On the basis of this reasoning we would expect support for
democracy to drop in newer democracies after the global financial crisis (H4.1).
The magnitude of the crisis also provides an opportunity to test whether public
support for democracy can be shaken even in the established democracies. The
conventional wisdom suggests that support for democracy should remain strong in
the consolidated democracies ‘even in the midst of major economic problems’ (Linz
and Stepan, 1996a, p. 16). The longer a country has been democratic, the more
time citizens have had to transition from authoritarian to democratic mindsets (Shin
and Wells, 2005), and the greater the proportion of its citizens who have lived their
entire lives within a democratic political system. However, as this is the greatest
economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, there is no recent precedent
to know what the effect of a financial shock of this scale will be. The severe nature of
the recent crisis provides an unprecedented opportunity to test whether support for
democracy really does remain strong in established democracies, in the context of a
major crisis which goes well beyond regular fluctuations in economic performance.
Thus an alternate hypothesis would be that support for democracy declines in both
new and established democracies as a result of the severity of the crisis (H4.2).
To the extent that these effects take place we might expect countries harder hit
by the crisis to suffer greater losses in democratic support (H4.3). At the individ-
ual level, it might be expected that those experiencing greater financial hardship,
such as the unemployed and those on low incomes, would become less supportive of
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democracy than those who are still getting by relatively comfortably (H4.4) (McAl-
lister and White, 2011, p. 482).
H4.1: After the crisis support for democracy would be more likely to decline in
newer democracies.
H4.2: After the crisis support for democracy declines across both new and old
democracies.
H4.3: In countries harder hit by the crisis, support for democracy will be more
likely to decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H4.4: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be less sup-
portive of democracy after the crisis.
Another way in which the crisis may have affected democratic support, is through
the role of international actors interfering in national politics. The effect of this in-
ternational interference has been investigated in two recent studies, although the
findings point in opposite directions. Armingeon and Guthmann (2014) make the
case that the interference of external actors including international organizations and
markets, may undermine support for national democracy by interfering in domestic
politics. The International Monetary Fund’s role, imposing policies as conditions for
receiving loans, takes some power away from the domestic decision making process
and places it in the hands of unaccountable organizations. Armingeon and Guth-
mann argue this interference in conjunction with declining economic circumstances
is resulting in lower support for democracy in a study of 26 European countries over
2007 to 2011 (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014, p. 423). This leads to the hypothe-
sis that support for democracy would decline in countries affected by the bailouts in
the European Union (H4.5). However, Cordero and S´ımon, in a study of European
countries over 2012 to 2013, find that negative economic evaluations are associated
with lower support for democracy, except where countries received bailouts from
the IMF and European Union, in which case the relationship was reversed (2016,
pp. 319–320). They argue the international interventions increased the salience of
democracy in affected countries, and thus increased democratic support. This leads
to a competing hypothesis, whereby the IMF or EU bailouts would lead to greater
support for democracy (H4.6).
H4.5: In countries that received conditional loans from the IMF or the EU after
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the crisis, support for democracy will be more likely to decline.
H4.6: In countries that received conditional loans from the IMF or the EU after
the crisis, support for democracy will be more likely to increase.
2.6 Conclusion
The global financial crisis provided a considerable shock to the economies of most
countries around the world, and to the people who live within them. The effects of
this crisis on how citizens engage in the political process remains a puzzle. Whilst the
relationships between economic conditions and various aspects of political behavior
and attitudes have been extensively studied during ordinary times, we have little
precedent to understand how these relationships manifest in the case of a major
economic crisis on the scale of the global financial crisis that began in 2008. The crisis
is the greatest since the Great Depression of the 1930s; since that time we have seen
advances in democratic governance around the world as well as the advent of cross-
national public opinion surveys that enable the study of democratic attitudes and
behaviors across time and between countries. These data facilitate the exploration
of these relationships in the circumstances of a major economic crisis.
This chapter has outlined at times competing theories as to how various dimen-
sions of political behavior, and democratic support, might be affected by a major
financial crisis. These theories draw upon existing research linking economic con-
ditions and various aspects of politics. Looking first at voting behavior, theories
of voter mobilization and economic voting were explored to map out how citizens’
votes might be affected by a major crisis in terms of whether or not to vote and
who to vote for. Potential effects of the crisis on participation in voluntary as-
sociations, or civic engagement, were conceptualized in terms of a mobilization or
retreat response, drawing upon the inequality of participation literature. In explor-
ing potential ways that protest might be affected by crisis, the chapter touched on
grievances, resources, political opportunities, and values approaches explored previ-
ously in the literature. Finally, potential ramifications for democratic support were
viewed through the lense of blame attribution, which would particularly affect newer
democracies, as well as an international actors model. Alongside development of the
theoretical framework, this chapter has reviewed empirical evidence emerging from
other studies of the recent crisis.
The next chapter will discuss the data sources and methodological approach used
to test the hypotheses introduced in this chapter. Then chapters four to seven will
test these hypotheses using cross-national survey data from before and after the
crisis. Chapter 4 will investigate the effects of the crisis on voting behavior, both
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voter mobilization and vote choice. Chapter 5 then looks at civic engagement, to
test the competing hypotheses regarding a mobilization or retreat response. Chapter
6 tests the various hypotheses on political protest, and Chapter 7 will cover the
attitudinal measure of support for a democratic political system.
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Chapter 3
Data and Methodology
How can one investigate empirically the impacts of the global financial crisis on
political behavior and values? Building on the discussion of the previous chapter,
which explored and developed theoretical explanations as to how citizens might
respond to a major economic crisis, this chapter develops an approach to test these
theories empirically. The chapter begins by outlining the data sources used in this
study, the World Values Survey and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems,
and why these surveys have been selected. This discussion includes developing a
research design that will enable comparisons to be made from before and after the
crisis, and between countries affected to varying degrees by the crisis. Next are
details on the selection of country cases from within the two datasets. The chapter
then provides an overview of the measures to capture the key independent and
dependent variables. Finally, it covers the methodological approaches employed to
conduct the analysis.
3.1 Data
In seeking to test the effects of the crisis on citizen political behavior and democratic
values I sought data which would meet three criteria. Firstly, the data needed to
measure the key dependent variables in question, including the three dimensions of
political behavior: voting behavior, civic engagement and political protest, as well
as democratic support. Secondly, the source of evidence needed to explore these
same measures over time, capturing time points before and after the crisis hit, to
enable an investigation of the impact the crisis may have had on these measures.
Thirdly, the source of evidence needed to provide contextual variation by testing
the same measures across countries that were hit by the financial crisis to varying
degrees, to enable an investigation of how the degree of crisis impact influenced
behavior and attitudes. Two main datasets were identified that together meet these
criteria: the World Values Survey, which covers civic engagement, political protest
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and democratic support; and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems which
provides data on electoral behavior, including vote choice and turnout.
By meeting these three criteria, this study is taking a quasi-experimental ap-
proach, whereby we have evidence on the dependent variables from before and after
the experimental treatment, the crisis, was applied (see Shadish et al., 2002). Whilst
the crisis affected all countries to some degree, there were considerable differences in
the extent to which different countries were affected. Some countries like Australia
managed to avoid experiencing a recession, while others experienced deep recessions
and dramatic increases in unemployment. These differences facilitate comparison
between countries, as well as within countries over time. Unlike a true experiment—
which is not feasible to conduct in the case of global economic conditions—there was
no random assignment to determine the crisis effects in different countries, so the
existing differences between countries need to be taken into account.
The WVS is a cross-national survey of public opinion which has been fielded in
almost 100 countries since 1981. The surveys cover a wide range of different countries
incorporating different regions, political systems, levels of economic development,
and culture. The surveys undertaken to date have been fielded across six waves, with
the most recent wave covering the period from 2010 to 2014. The WVS typically
samples at least 1000 respondents per country, with an average sample size of 1505
per country in the most recent wave.
The WVS has been selected to investigate the effects of the financial crisis on
political behavior and democratic support for several reasons. Firstly, the survey
measures the key variables of interest. In particular, the WVS provides questions
from which a robust measure for democratic support can be constructed that inves-
tigates both support for democracy and rejection of its alternatives.1 The WVS also
provides measures for a range of different protest activities, in addition to participa-
tion across a suite of civic groups. The WVS is less well suited to assessing electoral
behavior however, as the timing of the surveys does not necessarily coincide with
elections, reducing the validity of items designed to tap vote preferences. For this
reason the analysis of the WVS will be complemented with analysis from the CSES
as will be detailed further within this chapter.
Secondly, the timing of the WVS is suitable for assessing the impacts of the
global financial crisis. The two most recent waves were fielded over 2004 to 2007,
and 2010 to 2014 respectively. This provides data for comparing indicators of citizen
engagement in politics and democratic support from both before and after the crisis
hit in 2008 (see Figure 3.1). The final reason for selecting the WVS is the breadth
of countries incorporated in the WVS, not limited by region, culture, or political
1See Shin and Wells (2005) for a discussion of why measures of democratic support should
incorporate rejection of authoritarian alternatives.
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system. This facilitates an analysis of the effects of the crisis broadly, rather than
confined to the much studied advanced Western democracies. It enables an assess-
ment of how contextual factors such as the severity of the crisis and democratic
experience affect citizen responses to the crisis.
Figure 3.1: World Values Survey Field Dates and OECD Economic Conditions
Note: The shading shows the timing of the WVS in the countries incorporated in the
previous two waves. Wave 5 spans 2004 to 2007, (beginning with New Zealand in August
2004, ending with Spain in July 2007), Wave 6 spans 2010 to 2013 (beginning with South
Korea in February of 2010 and ending with Germany in November 2013).
Sources: GDP Growth and Unemployment data from the OECD (2016a; 2016b); Survey
timing from the WVS (2017).
The CSES is an ongoing collaborative project that began in 1996 and involves
the participation of election teams in over 50 countries who have fielded a common
module of questions in a post-election survey. Many national election teams have
deposited data over multiple waves which facilitates an examination of voting be-
havior from before and after the crisis. Due to the targeted nature and timing of the
survey, this dataset provides valid measures of electoral behavior as a complement to
the other indicators including protest and democratic support better assessed by the
WVS. Module 3, which was fielded from 2006–2011, includes over forty countries.
Of those, about a third of the countries had run the CSES module before and after
2007, which marked the onset of the global financial crisis.
Other than the measures of voting behavior it provides, the CSES has been
selected for similar reasons to the WVS. The timing of surveys, covering elections
preceding, during and after the financial crisis, enables a comparison of citizen voting
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behavior from before and after the crisis began. The CSES also covers a wide range
of countries not limited to a particular region. The coverage of the two surveys
differs though there is some overlap.
Whilst most of the data used in this thesis comes from the WVS and the CSES,
data from a range of additional sources has been incorporated. The inclusion of data
from additional sources serves three purposes: first, to supplement the analyses with
the primary datasets where it is not possible to test all hypotheses with the WVS
or CSES data; second, to provide country level data for analyses at the aggregate
level; and third, to provide contextual variables for inclusion in multilevel models.
Data from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) is used in
Chapter 6 on political protest to investigate hypotheses regarding the effects of
austerity policies in Europe. The data tracks the number of protest demonstrations
cross-nationally, providing a complement to the data on individual level protest
participation in the WVS. Chapter 7 on democratic support meanwhile utilizes
European Social Survey (ESS) data on democratic satisfaction and support within
Europe to facilitate investigations of political support in the context of the European
sovereign debt crisis. Both chapters 6 and 7 supplement the trends over time in
protest and democratic support from the WVS, with data from the European Values
Study (EVS) where it has fielded the same question items.
Country level indicators are taken from the World Bank, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International IDEA (2017), the
Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Parline Database on national parliaments, Freedom
House’s country classifications (2016), Pippa Norris’ Democracy Cross-National
Data (2015), and Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2016a). This includes data on GDP
growth, unemployment, and other economic indicators from the World Bank (2015a;
2015b). Data on electoral outcomes, including seats in parliament, are taken from
Parline (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014). International IDEA (2017) provides offi-
cial voter turnout data. Variables regarding each country’s experience with democ-
racy are obtained from the Democracy Cross-National Data (Norris, 2015) and Polity
IV (Marshall et al., 2016a).
3.2 Case Selection
In order to make comparisons within and across countries over time, it is necessary
to have data for the same countries from both before and after the crisis commenced
in 2008. The sample of countries incorporated in the WVS varies from wave to wave,
presenting challenges for tracking trends over time across a large group of countries.
It is therefore necessary to take a subset of countries covered in the relevant survey
waves. The two most recent waves of the WVS (Waves 5 and 6), covering 2004 to
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2007 and 2010 to 2014 respectively, provide a snapshot from before and after the
crisis hit. Taking these two most recent waves leaves 31 countries that have been
incorporated in both, 18 of which can be considered democracies—as indicated by a
free classification in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report (2016). Whilst
tracking trends over a longer period of time would be desirable, incorporating three
time points from the previous three waves of the survey would reduce the number
of countries to 14 in total, or just seven democratic countries. Thus, to increase the
sample size, which improves the statistical models and enhances external validity,
the selection is based on those fielded in the previous two waves.
The sample included in the analysis is limited to democratic countries as there
is a wider range of factors that would be influencing citizen participation in politics
and attitudes towards democracy in non-democratic countries. For one thing polit-
ical participation in non-democracies or partial democracies is restricted to varying
degrees and citizens do not necessarily have the opportunity to participate in free
and fair elections, to freedom of association, or the right to protest against the
government, the critical dimensions investigated in this study. Thus investigating
the impact of the crisis across a range of political systems it becomes increasingly
difficult to separate the effects of the crisis from numerous other factors in play.
Keeping the sample to countries which have similar political rights and civil liber-
ties facilitates an analysis of how citizens in democracies responded to the crisis.
Nevertheless, the impact of the global financial crisis on citizen political attitudes
and behaviors in non-democracies remains an interesting topic of study though this
is left to future studies with research designs better suited to this task.
The above approach leaves 18 democratic countries to be included in this study,
incorporating all democratic countries which were fielded in the previous two WVS
waves (see Table 3.1). This includes countries that were hard hit by the crisis,
and fell into recession, including Spain and the United States, and those that were
relatively unaffected such as Australia. This facilitates the comparison of citizen
responses to the crisis in countries which were badly affected by the crisis and
those which were not. Countries with a long history of democracy are included
alongside those which democratized more recently such as Spain and South Korea,
enabling an investigation of whether democratic behaviors and attitudes are more
fragile to economic shocks in consolidating democracies than they are in established
democracies.
For the chapter of this study that uses data from the CSES a similar approach
to case selection is adopted. The CSES data provides an opportunity to compare
trends in political mobilization and economic voting from before and after the global
financial crisis hit in 2008, across a diverse set of countries. In order to provide a
sufficient comparison between elections before and after the financial crisis I restrict
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Table 3.1: World Values Survey Case Selection and Sample Size
Country Pre-Crisis Survey N Post-Crisis Survey N
Australia 2005 1,421 2012 1,477
Chile 2006 1,000 2011 1,000
Cyprus 2006 1,050 2011 1,000
Germany 2006 2,064 2013 2,046
Ghana 2007 1,534 2011 1,552
Japan 2005 1,096 2010 2,443
Netherlands 2006 1,050 2012 1,902
New Zealand 2004 954 2011 841
Peru 2006 1,500 2012 1,210
Poland 2005 1,000 2012 966
Romania 2005 1,776 2012 1,503
Slovenia 2005 1,037 2011 1,069
South Korea 2005 1,200 2010 1,200
Spain 2007 1,200 2011 1,189
Sweden 2006 1,003 2011 1,206
Trinidad and Tobago 2006 1,002 2011 999
United States 2006 1,249 2011 2,232
Uruguay 2006 1,000 2011 1,000
Total 22,136 24,835
Note: Shaded countries experienced a recession during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009,
defined as two or more consecutive quarters of negative growth.
Source: WVS technical reports: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp
the analysis to countries that fielded at least two election studies prior to 2008. In
addition, countries are only included where the data is for similar elections across
time—either presidential or parliamentary—so that like can be compared with like.
This leaves us with a sample of 45 elections in 13 countries between 1996 and 2011.
Table 3.2 provides a summary of the sample of countries and elections included in
the analysis, including the number of observations in each election study. As is
evident from Table 3.2, the sample includes elections from a diverse set of countries
that include both established democracies, such as the United States, Germany,
Finland and New Zealand and newer democracies such as the Czech Republic and
Brazil. Five countries overlap across the two datasets, specifically Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and the United States, although the timing and
nature of the surveys differs. Unlike the WVS countries, all countries that can
be incorporated from the CSES (as per the above criteria) experienced a recession
during the economic crisis of 2008 to 2009. There remain significant differences in
the extent of crisis impact between these countries however, enabling an assessment
of the effects of the crisis.
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Table 3.2: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Case Selection and Sample Size
Country Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Elections Elections
N N N N
Brazil 2002 2,514 2006 1,000 2010 2,000
Canada 1997 1,851 2004 1,674 2008 4,495
Czech Republic 1996 1,229 2002 948 2006 2,002 2010 1,857
Finland 2003 1,196 2007 1,283 2011 1,298
Germany 1998 2,019 2002 2,000 2005 2,018 2009 2,095
Iceland 1999 1,631 2003 1,446 2007 1,595 2009 1,385
Netherlands 1998 2,101 2002 1,574 2006 2,359 2010 2,153
New Zealand 1996 4,080 2002 1,741 2008 1,149
Norway 1997 2,055 2001 2,052 2005 2,012 2009 1,782
Portugal 2002 2,606 2005 2,801 2009 1,316
Slovenia 1996 2,031 2004 1,002 2008 1,055
Spain 1996 1,212 2000 1,208 2004 1,212 2008 1,204
United States 1996 1,534 2004 1,066 2008 2,102
Total (Pre-Crisis) 57,052 23,891
Note: All these countries experienced a recession during the global financial crisis of 2008–
2009, defined as two or more consecutive quarters of negative growth.
Source: CSES (2013b,c,d).
3.3 Measurement and Variables
This section introduces the major variables that will be used in this study. Firstly
the dependent variables for each chapter are covered, followed by a discussion of the
independent variables, first at the country level, and then at the individual level.
Cross-national survey data consists of individuals nested within country contexts,
enabling analysis at both levels. The multilevel structure of the data will be dis-
cussed further in the subsequent section. What follows is an overview of what the
main variables are, why they have been chosen, and how they are measured. There
are five dependent variables investigated in this study, including four dimensions of
political behavior: turnout, vote choice, civic engagement, and political protest, in
addition to democratic support. A list of variables, coding and means is shown in
Table 3.1. This covers the main variables used throughout this thesis, where addi-
tional variables are used in a particular chapter, details will be provided within that
chapter on measurement and coding.
Turnout The turnout measure is based on responses to a question asked in the
CSES regarding whether the respondent cast a ballot in the most recent election.
Research findings indicate that this can be an unreliable measure, given the social
desirability of voting there is a tendency to provide a positive response to this
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Table 3.1: World Values Survey – Variables, scoring, and means
Wave 5 (2004–2007) Wave 6 (2010–2013)
Variable Codes Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent Variables
Civic Engagement Scale from 0 (low) to 18 (high) 2.45 2.84 2.41 2.74
Protest Scale from 0 (low) to 3 (high) 1.19 0.91 1.18 0.89
Democratic Support Scale from 0 (low) to 12 (high) 8.30 2.29 8.28 2.26
Independent Variables (Country level)
Log of years democracy From PolityIV-durable (Norris 2015) 3.31 1.04 3.72 0.86
GDP growth Average Annual % 2003–2004 / 2008–2009 3.92 2.33 0.31 2.84
Unemployment Average Annual %: 2003–2004 / 2008–2009 7.37 3.33 6.10 2.56
Historically Protestant 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49
Independent Variables (Individual level)
Income Scale from 1 (lowest income category) to 10
(highest income category)
4.73 2.35 4.81 2.08
Unemployed 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.25
University degree 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.15 0.35 0.21 0.41
Gender (female) 1 = female, 0 = male 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
Age range 1 = 18–29, 2 = 30–49, 3 = 50 and over 2.16 0.78 2.24 0.78
Married 1 = married, 0 = not married 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.49
Trust 1 = most people can be trusted, 0 = need to
be very careful
0.27 0.45 0.31 0.46
Religious 1 = religious, 0 = not religious / an atheist 0.63 0.48 0.58 0.49
Postmaterialist (12-item) 0 = materialist, 2–4 = mixed, 5 = postma-
terialist
2.18 1.18 2.16 1.17
N 22,043 24,802
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question even when it is not the case (Karp and Brockington, 2005). Voters also
tend to be overrepresented in surveys due to response bias (Selb and Munzert, 2013).
In an effort to minimize misreporting, the CSES has asked that collaborators frame
questions in such a way that reduces this issue. In France, for instance, they ask
‘For one reason or another, lots of people abstain from voting in the first round of a
presidential election. Did you, personally, vote in the first round of the presidential
election, on last April 21?’ (CSES, 2007). The specific wording varies according to
the national context (see CSES, 2013).
Despite efforts to increase the validity of the turnout measure, self-reported
turnout in the CSES still exceeds official turnout figures from International IDEA
(Dahlberg and Solevid, 2016, p. 498). Some election studies now include validated
turnout measures by cross-checking responses with voting records (Belli et al., 2001;
British Election Study, 2016). As the CSES does not include a validated turnout
measure, the analyses will rely on self-reported turnout. The use of the self-reported
turnout measure means that there will be less variation in the dependent variable
than would be the true distribution in the population (Dahlberg and Solevid, 2016).
Existing research shows that overreporters sit somewhere in between admitted non-
voters and validated voters in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, political
interest, party strength and political knowledge (Belli et al., 2001, p. 490). The
self-reported turnout measure should therefore provide a more conservative test of
the hypotheses, as some non-voters are inevitably recorded as voters.
Vote Choice Vote for the incumbent is measured as a dichotomous variable using
responses to the vote choice question asked by the CSES. A vote for the incumbent
is considered to be a vote for the party of the incumbent President or Prime Minister
(or party of the Chancellor in the case of Germany); a vote for the opposition is for
those who voted for any party other than that of the incumbent President or Prime
Minister. Non-voters are excluded from the analysis. The specific wording varies
from country to country as it is tailored to the national election type (see CSES,
2013 for details).
Civic Engagement Civic engagement is constructed using Norris’ index of asso-
ciational activism, a scale weighting active and inactive membership across nine cat-
egories of voluntary organizations (2002, pp. 147–148). The scale ranges from zero
to 18, with active memberships contributing two points each to the scale, whereas
inactive memberships contribute one point.2 To differentiate different types of vol-
2Analyses will be tested with alternate measures of participation in voluntary associations
to test whether the results hold for different operationalizations of the dependent variable. The
alternative measures also come from Norris (2002, pp. 147–148) including a dichotomous measure
of whether a respondent has participated in any type of voluntary association, and an unweighted
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untary association, I also construct measures of membership in old and new social
movement organizations respectively (as per the approach of Schofer & Fourcade-
Gourinchas, 2001). Old social movement membership includes membership in ei-
ther a union, a political party, or a professional association, with active and inactive
memberships weighted to produce a scale ranging from zero to six. New social move-
ment membership reflects membership in either an environmental organization or a
humanitarian/charitable organization and is weighted similarly resulting in a scale
from zero to four.
These measures of civic engagement, whilst providing a good indication of vol-
untary association membership, do have some limitations. Firstly, they cannot
entirely reflect the total number of associational memberships a respondent has, as
the survey asks whether respondents have one or more memberships in each cate-
gory, meaning multiple memberships within the one category are not specified. It
also cannot reflect participation in informal networks.3 That said, the civic engage-
ment scale provides a good indicator of associational membership, and the overall
health of civil society. Similar operationalizations of the concept using the battery
of questions from the WVS are frequently used in studies which seek to capture
civic engagement, facilitating comparison with other works investigating the con-
cept (see for instance Curtis et al., 2001; Norris, 2002; Paxton, 2007; Schofer and
Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). The question wording is as follows:
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each
organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an
inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?
- Church or religious organization
- Sport or recreational organization
- Art, music or educational organization
- Labor Union
- Political party
- Environmental organization
- Professional association
- Humanitarian or charitable organization
- Consumer organization
- Other organization
(World Values Survey Association, 2012)
count of the number of associations a respondent is a member of.
3For a detailed overview of considerations for the measurement of civic engagement see Norris
(2002, pp. 140–153).
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Political Protest To measure political protest, I use the question items asked in
both waves of the WVS. The question wording remains consistent across the two
waves for three items, signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending peaceful
demonstrations. The question captures both protest activism, measured by ‘have
done’ responses, as well as protest potential, measured by ‘might do’ responses.
Factor analysis reveals that responses to these three items are highly inter-correlated,
meaning they can be combined into a single scale of protest. This scale is constructed
by adding up values across each of the items, with ‘have done’ responses scored as
1, ‘might do’ responses as 0.5, and ‘would never do’ responses as 0. This results in
an overall scale of protest ranging from 0 to 3, where 3 indicates the highest level of
protest activism. The measure draws upon the seminal Political Action Study that
advocates measuring protest potential as protest activity alone is ‘governed far more
by local political opportunity’ (Barnes and Kaase, 1979, pp. 57–96). The measure
also draws on Norris’ political activism scale, albeit Norris advocates the exclusion
of protest potential as a focus on those protest activities respondents have actually
participated in would provide ‘the most accurate and reliable indicator of protest
activism’ (2002, pp. 194–195). The question wording common to both waves is
outlined as follows:
I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take,
and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of
these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circum-
stances do it:
- signing a petition
- joining in boycotts
- attending peaceful demonstrations
(World Values Survey Association, 2012)
Democratic Support Support for democracy is measured using the four-item
battery in the WVS, which asks respondents to evaluate different ways of governing
the country, including a democratic political system, but also alternatives to democ-
racy such as having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament
and elections, having experts make decisions rather than government, and having the
army rule (see also Dalton, 2014; Inglehart, 2003; Norris, 1999c; Thomassen, 2007).
From these questions a measure is constructed that captures both democratic sup-
port and rejection of its alternatives, drawing upon the work of Shin and Wells
(2005). Factoring in non-democratic alternatives provides a more robust measure
of democratic support, as whilst asking about a democratic political system alone
attracts very high levels of support across a range of contexts, differences emerge
when measures incorporate the rejection of alternatives also (Shin and Wells, 2005,
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pp. 91–92). The measure which will be used as the dependent variable in the regres-
sion model is a 13-point scale of the combined responses to all four questions, where
higher scores represent greater support for democracy (adopted from McAllister and
White, 2014). The question wording is as follows:
I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what
you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one
would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way
of governing this country?
- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament
and elections
- Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what
they think is best for the country
- Having the army rule
- Having a democratic political system
(World Values Survey Association, 2012)
Measuring the effects of the crisis To measure the effects of the financial
crisis at the country level, I use measures of GDP growth and unemployment which
capture differences in crisis impact between countries. The GDP growth figures
are taken from the World Bank (2015a). Whilst the surveys in each wave of the
WVS were fielded at different times for each country, at varying points over 2010 to
2013 for the latter wave, economic growth rates have been taken for the same time
period for each country to capture differential effects of the economic crisis, which
hit hardest cross-nationally during 2008 to 2009. Thus I have taken the average
annual growth rate for those two years as the measure of GDP growth. This avoids
the growth figure being an artefact of the survey timing, rather than a reflection of
crisis impact in comparison to other countries. For the earlier wave of the survey, I
have taken the World Bank growth rates over 2003 to 2004, as an equivalent time
period for comparison two years prior to the first surveys being fielded. Similarly,
the unemployment figures are taken from the World Bank (2015b) over the same
period of time as the growth rates.
Country level controls In addition to the country level variables relating to
economic conditions, controls are incorporated to account for differences amongst
this diverse set of countries, and to reflect factors that previous research has demon-
strated relevant in predicting the dependent variables. This includes a country’s
experience with democracy. Years of democratic experience is calculated as the dif-
ference between the survey year, and the variable ‘PolityIV-durable’ from Norris’
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Democracy Cross-national Data (2015), which represents the latest regime transi-
tion date. As the distribution of years’ of democratic experience is positively skewed
this variable is log transformed in the regression models. Where relevant to the de-
pendent variable in question, additional country level controls are introduced within
each chapter.
Individual level predictors At the individual level I consider factors which
may indicate increased vulnerability to the financial crisis, as well as a range of
control variables from the WVS.4 Income is on a scale from one to ten, with ten
being the highest income category. Unemployment is coded dichotomously as those
who are unemployed, compared to everyone else, including those in employment,
retirees, stay–at–home parents, and students. Education dichotomously represents
those who completed a college degree or higher compared to everyone else. Age is
incorporated as deciles to avoid overly small regression coefficients. Gender is coded
dichotomously. Marital status incorporates those who are married or living together
in a de facto relationship. Existing research demonstrates that postmaterialism is
a factor influencing several of the dependent variables incorporated here including
civic engagement and protest (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Inglehart, 1977; Schofer and
Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). Postmaterialism is thus incorporated in a number of
the models, and is measured via the 12-item index (see Inglehart, 1977, pp. 39–41).
The index is derived from the answers to three, four-item lists about respondents’
top two priorities for the nation, with those focused on order and security coded as
materialist, and those focussed on higher level concerns such as freedom of speech
and quality of life coded as postmaterialist (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995, p. 1;
index details in Appendix A). This covers the variables used in most regression
models using the WVS data. Where additional variables are incorporated in a
particular model, this is detailed within the relevant chapter.5
3.4 Methods of Analysis
To conduct the analysis I use a range of quantitative methods. Stata14 is the
software program employed throughout this study. In the initial instance I use
descriptive statistics to provide insights as to how trends in political behavior and
democratic support have changed over time, across each country. This is done by
calculating country means for the various dependent variables from before and after
the onset of the crisis, and then comparing these aggregated indicators between
4Coding will be as similar as possible for the analysis using the CSES data. This will be
detailed in Chapter 5, the only chapter that uses the CSES data.
5See Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 for the coding of variables for the CSES.
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the two time points including a t-test for significant differences. Scatterplots are
also used as relevant to highlight relationships between these indicators and other
country level independent variables, such as democratic experience and economic
growth. This aggregated data is useful to provide a snapshot of overall trends in
each country, including assessing whether the indicators, such as political protest,
or democratic support, have increased or decreased over time.
An analysis of the aggregated data, whilst providing insights into the trends
across countries, is insufficient for investigating the theoretical relationships dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 for a number of reasons. Firstly the number of country cases
(18 from the WVS; 13 in the chapter using CSES data) is too low to support rigor-
ous assessment as to the relationships between national economic conditions and the
dependent variables. Second, relying on the aggregated data risks committing the
ecological fallacy, where inferences about individual level behavior are made from
group level data (Robson and Pevalin, 2016, p. 5; Snijders and Bosker, 2012, p. 15).
Finally, focussing solely on aggregated data would miss the richness of individual
level data contained within the WVS and CSES.
The data used in this study is hierarchical, consisting of individuals nested within
countries. To handle data of this nature, following the investigation of aggregate level
trends, multilevel modelling (sometimes referred to as hierarchical models or mixed
models) is employed to assess the role of individual and country level predictors on
the dependent variables. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models,
or other single-level regression models, is not appropriate in this case for a number
of reasons. As the data is grouped, with people within countries being similar to
one another in various respects, the assumption of independence of observations is
not met, rendering OLS regression unsuitable (Robson and Pevalin, 2016, p. 8).
Moreover, using OLS on grouped data has a tendency to reduce the standard errors
of estimates, meaning the results are prone to show statistically significant results
when this does not reflect the actual relationships (Robson and Pevalin, 2016, p. 17).
Using multilevel models therefore provides a more conservative test of the hypotheses
that is less likely to result in Type I errors (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, p. 219).
As a workaround to these problems it would be possible to run individual regressions
on the data for each country, though this becomes inefficient with the number of
cases here and also fails to provide any insight into the role of country level factors
including national economic conditions. With multilevel modelling it is possible to
avoid these pitfalls of using OLS or other single-level regression analysis on grouped
data, and further enables an assessment of the impact of both country and individual
level effects on the dependent variables (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Robson and
Pevalin, 2016; Snijders and Bosker, 2012).
The multilevel models employed consist of two levels, individuals are the level 1
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units, which are nested within countries, at level 2. Within each country, the data
provides a representative sample of the national population (whether from the WVS
or CSES). The WVS for each country has between 841 observations (New Zealand,
2011) and 2,443 observations (Japan, 2010), the average sample size is 1,305 per
country. The CSES covers similar numbers for each election study, ranging from
948 in the Czech Republic in 2002 to 4,495 in Canada in 2008. The average country
sample is 1799 observations. At the country level there are 18 countries within the
chapters that use the WVS data, and 13 countries in the voting behavior chapter
that utilizes the CSES, covering 45 elections.
There are debates over the necessary number of cases for using multilevel models.
The debates center on the number of level 2, or group units, as there are typically
far fewer groups than individuals within each group, as is the case here with a
large sample within each country across a smaller number of countries. Nezlek
(2008, p. 858) suggests 10 or more group level observations are suitable. Bryan
and Jenkins (2016, pp. 19–20) argue that 25 to 30 countries are required to avoid
imprecise estimates at the country level. The University of Bristol’s Centre for
Multilevel Modelling (2017) sums up the lack of clarity noting ‘rules of thumb such
as only doing multilevel modelling with 15 or 30 or 50 level 2 units can be found
and are often personal opinions based on personal experience and varying reasons’.
Numerous published works in political science employ multilevel models with similar
number of countries, or at times much fewer, than what will be used in this study
(for example see Armingeon and Scha¨del, 2015; Arzheimer, 2009; Karakoc, 2013;
Van der Meer et al., 2009; Weldon, 2006).
Whilst it would be ideal to have more cases, one must work within the limitations
of the data that are available. In this case the number of countries are restricted
by the need to have data for the same countries from before and after the crisis hit.
Multilevel modelling can be viewed as a superior methodology to simply ignoring
the multilevel structure of the data, which would be prone to the problems discussed
above, including greater likelihood of Type I errors (Robson and Pevalin, 2016, p.
22). Given the smaller number of countries the methodological literature suggests
some caution in setting up the model and interpreting level 2 predictors. Several
studies advise that with fewer level 2 units, one should avoid cross-level interactions
and adding in too many predictors at the country level due to the limited degrees
of freedom (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; Stegmueller, 2013, pp. 758–759; McNeish and
Stapleton, 2016, p. 296). Bryan and Jenkins also advocate for more descriptive
analysis of the country level data to supplement multilevel modelling (2016, p. 20).
The potential pitfalls discussed are avoided by limiting the number of country level
independent variables, developing simple models without cross-level interactions,
and providing descriptive analysis of the country level data prior to conducting mul-
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tilevel models. It is also worth noting that whilst some caution should be exercised
in interpreting the country level coefficients given the small number of level 2 cases,
given a large number of level 1 units within each country one can be confident in
the estimates of individual level predictors (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016).
There are a number of methodological decisions to be made in specifying each
model. In some applications of multilevel models it is common to center predictors,
either on the grand mean, or the group mean (Enders and Tofighi, 2007), however in
cases where it is not necessary to discuss the intercepts there is no need for centring
(Robson and Pevalin, 2016, p. 120). Moreover this is common practice in political
science applications to use the raw metrics without centring (see for instance Barnes
and Co´rdova, 2016). As there is no need for discussing the intercepts in this study,
the raw metrics are used rather than centered variables.
The nature of the dependent variable differs in each chapter, as such several types
of multilevel models are employed. For the voting behavior chapter both turnout
and vote choice are operationalized dichotomously, as such a multilevel logistic re-
gression is used, with the command gllamm.6 For the chapter on civic engagement a
multilevel negative binomial regression model is used, for which the Stata command
is menbreg. Negative binomial regression, similar to a poisson regression model al-
though allowing for overdispersion, is appropriate for the dependent variable which
is a cumulative count of memberships in voluntary organizations, with active mem-
berships weighted to contribute twice as much to the total as inactive memberships.7
For the chapters on political protest (on a seven point scale) and democratic support
(on a 13 point scale), these are treated as linear multilevel models and the command
used in Stata is mixed. Each of these models allows the intercept to vary for each
country included in the analysis. In terms of how the regression models are run, the
multilevel regression analysis is estimated separately on the data from before and
after the crisis. Regression coefficients can then be compared between the two time
points to assess whether and how the economic crisis has affected the dynamics of
political behavior and democratic values.
Given there are several potential ways to operationalize the dependent variables,
each model is also tested with alternative measures of the dependent variable. To
give one example civic engagement could be measured dichotomously, differentiating
those who are active in one or more voluntary assocations compared to everyone
else, or it could be measured as a cumulative count of memberships. To ensure the
6Unlike other options for estimating a multilevel logit model, such as xtmelogit, gllamm
enables sampling weights to be used. In addition to sampling weights, the following options are
specified with gllamm: family(binom); link(logit).
7For similar modelling approaches with civic engagement as a dependent variable see Schofer
and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001), Karakoc (2013), Beyerlein and Hipp (2006), Curtis et al. (2001),
and Smith and Wiest (2005).
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results are not overly sensitive to these measurement decisions, appropriate models
are tested with the different operationalizations of the dependent variables to ensure
that the substantive interpretation of the results does not differ.
Missing data is handled using listwise deletion. Other methods of handling
missing values are becoming popular, particularly multiple imputation, however
at present there are computational limitations in applying multiple imputation for
multilevel models (Drechsler, 2015, p. 70–71). Pairwise deletion is also incompatible
with the multilevel modelling commands used in this thesis and results in biased
estimates, while mean imputation underestimates the variance (van Buuren, 2012,
pp. 8–11). Listwise deletion is not without its shortcomings, specifically it results in
lost observations, however this approach has been selected for compatibility with the
multilevel modelling commands used. There is no missing data at the country level,
as indicators including GDP growth, unemployment, and democratic experience are
easily sourced, for example from the World Bank, so there are no problems generated
from missing data at level 2.
Efforts have been made to correct for missing data on two of the dependent
variables at level 1 where it was considered reasonable to do so—civic engagement
and voter turnout. The civic engagement scale is constructed from responses to a
question regarding participation across nine types of voluntary organization. There
are a large number of cases (23 percent of the total sample) where respondents have
provided a response for some but not all types of association in this list. Rather
than lose data for respondents that have gone to the effort of providing a response
for some items in this list, it is considered reasonable that they would have provided
a response for the other association types if they were members. Where data is
missing for all of the items in the list, this remains coded as missing. This reduces
the degree of missing data for the civic engagement scale from 23 percent to less
than 1 percent. The other variable where some missing values are recoded is voter
turnout. Where a respondent had indicated that they did not know whether or not
they voted, this has been recoded as a non-vote. There is a tendency for people to
overreport turnout due to social desirability bias (Karp and Brockington, 2005), and
it could be expected that those who do not remember (or say they do not remember)
whether they voted, most likely did not vote. For both of these variables the results
are also tested with these items coded as missing to ensure that these assumptions
have not affected the interpretation of the results.
Weighting is necessary to ensure that the country samples are reflective of na-
tional population characteristics. To achieve this, analyses with the WVS are
weighted using one of two variables. On occasions where models are estimated for a
single country, the variable S017 is used to ensure that the data is representative of
the national population (Medrano, 2017). For all cross-national analyses the variable
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S018 is used, which weights the country samples to an N of 1000 each (Medrano,
2017). This ensures that the samples from each country contribute equally to the
results, without a large sample in a particular country biasing the results. This vari-
able is derived from the original country weights to ensure that the data remains
representative of each national population (Medrano, 2017).
For the CSES a similar approach is taken. Any analyses conducted with the data
from a single country use C1010 1 which is the original sample weight determined
by the national election study team (CSES, 2013a). For cross-national analyses
the weight variable C1014 1 is applied which means ‘each election study component
contributes equally to the analysis’.8 This variable also factors in the country weights
to ensure samples are representative, although the way this has been calculated
differs across the different countries (CSES, 2013a).
8The variable names listed are from Module 3 of the CSES. For Modules 1 and 2 of the CSES
the equivalent variables are used. For single country analyses: A1010 1 (Module 1); B1010 1
(Module 2). For cross-national analyses: A1014 1 (Module 1); B1014 1 (Module 2).
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Chapter 4
Voting Behavior
A considerable body of work has examined how economic conditions influence citizen
voting behavior.1 This research has primarily taken place during ordinary fluctua-
tions in economic performance. The global financial crisis provides an unprecedented
opportunity to test these theories under the conditions of a severe economic shock.
This chapter will explore the impact of the global financial crisis on two dimensions
of voting behavior. The first is voter mobilization—the decision a citizen makes as
to whether or not they will cast a vote in an election. The second dimension is vote
choice—for which party or candidate a citizen chooses to cast their vote.
Chapter 2 drew upon the existing literature to develop hypotheses for the po-
tential impact of an economic crisis on voter mobilization. At the aggregate level
competing hypotheses were outlined. On the one hand, research on the salience
of elections suggests that turnout will be higher when the results matter more
(Franklin, 2004). In the context of a major crisis the stakes are higher, with the
potential for different policy responses to the crisis to have a big impact on citizens’
lives. Thus it could be expected that the crisis would mobilize turnout. On the
other hand, recent studies have demonstrated that economic globalization is linked
to lower turnout (Karp and Milazzo, 2016; Steiner, 2010, 2016; Steiner and Mar-
tin, 2012). Economic globalization constrains the room to manoeuvre of national
governments, thus reducing the influence citizens can have over policy making by
casting a ballot (Steiner, 2016). As the global nature of the crisis was evidently a
manifestation of economic globalization, it could be expected that the crisis would
depress turnout if citizens perceive their government to have little control over the
nation’s economic fortunes.
Hypotheses on voter mobilization were also developed at the individual level.
Existing research shows that those with greater resources—particularly education,
though also income—are more likely to vote (Blais, 2000, p. 53; Norris, 2002, p.
1See for instance Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007), Van der Brug et al. (2007), Duch and
Stevenson (2008), and Blais and Dobrzynska (1998).
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86; Verba et al., 1995). The question is whether the likelihood of those with fewer
resources voting remained the same, whether it increased, or whether it decreased
after the crisis. Karp and Milazzo (2016) found that the crisis demobilized those
most vulnerable in society, whilst mobilizing those with greater resources, increasing
the inequality of participation in civic life (see Verba et al., 1995). On the other
hand, rational choice approaches presume that voters are instrumental (see Blais,
2000; Downs, 1957).2 In the context of a crisis, it could be suggested that those
with the most to gain by voting (or the most to lose by not voting), would become
more likely to do so. In that case those with the fewest resources who were the most
vulnerable to the crisis could become more likely to vote.
After exploring the impact of the crisis on voter mobilization, the chapter will
turn to investigate the effect of the crisis on vote choice. Of those who made the
decision to cast a vote, for which party or candidate did they lend their support?
Drawing upon the existing literature on economic voting,3 it could be expected that
after the crisis, and in countries harder hit by the crisis, voters will be more likely to
vote against incumbents. This economic voting response could also be expected to be
stronger in countries with greater clarity of responsibility, where blame for economic
performance can be clearly attributed to the incumbent government (Powell and
Whitten, 1993). At the individual level it can be investigated whether citizens
vote with their pocketbooks, although the evidence for pocketbook voting from
previous studies has been mixed (Clarke et al., 2000; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979;
Lewis-Beck, 1983). To the extent that people vote based on their personal economic
circumstances, it could be expected that those with fewer resources, who were more
vulnerable to the crisis, may vote against incumbents to a greater degree than those
who are better off.
This chapter proceeds in four main sections. The first section outlines the data
and methodological approach. As this is the only chapter to use the data from the
CSES most details regarding the data and variables are described here rather than
in the previous chapter. The next section tests the hypotheses on voter turnout at
the aggregate level. The third section explores what characteristics are associated
with voter mobilization at the individual level before and after the crisis. The
fourth section investigates economic voting in the context of the economic crisis,
with aggregate and individual level data.
2Although Blais (2000, p. 82) finds that rational choice approaches to voting have limitations.
3See Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007) for an overview.
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4.1 Data and Approach
To investigate the effects of the global financial crisis on voting behavior, this chapter
primarily uses data from the CSES. Whilst the other chapters will use data from the
World Values Survey, for analyses of electoral behavior the CSES is ideal as it fields
post-election surveys cross-nationally. This provides greater validity on questions
regarding voting than other surveys fielded outside of the electoral cycle.4 Data
from Modules 1, 2 and 3 of the CSES have been combined into a single file to
enable analyses covering 45 elections across 13 countries. Countries were selected if
election surveys were fielded after the onset of the crisis in 2008, and for at least two
elections prior to the crisis, enabling a comparison of the same countries over time.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the sample of countries and elections included in
the analysis. As is evident from Table 4.1, the sample includes elections from a
diverse set of countries that incorporates both established democracies, such as the
United States, Germany, Finland and New Zealand and newer democracies such as
the Czech Republic and Brazil.
Table 4.1: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Case Selection
Country Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Elections Election
Brazil 2002 2006 2010
Canada 1997 2004 2008
Czech Republic 1996 2002 2006 2010
Finland 2003 2007 2011
Germany 1998 2002 2005 2009
Iceland 1999 2003 2007 2009
Netherlands 1998 2002 2006 2010
New Zealand 1996 2002 2008
Norway 1997 2001 2005 2009
Portugal 2002 2005 2009
Slovenia 1996 2004 2008
Spain 1996 2000 2004 2008
United States 1996 2004 2008
Note: All these countries experienced a recession during the
global financial crisis of 2008–2009, defined as two or more
consecutive quarters of negative growth.
The CSES surveys are supplemented by various other sources of data at the ag-
gregate level. Voter turnout data has been sourced from International IDEA’s Voter
Turnout Database (2017). For analyses at the aggregate level this provides a greater
degree of accuracy than using the responses from the CSES as there is a tendency
4See further discussion on the choice of data sources in Chapter 3.
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for post-election surveys to overreport turnout, due to a combination of social desir-
ability bias and overrepresentation of voters in surveys (see Karp and Brockington,
2005; Selb and Munzert, 2013). Aggregate level data on seats in parliament and vote
shares has been sourced from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Parline Database on
national parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014). National economic indi-
cators, specifically GDP growth and unemployment, have been sourced from the
World Bank from the year preceding each election year (2015a; 2015b).
There are two dependent variables explored in this chapter, first—whether a
respondent cast a vote, and second—for which party they voted. To investigate
whether citizens cast a vote, a dichotomous measure is constructed using responses
to the question asked in the CSES on whether the respondent cast a ballot in the
most recent election. The precise question wording varies by country and is designed
to minimize overreporting, as discussed in Chapter 3 (see also Karp and Brockington,
2005). As the CSES does not include a validated turnout measure at the individual
level it can still be expected that there is less variation in the dependent variable
than would be the true case in the population (Dahlberg and Solevid, 2016, p.
498). Missing values are coded as non-votes rather than missing, as it is reasonable
to presume that if someone responds that they ‘don’t know’ whether they voted,
chances are they did not.5
Vote choice is operationalized as a dichotomous measure of whether or not the
respondent voted for the incumbent. A vote for the incumbent is considered to be
a vote for the party of the incumbent President or Prime Minister (or party of the
Chancellor in the case of Germany); a vote for the opposition is for those who voted
for any party other than that of the incumbent President or Prime Minister.6 Non-
voters are excluded from the analysis of vote choice. Thus, the sample for each of
these dependent variables is different: for voter turnout the sample includes voters
and non-voters; for vote-choice the sample is restricted to those that cast a vote in
the most recent election.
Economic conditions can be measured at the country level and the individual
level. Modules 2 and 3 of the CSES do not include direct measures of subjective eco-
nomic evaluations. Thus, it is not possible with this dataset to assess the economic
vote with the commonly employed measures of subjective retrospective, prospec-
tive, sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations (see for example Lanoue, 1994;
Lewis-Beck, 1988). As an alternative, various proxies are factored into the models.
5Results are checked to ensure that this coding of the missing values does not affect the sub-
stantive interpretation of the results.
6An alternative operationalization would include coalition partners with the President or Prime
Minister’s party. Both operationalizations have appeared in the literature (see Anderson, 2000,
p. 157; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2014a, p. 386). The measure of the President or Prime
Minister’s party will be used as some studies have found it to attract a stronger economic vote (see
Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2014a, p. 386; Duch and Stevenson, 2008, p. 269).
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To account for economic conditions at the country level, measures of GDP growth
and unemployment are taken from the World Bank, in the year preceding each elec-
tion year.7 At the individual level to differentiate those more vulnerable to the crisis
a number of socio-demographic characteristics are incorporated. This includes in-
come (measured in quintiles), whether the respondent has completed a university
degree (coded dichotomously), and employment status—a categorical variable com-
paring the unemployed, and an ‘other’ category, against a base category of labor
force participants.8
Besides measures of economic circumstances, a number of other variables are
incorporated that are known to impact the dependent variables from the existing
literature. Additional country level variables include a measure of whether the
government is a multi-party coalition or single party government to capture the ex-
pectation that citizen voting behavior may be influenced by clarity of responsibility
(Powell and Whitten, 1993). The years the incumbent has been in power is included
to reflect the expectation that voters will be more likely to vote out an incumbent
the longer they have been in power. A dummy variable for whether the incumbent
government is on the left or the right is incorporated to assess whether governments
on the right were punished to a greater extent than those on the left. A number
of individual level variables are also included. Age is grouped into three categories,
with young people aged 18 to 29 as the base category. Gender is coded as ‘1’ for
females and ‘0’ for males. How much the respondent likes the incumbent party is
also controlled for on an eleven point scale ranging from ‘0’ for those who strongly
dislike the party to ‘10’ for those who strongly like the incumbent party. A full list
of variables, coding and means for this chapter is shown in Table 4.2.9
4.2 Voter Turnout
The effects of the crisis on voter turnout can be explored first at the aggregate level.
Chapter 2 set out competing hypotheses as to the effects of the global financial
crisis on voter turnout. On the one hand, some theories would point to voter de-
mobilization in the context of a major crisis (H1.1). Various studies suggest that
7In subsequent chapters GDP growth and unemployment are taken for the same period of time
in each country. This is done to compare the relative impacts of the crisis, and is possible as the
WVS is fielded over a similar period of time in each country across the two most recent waves
of the survey. For the CSES, as the timing is determined by the electoral cycle, rather than set
times for survey waves, it is better to take these indicators from the year preceding the election.
The annual indicators for the World Bank have been selected instead of quarterly figures from the
OECD, due to some missing data for the earlier years from the OECD.
8‘Other’ employment status includes retirees, housewives and students.
9For consistency with the subsequent chapters that use survey data from the WVS, wherever
possible the coding of variables has been kept the same, or as close to it as possible, to facilitate
comparability. See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 for the WVS coding.
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Table 4.2: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems – Variables, scoring, and means
Pre-crisis (1996–2007) Post-crisis (2008–2011)
Variable Codes Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent Variables
Voted 1 = Cast a vote, 0 = Did not cast a vote 0.82 0.38 0.83 0.39
Vote for Incumbent 1 = Voted for the party of the incumbent
President or Prime Minister, 0 = Voted for
any other party. (Non-voters are excluded)
0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47
Independent Variables (Country level)
GDP growth Annual GDP growth from the year prior to
the election (World Bank)
3.17 1.55 1.14 2.97
Unemployment Annual unemployment rate from the year
prior to the election (World Bank)
7.45 4.14 5.85 2.30
Coalition incumbent 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.63 0.48 0.69 0.47
Years incumbent in
power
Continuous measure of how many years the
incumbent party has been in power
5.87 3.46 5.23 2.19
Left incumbent Incumbent coded ‘left’ if mean score is less
than 5 on scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right)
0.56 0.49 0.38 0.49
Independent Variables (Individual level)
Employment status 1=Labor force participant (base category),
2=Unemployed, 3=Other
1.73 0.94 1.76 0.95
Income Measured in quintiles from 1 (lowest income
category) to 5 (highest income category)
3.12 1.37 3.13 1.39
University degree 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.45
Age range 1 = 18-29, 2 = 30-49, 3 = 50 and over 2.26 0.73 2.29 0.74
Gender (female) 1 = female, 0 = male 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50
Likes incumbent
party
Scale from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10
(strongly like)
5.36 2.87 5.19 2.97
N (elections) 31 13
N (respondents) 35,309 13,543
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globalization depresses turnout, as it reduces the influence of national governments
over policy making (Steiner, 2010, 2016). The global financial crisis was evidently a
product of globalization, so in that sense it might be expected that citizens perceive
that their national governments have little influence over economic conditions in
their country. This perception may depress participation. Another argument would
also support the voter demobilization thesis in the context of an economic crisis.
Existing research shows that those with fewer resources, whether income, educa-
tion, or employment, are less likely to vote (Norris, 2002, p. 86; Verba et al., 1995).
As those suffering resource constraints are more numerous during a crisis it could
be expected that these factors would depress participation. On the other hand, a
different set of theories would lead to the prediction that voters would be mobilized
in the context of a crisis (H1.2). Given that economic issues are highly salient, and
that salient elections mobilize turnout (Franklin, 2004), it could be expected that
there would be voter mobilization at a time of economic crisis .
H1.1: After the crisis voter turnout will be more likely to decline, particularly
within countries harder hit by the crisis.
H1.2: After the crisis voter turnout will be more likely to increase, particularly
within countries harder hit by the crisis.
Before testing the impact of the crisis on aggregate voter turnout, it is useful to
first understand turnout trends across countries and over time. Figure 4.1 shows
the trends in turnout over the past 20 years in each of the 13 countries selected from
the CSES. The data comes from International IDEA’s Voter Turnout Database and
thus provides actual rather than reported turnout. Three factors can be observed
from this chart. First, there is a considerable degree of variation in turnout across
these countries. Turnout is lowest in the United States and Canada, hovering mostly
between 50 and 60 percent. Voter turnout is highest in Iceland, sitting between 80
and 90 percent across the previous two decades. It is also high in Brazil where
voting is compulsory.10 Second, there is a decline in voter turnout evident over
time in many of these countries, including Germany, Slovenia, Portugal and Spain.
In other countries turnout has remained stable, for instance in Norway, Finland,
Canada, and the United States. Franklin (2004) has argued that these changes
over time within countries are due to the ‘character’ of elections, including the level
of competitiveness, in addition to generational changes. Finally, the dashed line
10A large body of literature has sought to explain cross-national differences in turnout as a result
of institutional or socioeconomic factors (e.g. Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Norris, 2002; Powell,
1982). For example, compulsory voting, proportional representation, and economic development
have all been associated with higher turnout levels (see Blais, 2007, pp. 624–625 for an overview).
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Figure 4.1: Voter Turnout over Time
Note: The turnout measure is the number of votes divided by the voting age population
(Vote/VAP). The charts show turnout for parliamentary elections for all countries with the excep-
tion of the United States and Brazil, where the chart shows turnout for presidential elections. The
dashed vertical line marks the onset of the economic crisis in 2008.
Source: International IDEA Voter Turnout Database (2017).
highlighting the onset of the crisis in 2008 does not mark an obvious change in the
turnout trends, although there are more robust ways to investigate the effect of the
crisis on turnout.
To assess whether overall turnout increased or decreased after the onset of the
global financial crisis, the change in turnout between elections can be calculated.
Table 4.3 presents the turnout level for the first election in each country fielded in
2008 or later, considered to be the first election after the onset of the crisis (t3 ),
and the two elections before that (t1 and t2 ).11 It also shows the change in turnout
between these elections, in each country and overall. Between the two elections
before the crisis hit (t2-t1 ), there was an overall increase in turnout of 0.9 percent,
with turnout increasing in eight of the 13 countries, and decreasing in the other
five. Between t2 and t3, the first election after the crisis, turnout had declined in
nine countries, increased in just four, with an average change of -2.4 percent. This
finding is consistent with the demobilization hypothesis (H1.1). Whilst turnout had
11The specific election years are listed in Table 4.1.
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increased slightly between the two elections prior to the crisis, for the first election
after the crisis turnout had declined by 2.4 percent in the overall sample. Although
further examination of the change in turnout within this sample at earlier times
shows that a decline of one or two percent on average is not unusual within the
sample.
Table 4.3: Change in Voter Turnout
Turnout (%) Change (%)
t1 t2 t3 t2-t1 t3-t2
Brazil 79.1 83.6 77.3 4.4 −6.3
Canada 55.3 58.4 53.6 3.1 −4.8
Czech Republic 59.0 65.1 62.2 6.1 −2.9
Finland 70.0 68.2 72.8 −1.8 4.6
Germany 73.5 72.0 64.6 −1.5 −7.4
Iceland 89.1 84.7 84.7 −4.5 0.1
Netherlands 77.5 77.5 71.1 −0.1 −6.4
New Zealand 72.5 79.2 77.8 6.7 −1.4
Norway 73.5 76.5 74.7 3.0 −1.8
Portugal 68.6 69.2 66.1 0.6 −3.1
Slovenia 72.3 61.1 65.0 −11.2 4.0
Spain 73.8 76.3 69.9 2.5 −6.3
United States 52.6 57.1 57.5 4.5 0.4
Average 70.5 71.4 69.0 0.9 −2.4
Note: t3 is the first election that took place after the economic
crisis hit in 2008. t2 is the election before the crisis started, and t1
is the election before that. The turnout measure is the number of
votes divided by the voting age population (Vote/VAP). The charts
show turnout for parliamentary elections for all countries with the
exception of the United States and Brazil, where the chart shows
turnout for presidential elections.
Source: International IDEA Voter Turnout Database (2017).
To further investigate the effect of economic conditions on turnout, we need to
consider not only comparisons from before and after the crisis, but also take into
account differential impacts of the crisis across countries. To do this, GDP growth
in the year preceding the election can be plotted against the change in turnout.
This is shown in Figure 4.2. The relationship is positive, indicating that countries
where growth was high in the year preceding the election, turnout was more likely to
increase since the previous election. In countries where growth was lower, declines
in voter turnout were more likely. A Pearson’s correlation test shows a relationship
which is positive, and whilst short of significance at the 0.05 level, is significant at
the 0.1 level (r=0.49, n=13, p=0.09). Recognizing the limits of a small sample of
13 countries, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the crisis would
depress voter turnout (H1.1). None of the evidence presented here supports the
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hypothesis that the crisis would mobilize turnout (H1.2). Combining the results of
Figure 4.2 with Table 4.3, a consistent picture emerges. After the crisis, turnout
declined compared to before the crisis. Meanwhile, countries hit harder by the crisis
were more likely to observe declines in voter turnout in the election after the onset
of the crisis, relative to other countries in the sample.
Figure 4.2: GDP Growth and Change in Voter Turnout
Notes: Change in turnout measures the difference in turnout between the post-crisis elec-
tion and the preceding election (see Table 4.1). GDP growth is from the year preceding
the post-crisis election.
Sources: International IDEA Voter Turnout Database (2017), GDP growth from the
World Bank (2015a).
4.3 Voter Mobilization
Electoral participation can also be explored at the individual level. It would be ex-
pected that the economic circumstances of individuals influence their likelihood of
casting a vote. Existing research shows that those with greater resources are more
likely to vote (Blais, 2000; Norris, 2002; Verba et al., 1995). In the context of a
crisis, on the one hand it could be expected that those most vulnerable to the crisis
would be mobilized, as they have the most to gain (H1.3). Although, there are also
reasons to expect that the opposite would be true. If those with fewer resources are
less likely to participate in ordinary times, it could be expected that this dynamic
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would persist during a time of greater resource scarcity (H1.4), or even that the
participation gap could increase as was found by Karp and Milazzo (2016).
H1.3: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to vote after the crisis.
H1.4: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be less likely
to vote after the crisis.
These hypotheses regarding the influence of individual resources on the likelihood
of voting will be investigated first with bivariate regression models before progressing
to full multilevel models taking account of a suite of control variables. Bivariate
logistic regression models are estimated separately on the data from before and after
the onset of the financial crisis. Models are estimated for every country, in addition
to a multilevel model which combines the data from all countries and elections.
The results are presented in Figure 4.3, which shows the coefficients and 95 percent
confidence intervals for each model. Three predictor variables are considered, the
first is a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent has completed a university
degree, the second is income, measured in quintiles, the third compares those who
are unemployed against a base category of labor force participants.
Consistent with the existing literature,12 university education has a positive and
significant effect on the likelihood of voting in almost all cases. In the model that
combines all countries, the effect is positive, significant, and of the same magnitude
before and after the crisis. The effect of income varies to a greater extent across
countries, though the effect is also positive and significant overall, with overlapping
confidence bars suggesting that the effect is similar before and after the crisis. Those
who are unemployed are less likely to cast a vote. The negative coefficient is greater
after the crisis although not significantly different from before the crisis. These
results align with the existing work on who votes,13 and indicate little change in
the nature of these relationships since the crisis. The finding that resources have
a similar effect on the likelihood of voting whether during a crisis or otherwise, is
consistent with the aggregate level findings that show a decline in turnout after the
crisis overall. If resources have a positive effect on participation, during a crisis when
more people experience resource constraints it would be expected that participation
goes down.
12See Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, p. 24), Blais (2000, p. 53), and Norris (2002, p. 86).
13See Blais (2007) for an overview.
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Figure 4.3: Effects of Resources on the Likelihood of Voting
Note: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for bivariate logit models before
and after the crisis. The models regress university degree, income, and unemployment on the
dichotomous measure of voter turnout, coded ‘1’ for those who reported that they cast a vote in
the election, and ‘0’ for those who did not. University degree is dichotomous. The unemployed are
compared against labor force participants. Income is measured in quintiles.
Source: (CSES, 2013b,c,d).
A more robust test of the effects of resources on voting will take into account
a range of control variables. To this end, multilevel logistic regression models have
been estimated which incorporate individual resources, alongside a suite of controls
at the country and individual level. The same model has been estimated on the
data from before the crisis—in 31 elections across 13 countries spanning from 1996
to 2007, and after the crisis began—for one election in each of the 13 countries
between 2008 and 2011. For the multilevel model, individuals are the level 1 units,
and elections are the level 2 units. Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4 present the results.
The results are presented in graphical and tabular format as the plot of coefficients
allows for easy comparison of effect sizes and confidence intervals on the models
estimated separately on the data from before and after the crisis.
At the country level, GDP growth has a significant negative effect before the
crisis, and a significant positive effect after the crisis. In other words, after the crisis
citizens in those countries that were harder hit were less likely to vote. The national
95
Table 4.4: Predicting the Likelihood of Voting
Pre-crisis (1996–2007) Post-crisis (2008–2011)
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)
Country level predictors
GDP growth −0.04∗∗ (0.02) 0.04∗∗ (0.00)
Unemployment −0.01∗ (0.00) 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Coalition incumbent 0.31∗∗ (0.04) 0.71∗∗ (0.02)
Individual level predictors
Employment status (base: labor force participants)
Unemployed −0.19† (0.10) −0.39∗∗ (0.11)
Other employment status 0.01 (0.05) 0.20∗∗ (0.07)
Income 0.20∗∗ (0.02) 0.19∗∗ (0.03)
University degree 0.66∗∗ (0.10) 0.83∗∗ (0.11)
Age range (base: 18–29)
Aged 30–49 0.49∗∗ (0.05) 0.58∗∗ (0.10)
Aged 50 and over 0.99∗∗ (0.08) 0.92∗∗ (0.11)
Gender (female) −0.01 (0.04) 0.07 (0.07)
Likes incumbent 0.06∗∗ (0.01) 0.06∗∗ (0.01)
Constant 0.18 (0.12) −0.60∗∗ (0.19)
N (elections) 31 13
N (respondents) 43,814 16,708
ICC 0.11 0.08
Note: Multilevel logistic regression model with random intercepts produced using the Stata
gllamm command. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, coded ‘1’ for those who
reported that they cast a vote in the election, and ‘0’ for those who did not. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
† p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Sources: The CSES (2013b; 2013c; 2013d), with country level indicators from the World Bank
(2015a; 2015b).
unemployment level also has a negative effect before the crisis, and a positive effect
after the crisis, although the substantive interpretation is the reverse. In this case,
after the crisis high levels of unemployment were associated with a higher likelihood
of voting. This mixed finding suggests that the effect of country level economic
factors did not remain constant after the crisis.
The other country level variable incorporated in the model is a dichotomous
indicator of whether the incumbent government was a coalition at the time of the
election. If the incumbent government was made up of a coalition, this is associated
with significantly higher turnout both before and after the crisis. This is consistent
with the literature that shows political systems with proportional representation
(PR), which more often lead to coalition governments, tend to have higher turnout
(Blais and Carty, 1990; Jackman, 1987; Karp and Banducci, 1999). This is as
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Figure 4.4: Predicting the Likelihood of Voting – Coefficient Plot
Note: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for a multilevel logistic
regression model with random intercepts produced using the Stata gllamm command.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, coded ‘1’ for those who reported that
they cast a vote in the election, and ‘0’ for those who did not. The base category for age
is 18–29. The base category for employment status is labor force participants.
Sources: The CSES (2013b; 2013c; 2013d), with country level indicators from the World
Bank (2015a; 2015b).
winner-take-all systems lead to wasted votes, whereas in PR systems, for supporters
of smaller parties the likelihood of their vote having an impact is higher (Blais, 2007;
Jackman, 1987). Whilst the effect of coalition incumbency is significantly positive
both before and after the crisis, the effect size is significantly greater after the crisis,
indicating that the crisis demobilized voters in winner-take-all systems relative to
those with coalition governments.
The multilevel model also explores the effect of individual level variables, as
shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4. Variables indicating individual resources, which
were first tested in the bivariate models discussed previously (see Figure 4.3), can
now be tested when various controls are taken into account. The unemployed are
less likely to vote than those in the labor force before and after the crisis. The
difference increases between the two periods, suggesting the crisis may have demo-
bilized the unemployed. Income has a positive and significant effect before and after
the crisis with no difference in the effect size. Having a university degree similarly
has a positive and significant effect at both time points. The effect of education is
97
greater after the crisis, although it cannot be said that the increase is significant
as the confidence intervals overlap. The findings on education and unemployment
are consistent with the idea that the crisis demobilized those with fewer resources,
relative to the dynamics of participation before the crisis hit. Older age groups are
significantly more likely to vote than younger age groups, although the overlapping
confidence intervals suggest that the age differences remain similar before and after
the crisis. Women are no more or less likely to vote than men when controlling for
other variables at both time points. If the respondent likes the incumbent party
they are more likely to vote.
Relating these findings back to the hypotheses on resources, the results show that
those more vulnerable to the crisis remain less likely to vote after the crisis (H1.4).
There is no support for the hypothesis that those with fewer resources, including the
unemployed, those on low incomes, and those with lower levels of education were
mobilized to vote by the crisis (H1.3). The effect of resources on the likelihood of
voting remains similar after the crisis. If anything, the results would be consistent
with the argument that those with the fewest resources were demobilized by the
crisis, as indicated by the increasing effect sizes of education and unemployment
after the crisis.
4.4 Vote Choice
The second dimension of voting behavior to explore is vote choice. Once a citizen
has made the decision to cast a vote in an election, for which party or candidate do
they cast their vote? As with turnout, this can be explored at both the aggregate
and individual level. At the aggregate level, the economic voting hypothesis would
suggest that after the crisis incumbents would be more likely to suffer losses in voter
support (H1.5). This could be evident through incumbents being voted out after
the crisis at a greater rate than before the crisis, or through a decline in vote-shares
and subsequent losses of seats in parliament. As the crisis did not affect all countries
equally, it could also be expected that incumbent vote shares would be more likely
to decline in countries hit harder by the crisis (H1.6). Finally, it might be expected
that parties on the right would be voted out to a greater extent than parties on the
left due to their greater advocacy of the free market system, which voters may have
associated with the crisis (H1.7).
H1.5: After the crisis incumbents will be likely to experience a loss of voter sup-
port, evident through either being voted out of office, a loss of vote-shares, or a
loss of seats in parliament.
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H1.6: In countries hit harder by the crisis, incumbent vote shares will be more
likely to decline than in countries that were less hard hit.
H1.7: After the crisis, parties on the right will be more likely to be voted out than
parties on the left.
To investigate these hypotheses, first the electoral outcomes in the sample are
examined drawing on data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014). Figure 4.5
presents the election results for the previous three elections included in the CSES
across the 13 country sample. Within the sample incumbent governments were no
more likely to have lost power after the crisis than before. The figure shows that
in the post-crisis elections six of 13 incumbent governments were voted out, a rate
of 46 percent. In the two elections preceding the financial crisis, the rate is roughly
the same, with five of 13, and six of 13 incumbent governments voted out of office.
These figures are comparable to Powell who finds that out of 41 elections, incumbent
governments were evicted from office 18 times, a rate of 44 percent (2000, p. 270).
This suggests that although the cases examined here are a non-random sample of
elections from the CSES, the sample nevertheless includes a set of elections that
match electoral outcomes from other cross national analyses. These figures raise
some doubt about whether voters are more likely to punish incumbent governments
under conditions of economic crisis.
Figure 4.5: Electoral Outcomes in 13 Countries
Notes: Post-crisis election covers elections from 2008 to 2011. Elec-
tion 1 and Election 2 are the two previous elections included in the
CSES with dates ranging from 1996 to 2002 for Election 1 and 2002
to 2007 for Election 2.
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Of course it is quite possible that the outcomes observed in Figure 4.5 mask
fluctuations in vote shares. To examine this in more detail, Table 4.5 reports changes
in vote and seat shares for the incumbent party across elections. ‘Incumbent party’
is defined as the party of the President or Prime Minister incumbent at the time of
the election after the financial crisis hit. There is evidence that incumbent parties
suffered losses after the financial crisis. In nine of 13 elections the incumbent party’s
vote share declined, and in eight of 13 elections the incumbent party’s number of
seats in Parliament declined. On average the incumbent party’s vote share declined
by 4.6 percent.
To investigate whether the change in incumbent support is related to divergent
economic outcomes in each country, Figure 4.6 plots the change in vote share for
the incumbent party in each country against GDP growth in the year preceding
the election (World Bank, 2015a). This reveals a positive relationship, whereby
incumbents in countries that experienced lower growth were more likely to lose
votes than those in countries where growth rates were higher in the year before the
election. A Pearson’s correlation test confirms that there is a positive and significant
relationship between growth and the change in incumbent vote share (r=0.55, n=13,
p<0.05). This result lends support to the economic voting thesis that economic
performance drives incumbent vote-share.
The impact of the crisis can be examined in greater depth by looking at how
well minor coalition partners fared in the post crisis elections; Table 4.6 reports the
associated vote and seat shares. Here a more consistent pattern is evident, with
coalition partners experiencing a drop in vote share in seven of eight countries, and
a drop in seat share in six of nine countries. The average decline in vote share
for coalition partners is 3.2 percent. Whilst this is a smaller percentage of the
overall vote share than the 4.6 percent drop experienced by the Prime Minister
or President’s party, given coalition partners command a smaller proportion of the
vote, the relative effect for coalition parties has been greater. As a proportion of
their vote-share in the previous election, the President or Prime Minister’s party on
average lost 12.6 percent, whereas coalition partners lost 14.4 percent. Whilst both
leaders’ parties and coalition partners’ representation in parliament has declined,
for coalition partners the drop has been more consistent across countries and the
size of the drop relative to their previous vote-share has been greater. This suggests
smaller incumbent parties may have been disproportionately punished by voters.
The final area to explore at the aggregate level, is whether the loss of support for
incumbent parties has disproportionately affected the left or the right. A list of the
parties and their ideological orientation before and after the election is presented in
Table 4.7. Of the six cases where there was a change of government: in three cases
there was a shift from the right to the left—Iceland, Slovenia and the United States;
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Figure 4.6: GDP Growth and Change in Incumbent Vote Share
Notes: Change in incumbent vote share measures the difference in vote share of the party
of the Prime Minister or President between the post-crisis election and the preceding
election (see Table 4.1). GDP growth is from the year preceding the post-crisis election.
Sources: Vote share data sourced from national parliament websites, GDP growth from
the World Bank (2015a).
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Table 4.5: Change in Vote and Seat Shares of Incumbent President/Prime Minister’s Party
Incumbent Vote Share (%) Incumbent Seats in
Parliament
Country GDP
growth
(%)
Coalition
Govern-
ment
Pre-crisis
election
Post-crisis
election
Change Pre-crisis
election
Post-crisis
election
Change Incumbent
returned
Direction
of shift
Brazil −0.13 Yes 48.6 46.9 −1.7 83 87 4 Yes -
Canada 2.06 No 29.6 37.7 8.1 99 143 44 Yes -
Czech Rep. −4.84 Yes 35.4 20.2 −15.2 81 53 −28 Yes -
Finland 2.99 Yes 23.1 15.8 −7.3 51 35 −16 No Far right
Germany 1.08 Yes 27.8 27.3 −0.5 180 194 14 Yes -
Iceland 1.52 Yes 36.6 23.7 −12.9 25 16 −9 No Left
Netherlands −3.77 Yes 26.5 13.6 −12.9 41 21 −20 No Far right
New Zealand 2.89 Yes 41.1 34.0 −7.1 50 43 −7 No Right
Norway 0.38 Yes 32.7 35.4 2.7 61 64 3 Yes -
Portugal 0.20 No 46.4 37.9 −8.5 121 97 −24 Yes -
Slovenia 6.94 Yes 29.0 29.3 0.3 29 28 −1 No Left
Spain 3.77 No 43.3 44.1 0.8 164 169 5 Yes -
United States 1.78 No 50.7 45.7 −5.1 232 178 −54 No Left
Mean 0.30 - 36.2 31.7 −4.6 94 87 −7 - -
Note: Incumbent refers to the party of the incumbent President, Prime Minister, or Chancellor (in the case of Germany) at the time of the post-GFC election.
Note that for the Czech Republic and Iceland caretaker governments were in place immediately prior to the election, rather than coding the caretaker government
as the incumbent, the party of the Prime Minister prior to the caretaker period is taken as the incumbent. Note that in Brazil vote share is based on the second
round Presidential election.
Seats in parliament refers to the number of seats in the lower house, in the case of bicameral systems.
GDP growth is the annual growth rate from the year preceding the post-crisis election (World Bank, 2015a).
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Table 4.6: Change in Vote and Seat Shares of Minor Coalition Partners
Minor Coalition Partners’
Vote Share (%)
Minor Coalition Partners’
Seats in Parliament
Country GDP growth
(%)
Pre-crisis
election
Post-crisis
election
Change Pre-crisis
election
Post-crisis
election
Change
Brazil −0.13 166 223 +57
Czech Republic −4.84 10.2 6.8 −3.5 19 0 −19
Finland 2.99 35.3 32.0 −3.3 74 63 −11
Germany 1.08 41.6 29.6 −12.0 268 191 −77
Iceland 1.52 26.8 29.8 +3.0 18 20 +2
Netherlands −3.77 25.2 22.9 −2.3 39 35 −4
New Zealand 2.89 1.2 0.9 −0.3 1 1 0
Norway 0.38 15.3 12.4 −3.0 26 22 −4
Slovenia 6.94 20.0 16.1 −3.9 20 12 −8
Mean −0.43 22.0 18.8 −3.2 52 38 −13
Note: Minor coalition partners refers to parties other than that of the President, Prime Minister or Chancellor, that were
part of the incumbent governing coalition at the time of the post-crisis election. Seats in parliament refers to the number of
seats in the lower house, in the case of bicameral systems.
GDP growth is the annual growth rate from the year preceding the post-crisis election (World Bank, 2015a).
In Brazil’s second round presidential election, minor parties align with one of the two Presidential candidates. Thus minor
parties do not receive a share of the vote in the presidential election. The shift in seats in parliament is taken from the
parliamentary election.
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in one case there was a shift from the left to the right—New Zealand; and in two
cases the shift was from a centre-right government to a far-right government—the
Netherlands and Finland.14 Of the parties that lost the election five were right of
centre, and only one was left of centre, suggesting parties on the left were better able
to maintain support following the crisis. Albeit two of the parties on the right lost
to parties further to the right. Considering the sample of cases as a whole, there is
an overall shift to the left; five parties of the left were in power before the post-crisis
elections, compared to seven after.
Overall, the findings at the aggregate level support the hypotheses on an eco-
nomic voting response to the crisis (H1.5, H1.6). Whilst incumbents were not more
likely to be voted out after the crisis than in previous elections, there has been a
decline in support for incumbent parties in terms of both vote shares and seats in
parliament after the crisis.15 This applied to both the party of the incumbent Prime
Minister or President, and minor coalition partners in cases where a coalition gov-
ernment was incumbent. Countries with lower levels of growth in the year before the
election experienced greater declines in the incumbent vote share. The hypothesis
that parties on the left would be less likely to lose power after the crisis was also
supported (H1.7).
The second set of economic voting hypotheses concern voting behavior at the
individual level. Much of the recent economic voting literature has focussed on the
individual level to avoid committing the ecological fallacy, whereby inferences about
individual level behavior are drawn from group level data (see Dassonneville and
Lewis-Beck, 2014a, pp. 372–373). Work on individual voting behavior has differ-
entiated sociotropic and pocketbook effects. Sociotropic economic voting presumes
that citizens vote based on the economic performance of their country, whereas
pocketbook voting refers to voting based on one’s personal financial circumstances
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). Existing studies lend more support to sociotropic
economic voting (Alvarez and Nagler, 1995, 1998), though some studies have found
that the pocketbook does have an effect (Abramowitz et al., 1988; Elinder et al.,
2015; Lewis-Beck, 1985).
With individual level data from the CSES these theories can be tested with the
measures discussed in the Approach section above.16 If people vote with their pock-
etbooks we would expect those with the fewest resources in society to be voting
against the incumbent to a greater extent than those who are reasonably well off
14Those parties referred to here as ‘far right’ score above a mean of 7 on the 0–10 left-right scale
found in the CSES, where ‘0’ is left and ‘10’ is right.
15This is consistent with Kriesi’s findings in a comparative analysis of 29 European countries
after the crisis (2014).
16As CSES Modules 2 and 3 did not include subjective evaluations of the economy, it is not
possible with this data to test the impact of these subjective evaluations on voting behavior.
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Table 4.7: Change in Ideology of President/Prime Minister’s Party
Before Post-crisis Election After Post-crisis Election
Country Party of President/Prime Minister Party Ideology Party of President/Prime Minister Party Ideology
Brazil Workers Party Left Workers Party Left
Canada Conservative Party Right Conservative Party Right
Czech Republic Civic Democratic Party Right Civic Democratic Party Right
Finland Centre Party Right National Coalition Party Far right
Germany Christian Democratic Union Right Christian Democratic Union Right
Iceland Independence Party Right Social Democratic Alliance Left
Netherlands Christian Democratic Appeal Right People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy
Far right
New Zealand Labour Party Left National Party Right
Norway Labour Party Left Labour Party Left
Portugal Socialist Party Left Socialist Party Left
Slovenia Slovenian Democratic Party Right Social Democrats Left
Spain Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Left
United States Republican Right Democrat Left
Notes: Cases where there was a change of government are shaded. Those parties referred to here as ‘far right’ score above a mean of 7 on the 0-10 point
left-right scale found in the CSES. Finland’s National Coalition Party scores 8.5 on the 11 point scale, the Netherlands’ People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy scores 7.4. The incumbent party is that of the Chancellor in Germany.
105
(H1.8). If people vote according to national economic conditions, then it could be
expected that people will be more likely to vote against incumbents in countries
harder hit by the crisis (H1.9). Work on clarity of responsibility meanwhile would
suggest that citizens would be more likely to vote against incumbents in countries
where the path of blame attribution is clearer (H1.10) (see Powell and Whitten,
1993). The latter two hypotheses explore the relationship between country level
conditions and individual level behavior, which is possible with a multilevel mod-
elling approach.
H1.8: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to vote against incumbent parties after the crisis.
H1.9: In countries hit harder by the crisis, voters will be more likely to vote
against incumbent parties than in countries that were less hard hit.
H1.10: In countries with greater clarity of responsibility voters will be more likely
to vote against incumbent parties after the crisis.
First the hypothesis regarding the effect of individual resources on the likelihood
of voting for the incumbent (H1.8) will be tested. This can be explored by investi-
gating the bivariate relationships between these measures, followed by estimation of
a multilevel model which accounts for a range of country level and individual level
controls. Figure 4.7 presents the results of bivariate logistic regression models to es-
timate the likelihood of voting for the incumbent, in each country and in a multilevel
model on the pooled data across all 13 countries. The dependent variable is a di-
chotomous measure comparing those who cast a vote for the party of the incumbent
Prime Minister or President (Chancellor in the case of Germany), against those who
voted for any other party. The predictors in each respective model are university
education (dichotomous), income (in quintiles), and unemployment (comparing the
unemployed against labor force participants). Once again the models have been es-
timated separately on data from ‘pre-crisis’ elections prior to 2008, and ‘post-crisis’
elections from 2008 onwards.
The findings in Figure 4.7 do not support a pocketbook voting effect. For uni-
versity education, income and unemployment, there are no significant effects in a
majority of countries. In some there is a positive effect, in the Czech Republic
for instance better educated and wealthier voters were more likely to vote for the
incumbent after the crisis. In others there is a negative effect, for example in the
United States the unemployed were more likely to vote against the incumbent in
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the 2008 election and in Spain better educated people became more likely to vote
out the incumbent in the election after the crisis began. Overall there is no trend;
in the multilevel model that factors in data for all countries for each predictor there
are no significant effects on the likelihood of voting for the incumbent, either before
or after the crisis. Whilst the aggregate level results demonstrated that economic
performance at the country level was associated with incumbent vote shares, the
CSES data shows that resources at the individual level are not related to whether
or not one casts a vote for the incumbent party.
Figure 4.7: Effects of Resources on Likelihood of Voting for the Incumbent
Note: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for bivariate logit models before
and after the crisis. The models regress university degree, income, and unemployment on the
dichotomous measure of a vote for the incumbent, coded ‘1’ for those who cast a vote for the party
of the incumbent Prime Minister or President, and ‘0’ for those who cast a vote for a different party.
University degree is dichotomous. The unemployed are compared against labor force participants.
Income is measured in quintiles.
Source: (CSES, 2013b,c,d).
To further investigate how vote choice has been affected by the financial crisis
the next stage of the analysis estimates a multilevel with a full range of controls
at the country and individual level. The results are presented once again in table
format (Table 4.8), and graphically as a plot of coefficients (Figure 4.8) to enable
easy comparison of coefficients and confidence intervals from before and after the
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onset of the economic crisis. The dependent variable is, as before, a vote for the
party of the incumbent Prime Minister or President compared to a vote for any
other party. The model is estimated as a multilevel logistic regression using the
Stata gllamm command, allowing for random intercepts.
Table 4.8: Predicting the Likelihood of Voting for the Incumbent
Pre-crisis (1996–2007) Post-crisis (2008–2011)
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)
Country level predictors
GDP growth −0.02 (0.03) 0.04∗∗ (0.01)
Unemployment 0.06∗∗ (0.01) 0.14∗∗ (0.01)
Coalition incumbent −0.49∗∗ (0.12) −0.87∗∗ (0.08)
Years incumbent in power −0.04∗∗ (0.01) −0.03∗∗ (0.01)
Left incumbent 0.05 (0.06) 0.78∗∗ (0.03)
Individual level predictors
Employment status (base: labor force participants)
Unemployed 0.03 (0.11) −0.01 (0.16)
Other employment status −0.12∗ (0.05) −0.07 (0.07)
Income −0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04)
University degree −0.10 (0.07) −0.17 (0.11)
Age range (base: 18–29)
Aged 30–49 0.11 (0.10) 0.21∗ (0.09)
Aged 50 and over 0.17 (0.10) 0.38∗ (0.15)
Gender (female) 0.07 (0.05) 0.15 (0.09)
Likes incumbent 0.56∗∗ (0.12) 0.73∗∗ (0.09)
Constant −4.08∗∗ (0.78) −5.85∗∗ (0.68)
N (elections) 31 13
N (respondents) 35,309 13,543
ICC 0.12 0.12
Note: Multilevel logistic regression model with random intercepts produced using the Stata
gllamm command. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, coded ‘1’ for those who
cast a vote for the party of the incumbent Prime Minister or President, and ‘0’ for those who
cast a vote for any other party. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Sources: The CSES (2013b; 2013c; 2013d), with country level indicators from the World Bank
(2015a; 2015b).
Looking first at the effect of country level predictors on the likelihood of casting
a vote for the incumbent, GDP growth had no effect before the crisis, though a
positive effect after the crisis. This supports the view that there was an economic
voting response to the crisis and is consistent with Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck
(2014a) who found that economic voting effects were stronger during times of crisis.
The findings on unemployment show the opposite relationship to what would be
expected, with higher unemployment levels associated with a greater likelihood of
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Figure 4.8: Predicting Vote for Incumbent – Coefficient Plot
Note: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for a multilevel logistic
regression model with random intercepts produced using the Stata gllamm command.
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, coded ‘1’ for those who cast a vote
for the party of the incumbent Prime Minister or President, and ‘0’ for those who cast
a vote for a different party. The base category for age is 18–29. The base category for
employment status is labor force participants.
Sources: The CSES (2013b; 2013c; 2013d), with country level indicators from the World
Bank (2015a; 2015b).
voting for the incumbent. The unemployment coefficient is positive before and after
the crisis, although the effect is greater after the crisis. This aligns with existing
research which shows that GDP growth is better able to predict economic voting
than other economic indicators such as unemployment (Dassonneville and Lewis-
Beck, 2014a, p. 376; Van der Brug et al., 2007).
The effect of coalition government was negative and significant both before and
after the crisis, with a stronger effect after the crisis. Coalition government is gen-
erally associated with political systems where there are a greater number of parties
to choose from, and PR systems. It makes sense that voters would be more likely
to vote for a party other than that of the incumbent Prime Minister or President
if there are more alternatives to choose from. Beyond this, coalition government
was included in the model to account for clarity of responsibility, as responsibility
is relatively obscured if the government is made up of a coalition instead of a single
party (Powell and Whitten, 1993). That would lead to the expectation that the
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vote for the incumbent would be relatively strong after the crisis in countries with
a coalition incumbent, as it is harder to attribute blame. However, this data shows
the opposite to be the case, perhaps as the greater number of parties to choose from
provides more alternatives. Besides coalition government, as would be expected the
longer an incumbent has been in power, the greater the likelihood of voting against
the incumbent. There is no change in the effect of incumbency duration before and
after the crisis. In terms of party orientation, before the crisis it made no differ-
ence whether the incumbent was on the left or right. After the crisis voters were
significantly more likely to vote for the incumbent if the incumbent party was left
of centre. This is consistent with the view that parties on the right would be held
accountable to a greater extent than parties on the left.
At the individual level, as per the bivariate models discussed above, employment
status and income have no effect on the likelihood of voting for the incumbent.
Whilst falling short of significance, university education has a negative effect before
and after the crisis, suggesting that those with higher levels of education may have
been more likely to vote against incumbents, with the effect being greater after the
crisis. This would be consistent with the view that more sophisticated voters with
higher levels of education may process information differently to less sophisticated
voters (see Hellwig, 2001). Older people were more likely to vote for incumbents than
younger people; this was the case before and after the crisis though the difference
only reaches significance after the crisis. In other words, young people were more
likely to punish incumbents after the crisis. As young people were disproportionately
affected by the crisis (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011), this is the one piece of evidence in
support of the argument that those affected to a greater extent by the crisis might
become more likely to vote against incumbents. As confidence intervals overlap
however, it cannot be said that the effect is significantly different after the crisis
compared to what it was before. The effect of gender falls just short of significance
before and after the crisis, though the effect in both cases is positive with women
being more likely to vote for the incumbent. Those who like the incumbent party
are, unsurprisingly, more likely to vote for them. The effect size is greater after the
crisis suggesting that after the crisis voters were more polarized.
Overall these results lend support to the sociotropic economic voting hypothesis
(H1.9). After the crisis voters were more likely to vote against incumbents in coun-
tries with lower economic growth. Although the analysis used objective economic
indicators instead of subjective evaluations, research has found objective and sub-
jective measures to be closely related (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007, p. 531). No
support was found for pocketbook effects (H1.8), as those who were more vulnerable
to the crisis were no more or less likely to vote against the incumbent party. The
clarity of responsibility hypothesis (H1.10) was not supported in this case, although
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that could be due to challenges of assessing contextual variation within a small
sample size of only 13 countries.
4.5 Conclusion
Voting is the most conventional form of political participation and is the most direct
way for citizens to have an influence on how their societies are governed. A con-
siderable body of existing work has examined the effects of economic conditions on
voting behavior. Much of this research has examined these relationships in ordinary
times, though in the last few years studies have begun to explore voting behavior
in the context of the global financial crisis that began in 2008.17 This chapter has
contributed to this emerging body of literature by investigating two dimensions of
voting behavior, voter mobilization and vote choice, in the context of the crisis. The
analysis combines individual level data from the CSES across 45 elections within 13
countries with aggregate level data for the same sample of countries, to investigate
the dynamics of voting behavior before and after the onset of the crisis.
Voter turnout was investigated first at the aggregate level, with data from Inter-
national IDEA (2017). At the aggregate level the evidence supported the hypothesis
that the crisis demobilized voter turnout. Turnout in the first election after the cri-
sis was down by 2.4 percent in the overall sample, whereas in the same sample of
countries turnout had increased by 0.9 percent between the two preceding elections.
Moreover, countries that were harder hit by the crisis, as measured by GDP growth,
were more likely to experience declines in turnout than those that fared relatively
well. An exploration of the individual determinants of electoral participation re-
vealed that these dynamics remain much the same during a period of crisis as in
ordinary times. Those with higher levels of education, with higher incomes, and
those in the labor force were more likely to vote before and after the crisis, with no
significant change in the degree to which these variables have an effect.
The aggregate and individual level results on electoral participation are con-
sistent with one another. At the individual level we know that those with fewer
resources participate less (Verba et al., 1995); the results presented here demon-
strate that this dynamic is no different during a crisis. At a time of crisis those
with fewer resources are more numerous so it would then be expected that turnout
would decline across society as a whole as a function of greater numbers experiencing
resource constraints.
Analyses of electoral outcomes showed that governments were voted out to a
similar degree before and after the crisis. However, after the crisis incumbent parties,
17See for example Kriesi (2014), Duch and Sagarzazu (2014), Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck
(2014a) and Karp and Milazzo (2016).
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both the party of the Prime Minister or President and coalition partners, lost votes
and seats in parliament. A positive and statistically significant relationship was
identified between GDP growth and the change in incumbent vote share, lending
support to the central economic voting thesis that governments will be punished for
poor economic performance. Within this sample of countries, parties on the left were
more resilient to the crisis than those on the right. The sample is too small to infer
too much from that result, though this would be consistent with the expectation
that parties that have been proponents of the free market ideology that enabled the
crisis to spread, would be more likely to be blamed.
Utilizing the individual level data from the CSES enabled hypotheses on so-
ciotropic and pocketbook economic voting to be tested. Citizens were more likely to
vote against incumbents in countries that were harder hit by the crisis, suggesting
national economic conditions influenced the vote. There was no support however
for the hypothesis that those more vulnerable to the crisis, whether through lower
incomes or unemployment, would be more likely to vote against incumbents. Both
before and after the crisis these variables had no effect on vote choice. In other
words, there was no evidence of pocketbook effects either before or after the crisis in
the overall sample. The results did indicate though that younger people were more
likely to vote against incumbents after the crisis, relative to before the crisis.
This chapter adds to the substantial body of existing work examining the rela-
tionship between economic conditions and voting behavior by exploring these dy-
namics in the context of a major economic crisis. There have been many studies of
economic voting in individual countries since the crisis,18 though few have investi-
gated the crisis in cross national comparison. Of the recent cross-national studies,
they have focussed on either European data at the aggregate level (Dassonneville
and Lewis-Beck, 2014a; Kriesi, 2014), or individual level data from the European
Election Study (Okolikj and Quinlan, 2016). This study uses cross-national post
election surveys in a sample that extends beyond Europe. The chapter finds that
crisis demobilizes electoral turnout, although the individual participation dynamics
remain much the same during a crisis compared to ordinary times. In terms of vote
choice, the results are consistent with a sociotropic economic voting effect during
the crisis, though there is no evidence of pocketbook voting. The next chapter will
investigate the effects of the crisis on civic engagement with data from the World
Values Survey.
18See for example Anderson and Hecht (2012), Marsh and Mikhaylov (2012), and Nezi (2012).
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Chapter 5
Civic Engagement
Civic engagement, characterized by citizen participation in voluntary associations,
provides a good behavioral indicator for assessing impacts of the crisis on citizen
political engagement. Whilst voting behavior can only be measured at election
time and is affected by many factors specific to the particular election, associational
membership captures ongoing civic activity outside of the electoral cycle and is
relatively stable over time. Chapter 2 identified six hypotheses as to how civic
engagement might be affected by the crisis, which predicted either a mobilization
response or a retreat response, and reasoned that these trends might differ across
different types of association. This chapter will test these hypotheses with data
from the World Values Survey in 18 countries, and is the first of three chapters to
investigate citizen responses to the global financial crisis with the WVS data.
The retreat hypothesis predicts that the crisis would demobilize citizen partici-
pation in voluntary associations. This draws upon existing work on the inequality
of participation that indicates those with fewer resources participate less in civic
groups (Schlozman et al., 1999, 2012; Verba and Nie, 1972). Following the crisis,
as more people experience the resource constraints typically associated with a lower
likelihood of joining a voluntary group, it could be expected that voluntary asso-
ciation membership in the aggregate would decline. This hypothesis would also
predict that those with fewer resources would remain less likely to be members of
associations, much as before the crisis.
Alternatively, a mobilization hypothesis suggests that citizens will be mobilized
to participate in civic organizations, or at least certain types of civic organizations,
in response to the crisis. Politically oriented civic associations, whether unions,
parties, or campaigning groups, may be used as means to articulate interests during
the crisis. Moreover the services of humanitarian organizations, say soup kitchens
or homeless shelters, may experience greater demand during the crisis. This greater
need could be met with greater levels of voluntarism to provide required services. If
the mobilization hypothesis is correct, in the aggregate it would be expected that
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voluntary association membership would increase. At the individual level one might
suppose that those most affected by the crisis, such as the unemployed and those on
low incomes would be more likely to join civic associations than in ordinary times.
In addition to testing whether citizens were mobilized or demobilized from civic
participation overall, these trends are further investigated across different types of
organizations. To the extent that there is a mobilization, this would only be expected
within the politically focussed associations, whether in the old social movement
organizations, such as unions and political parties, or the new social movement
organizations, such as humanitarian groups. For more recreational organizations,
such as art, sport and music groups, it would be expected that the greater resource
constraints after the crisis may constrain participation even if there has been a
mobilization in the political sphere of civic activity.
This chapter proceeds in three main sections. The first provides an overview of
the dependent variable, civic engagement, including how it is measured and trends
over time in the countries under study. The second tests the mobilization and
retreat hypotheses by analyzing trends in civic engagement at the aggregate level
and through multilevel regression analysis. The third drills down to look at trends
across different types of voluntary association to assess whether there are differential
impacts.
5.1 Civic Engagement in 18 Societies
As discussed in Chapter 3, civic engagement is measured using the WVS, which asks
respondents whether they are active members, inactive members, or not a member
of nine types of voluntary organization across the two most recent waves of the
survey. This includes: church or religious organizations; sport or recreational or-
ganizations; art music or educational organizations; labor unions; political parties;
environmental organizations; professional associations; humanitarian or charitable
organizations; and an ‘other’ category. The frequencies for each item incorporating
data from the previous two waves of the WVS across all 18 countries are presented in
Table 5.1. This shows participation in some types of associations is more widespread
than others. As we would expect, membership in a religious organization is the most
common, with around 40 percent of respondents reporting either active or inactive
membership. This is followed by sport and recreational organizations at around 30
percent, and art, music or educational organizations, at around 20 percent. Par-
ticipation in old or new social movement organizations are less common, typically
drawing in 10 to 15 percent of respondents as active or inactive members.
This battery of questions enables the construction of various measures of civic
engagement, operationalized as citizens’ participation in voluntary organizations.
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Table 5.1: Voluntary Association Membership
Not a
member
Inactive
member
Active
member
W5 W6 W5 W6 W5 W6
Church or religious org. 61.1 60.9 19.4 20.2 19.5 18.8
Sport or recreational org. 70.7 71.8 11.3 10.9 18.0 17.3
Art, music or educational org. 79.6 81.5 8.8 8.6 11.6 9.9
Labor Union 83.2 85.3 11.2 9.5 5.6 5.2
Political party 86.1 87.5 9.7 8.9 4.2 3.6
Environmental org. 89.7 90.9 7.2 6.3 3.2 2.8
Professional association 86.1 87.7 7.8 7.0 6.1 5.4
Humanitarian or charitable org. 83.0 84.9 9.2 8.2 7.8 6.9
Other org. 92.5 90.4 2.5 4.4 5.0 5.2
Note: World Values Survey responses to the question worded, ‘Now I am going to read off
a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are
an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?’ The
table shows percentages drawn from the 18 country sample, weighted to a population of
1000 observations in each country survey (weight variable S018).
Source: Wave 5 (W5) and Wave 6 (W6) World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
Three separate measures drawn from Norris are provided for each country in Ta-
ble 5.2 (2002, pp. 147–148).1 The data comes from wave 6 of the WVS fielded over
2010 to 2013. The first measure shows the percentage of respondents within each
society who are members, either active or inactive, in one or more voluntary associ-
ations. The second provides the average number of associations a citizen is a part of
within each country. The third—the civic engagement scale which will be employed
in the analyses in this chapter—is formed from Norris’ index of associational ac-
tivism (2002, pp. 147–148). The scale ranges from zero to 18, weighting active and
inactive membership across the nine categories of voluntary organizations. Active
memberships contribute two points to the scale, inactive memberships one point.2
The first measure provides an indication of how widespread participation is
within a society. At the lower end, around one in three citizens of Romania and
Spain are members of an association; at the higher end, almost all Ghanaians, at 97
percent, are members of at least one association. There are also high levels of partici-
pation, between 85 and 90 percent, in the the oldest democracies in the sample—New
Zealand, Sweden, Australia, and the United States. The average across all countries
is 66 percent. The next measure shows that the average number of memberships
across these countries is 1.6. The average number of memberships is highest in New
Zealand, at 2.85, and lowest in Spain, at 0.63. The civic engagement scale weighting
1Also see Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001, p. 808).
2A Cronbach’s alpha reliability test for the civic engagement scale has been conducted, indi-
cating that the scale is of moderate reliability (α=0.66) (see Hinton et al., 2004, p. 363).
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Table 5.2: Measures of Voluntary Association Membership
Membership in
any association
(%)
Mean number of
memberships
Mean civic
engagement
scale
Ghana 97 2.46 3.81
New Zealand 90 2.85 4.42
Sweden 89 2.38 3.26
Australia 86 2.33 3.47
United States 85 2.64 3.90
Trinidad and Tobago 83 2.33 3.31
Netherlands 77 1.62 2.36
Germany 74 1.48 2.14
South Korea 71 1.54 2.11
Peru 64 1.18 1.79
Slovenia 60 1.35 2.02
Chile 59 1.49 2.19
Cyprus 53 1.23 1.79
Japan 49 0.88 1.30
Uruguay 43 0.76 1.18
Poland 43 0.91 1.36
Spain 36 0.63 0.91
Romania 36 0.69 1.03
Overall 66 1.60 2.35
Note: The civic engagement scale (0–18) incorporates active (+2) and inactive (+1) member-
ships across 9 types of voluntary association.
Source: Wave 6 World Values Survey (2015b).
active and inactive memberships is highest once again in New Zealand, and lowest
in Spain.3 The average across all countries is 2.35. This civic engagement scale is
the primary measure that will be used in this chapter as it makes use of the entirety
of information provided by respondents regarding their engagement in voluntary
associations.
In a few countries these results are driven by participation in religious organiza-
tions. Excluding membership in religious associations in Ghana leads to a drop in the
membership rate from 97 percent to 63 percent. In Trinidad and Tobago the drop is
from 83 to 49 percent. For most countries the difference is less dramatic, averaging
13 percent. When religion is excluded, it is the advanced democracies which have
the highest rates of membership in voluntary associations—New Zealand, Sweden,
Australia, and the United States.4
3The civic engagement scale ranges from 0 to 18, and consists of both active memberships,
which contribute two points each to the scale, and inactive memberships, which contribute one
point each to the scale.
4Results will be tested with and without religious organizations incorporated so as this does
not affect the results, an approach taken by Curtis et al. (2001, 1992).
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Figure 5.1: Trends in Civic Engagement over Time
Notes: Charts plot the mean civic engagement scale (0-18) for each country over time. The scale
is constructed from questions worded identically in each survey on active and inactive membership
in 9 types of voluntary associations. Surveys were fielded in some countries on more occasions than
others.
Sources: World Values Surveys waves 1 to 6 (2014; 2015b).
In addition to differences between countries, there is also variation within each
country over time. Figure 5.1 shows the mean point on the civic engagement scale for
all 18 countries at each time the question set on voluntary association membership
has been fielded. The data is sourced from waves 1 to 6 of the WVS, though as not
each country has been fielded in each survey wave, and as the battery of questions
regarding voluntary association membership has not been asked in each wave, there
are between two and four data points for each country. These trends show that
citizens in countries with a longer history of democracy tend to be more active in
civic life—see New Zealand, Sweden and Australia for example—compared to newer
democracies, Poland and Uruguay. For the few countries that incorporate long term
trends from the 1980s, Australia, South Korea, and Japan, the trajectory tends to
be upwards over time, although in many countries there is a more recent decline
over the 2000s.
The relationship between democratic experience and civic engagement is further
highlighted in Figure 5.2, which plots the years since each country’s democratic
117
transition (log transformed) against the mean of the civic engagement scale.5 There
is a strong positive relationship between democracy and civic engagement (r=0.57,
n=19, p=0.01). This relationship is stronger still if membership in religious orga-
nizations is removed from the scale (r=0.71, n=19, p<0.001). Democratic societies
allow the freedom of association and speech that is required for a healthy civic soci-
ety to emerge. After a country transitions to democracy a vibrant civil society does
not emerge overnight (Lipset, 1994, p. 3; Curtis et al., 2001, p. 787); it takes time for
democracy to become consolidated, including the development of civic associations
and citizens’ widespread participation within them (Linz and Stepan, 1996b). Vari-
ous studies have shown that the post-communist countries in particular have lower
levels of civic engagement, relative to both older democracies and other postauthor-
itarian states (Howard, 2002; Mondak and Gearing, 1998). This is evident in the
post-communist countries in this sample, Poland and Romania, which have some of
the lowest levels of voluntary membership across the 18 countries.
Figure 5.2: Relationship between Democratic Experience and Civic Engagement
Sources: Civic Engagement Scale constructed from Wave 6 World Values Survey (2015b).
Years of democratic experience is calculated as the difference between the survey year,
and the variable ‘PolityIV-durable’ from Norris’ Democracy Cross-national Data, which
represents the latest regime transition date (2015).
This section has provided an overview of the measurement of civic engagement,
and the trends in the 18 country sample from the WVS. Whilst it is not possible to
5The log of democratic experience is taken to reflect a non-linear relationship between demo-
cratic experience and civic engagement.
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get a perfect measure of civic membership,6 the civic engagement scale takes account
of both active and inactive memberships across a wide range of association types.
Moreover, the question was worded identically in the surveys fielded before and after
the crisis hit, enabling comparison over time. The next section tests the hypotheses
as to how civic engagement has been affected by the global financial crisis.
5.2 Mobilization or Retreat?
The overarching question to investigate is whether citizens were mobilized to par-
ticipate in civic associations following the crisis, or whether, on the contrary, they
retreated from civic groups. Specific hypotheses around this were developed at both
the country and individual level in Chapter 2. At the country level, the retreat
hypothesis would predict that in countries affected by the crisis to a greater extent,
civic engagement would be more likely to decrease (H2.1), as more citizens would be
experiencing the resource constraints that are typically associated with a lower like-
lihood of participation (Norris, 2002; Schlozman et al., 2012). On the other hand,
the mobilization hypothesis would predict the opposite—that in countries more af-
fected by the crisis, civic engagement would be more likely to increase, as citizens
would be mobilized to participate by the crisis (H2.3).
H2.1: In countries hit harder by the crisis, civic engagement will be more likely
to decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H2.3: In countries hit harder by the crisis, civic engagement will be more likely
to increase after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
To investigate how civic engagement has changed in the 18 countries between
the two most recent waves of the WVS, independent samples t-tests are conducted
to assess whether there are significant differences between the civic engagement
scale before and after the crisis. The results are presented in Table 5.3, showing a
statistically significant decline in the mean civic engagement scale in nine countries,
representing half of the sample. In just two countries, Australia and Romania,
there is a significant increase. In Romania, civic engagement increases from the
lowest level in the sample, a reflection of its communist history (Howard, 2002).
Australia is unique for having largely avoided the effects of the global financial crisis.
There were also increases in South Korea and Germany, falling short of significance
in both cases. South Korea is another country that avoided a recession during
6For example these items do not take account of multiple memberships in one category (Norris,
2002, p. 147).
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Table 5.3: Trends in Civic Engagement
Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change
Ghana 4.71 3.81 −0.91∗∗
Sweden 3.91 3.26 −0.64∗∗
Netherlands 2.76 2.36 −0.40∗∗
Japan 1.65 1.30 −0.35∗∗
Trinidad and Tobago 3.63 3.31 −0.32∗
Chile 2.47 2.19 −0.28∗
Spain 1.17 0.91 −0.26∗∗
Peru 1.99 1.79 −0.20∗
Uruguay 1.36 1.18 −0.18∗
Slovenia 2.16 2.02 −0.14
Cyprus 1.92 1.79 −0.13
Poland 1.43 1.36 −0.07
United States 3.89 3.90 0.01
New Zealand 4.40 4.42 0.02
Germany 1.99 2.14 0.15
South Korea 1.94 2.11 0.16
Australia 3.24 3.47 0.23∗
Romania 0.44 1.03 0.58∗∗
Total 2.50 2.35 −0.15∗∗
Note: The table presents means of the civic engagement scale, which is constructed
using weighted responses to the questions regarding active or inactive membership
across nine types of voluntary organizations. Scale ranges from 0-18, with each active
membership contributing 2 points to the scale, and each inactive membership 1 point.
Shaded countries experienced a recession during the global financial crisis.
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
the crisis, and Germany is considered to have fared well in comparison to other
countries, although it did not avoid recession. In the remaining 7 countries there is
no significant difference. Overall, the trend between the survey waves is significantly
negative, declining from an average of 2.50 on the scale, to 2.35. Countries that
avoided recession, those not shaded in Table 5.3, are more likely to have avoided a
decline in civic engagement.
In order to further test the competing hypotheses of retreat and mobilization,
Figure 5.3 plots growth rates over 2008 to 2009 against the change in the civic en-
gagement scale. Using GDP growth from the crisis peak accounts for variation in
crisis impacts between countries, beyond the dichotomous measure of which coun-
tries entered into recession during the crisis. Incorporating all countries there is no
correlation between the two variables (r=-0.09, n=18, p=0.73). Incorporating only
those countries classified as having very high human development according to the
Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme, 2016), the
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relationship is positive and reasonably strong although it does not reach significance
at the 0.05 level (r=0.45, n=14, p=0.10). This evidence is broadly consistent with
the retreat hypothesis—in countries harder hit by the crisis, civic engagement de-
creased to a greater extent than in those countries that fared relatively well in the
crisis, such as Australia, albeit this only holds in the most developed countries in
the dataset. Of the less developed countries in the dataset, including Ghana, Peru,
and Uruguay, there are too few to assess the relationship between the depth crisis
and the change in civic engagement.
Figure 5.3: GDP Growth and Change in Civic Engagement
Note: Change in Civic Engagement measures the difference in the civic engagement scale
country means (0–18) between WVS wave 5 (2004–2007) and wave 6 (2010–2013).
Sources: Civic engagement from the wave 5 and 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b);
GDP growth from the World Bank (2015a); Human Development Index (HDI) catego-
rizations from the United Nations Development Programme (2016).
These hypotheses can also be explored at the individual level. From the exist-
ing literature, we know that those with more resources, including education, income,
and labor force participation, are more likely to participate in voluntary associations
(Schlozman et al., 2012; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). If this continues
to be the case we would expect that after the crisis those with fewer resources partic-
ipate less, much as before (H2.2). If, on the other hand, those more vulnerable to the
crisis, such as the unemployed, those on lower incomes, and those with lower levels
of education, were mobilized by the crisis, it would be expected that the relationship
between resources and civic engagement would weaken after the crisis (H2.4).
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H2.2: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be less likely
to participate in voluntary associations after the crisis.
H2.4: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to participate in voluntary associations after the crisis.
To test these two hypotheses, bivariate negative binomial regression models are
conducted to investigate the effect of various dimensions of resources on the civic
engagement scale. Negative binomial regression is appropriate here as the data re-
semble count data, tallying up the number of active and inactive association mem-
berships.7 University degree, income, employment status and financial satisfaction
are considered as predictors. University degree is measured dichotomously—those
with a degree compared to everyone else; the unemployed are compared against
a base category of those in the labor force (whether full-time, part-time, or self-
employed); income has been measured in deciles on a scale from one to ten; and
financial satisfaction was reported on a scale from one to ten. The results of these
regression models are presented in Figure 5.4.
Looking first at education, in the majority of cases having a university degree
has a significant positive affect on voluntary association membership. The coeffi-
cients are similar across countries, indicating that there is not a lot of variation
cross-nationally in the effect that education has on an individual’s level of civic en-
gagement. Within each country the confidence bars in most cases overlap between
the pre- and post-crisis survey waves, suggesting that university education is having
a similar effect before and after the crisis. Romania and Uruguay are the exceptions,
where education has a positive effect both before and after the crisis, although the
size of the effect shifts. Japan is the only country where university education has
no effect on civic engagement. This could be linked to Japan’s lower level of civic
engagement overall, a finding consistent with other cross-national studies (Curtis
et al., 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). For the multilevel model in-
corporating all countries education has a similar positive effect pre- and post-crisis.
Income also has a positive and significant effect on civic engagement in most
cases, including the multilevel model incorporating all countries. However, there is
a greater degree of variation in the effect income has between countries. In Spain
7Active memberships contribute twice as much to the scale as inactive memberships, as per
Norris (2002, pp. 147–148). Negative binomial regression is more appropriate than Poisson regres-
sion in this instance as it allows for over-dispersion, as indicated by a non-zero alpha value.
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Figure 5.4: Effects of Resources on Civic Engagement
Note: Charts plot coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for negative binomial
regression models before and after the crisis. The models regress university degree,
income, unemployment, and financial satisfaction respectively on the civic engagement
scale (0-18). University degree is dichotomous. The unemployed are compared against
labor force participants. Income and financial satisfaction are on ten-point scales.
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
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income has a large positive effect both before and after the crisis, in New Zealand
and Sweden the effect is also positive but smaller, in the case of New Zealand falling
short of significance at the 0.05 level. Once again the overlapping confidence intervals
before and after the crisis, both within each country, and in the multilevel model,
indicate that the effect of income cannot be considered significantly different after
the crisis from what it was before. It continues to be those with higher incomes that
are more more active in voluntary associations.
The coefficient for unemployment is in all cases either negative or not significantly
different from zero. Whilst the effect of being unemployed, compared to being in the
labor force, in many cases does not reach statistical significance, the overall trend is
clearly negative, indicating that the unemployed are less active in civic associations.
In the multilevel model unemployment has a negative effect before and after the
crisis, although only reaches statistical significance after the crisis.
The final chart shows the effect of the respondents’ reported financial satisfaction
on civic engagement, as subjective economic perceptions, whether pertaining to the
country or one’s own finances, are found to matter in predicting political outcomes
(see for instance Blekesaune, 2007; Gabel and Whitten, 1997).8 Similar to income,
financial satisfaction trends positive cross-nationally, and reaches statistical signifi-
cance in most, but not all cases. The multilevel model shows financial satisfaction
having a similar positive effect before and after the crisis, as indicated by the similar
coefficients and overlapping confidence intervals. Comparing income and financial
satisfaction, both coded from one to ten, the effect size is similar in magnitude and
direction, indicating both objective and subjective income measures matter for civic
engagement.
How do these results inform the hypotheses regarding individual behavior and
the crisis? The data reveals a pattern of continuity rather than change—it continues
to be those with university educations, higher incomes, those in the labor force, and
those more satisfied with their financial circumstances that are more likely to be
engaged in civic associations. There was no mobilization of those most vulnerable
to the crisis, as predicted by H2.4, so this hypothesis can be rejected. Instead, there
is support for H2.2 which suggested those with fewer resources would remain less
likely to participate in civic groups. Those more vulnerable in society did not become
further demobilized, they just remain similarly inactive in associations, relative to
those with greater resources.
The above results come from bivariate regression models that explore the impact
of various predictors on civic engagement. To investigate the effects of country level
8The wording for this item in the World Values Survey is ‘How satisfied are you with the finan-
cial situation of your household?’, with responses from 1 to 10 where 1 is ‘completely dissatisfied’
and 10 is ‘completely satisfied’.
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and individual level predictors on civic engagement, a multilevel negative binomial
regression model is conducted taking account of a range of control variables explored
in previous studies (see Table 5.4). Multilevel modeling enables the investigation
of predictors at two levels, reflecting the hierarchical nature of the data which is
individuals nested within countries. Negative binomial regression is once again ap-
propriate for the dependent variable which is a cumulative count of memberships in
voluntary organizations, with active memberships weighted to contribute twice as
much to the total as inactive memberships.9
Table 5.4 and Figure 5.5 present the results of the regression investigating the
effects of various independent variables on an individual’s level of involvement in
voluntary associations. The same regression model has been run on the WVS data
from before the crisis (2004-2007) and after the crisis began (2010-2013). This
enables a comparison of the impact of various independent variables at the two time
points. The chart (5.5) and table (5.4) present the same information, although the
chart eases comparison of coefficients and confidence intervals. Where the confidence
intervals overlap from before and after the crisis for the same variable, the variable
cannot be said to be having a significantly different affect after the crisis to what it
was before.
At the country level a range of contextual factors previous research has demon-
strated relevant in predicting civic engagement are incorporated. This includes
democratic experience, log transformed to reflect a non-linear relationship with the
dependent variable (see Figure 5.2).10 Protestant background is controlled for as
historically Protestant nations are shown to have more vibrant civil societies than
those influenced by other religious traditions including Catholicism (Curtis et al.,
2001; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Additionally economic conditions are included
in the model, both GDP growth and unemployment, each taken from a two year
period before each wave of the surveys was fielded (2003–2004; 2008–2009). Incor-
porating economic conditions enables an investigation of the effects of the crisis,
and reflects previous research where national economic indicators were shown to be
relevant predictors of civic engagement (Curtis et al., 2001; Lipset, 1959, p. 84).
The analysis of country level predictors of civic engagement is largely consis-
tent with previous literature (for example Curtis et al., 2001, 1992; Schofer and
Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001), and does not suggest any major change following the
crisis. Democratic experience is positively associated with civic engagement both
before and after the crisis, although the effect is weaker after the crisis. GDP growth
9For similar modeling approaches with civic engagement as a dependent variable see Schofer
& Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001; Karakoc, 2013; Beyerlein & Hipp, 2006; Curtis, et al., 2001; Smith
& Wiest, 2005.
10Studies including Curtis et al. (2001) and Wessels (1997) have shown a relationship between
democratic experience and civic engagement.
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Table 5.4: Predicting Civic Engagement Before and After the Crisis
Pre-crisis (2004-2007) Post-crisis (2010-2013)
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)
Country level predictors
Log of years democracy 0.67∗∗ (0.15) 0.36∗∗ (0.10)
GDP growth 0.18∗ (0.08) 0.08 (0.07)
Unemployment −0.05∗ (0.02) −0.09∗ (0.05)
Historically Protestant 0.58∗ (0.26) 0.84∗ (0.34)
Individual level predictors
Employment status (base: labor force participants)
Unemployed −0.47∗∗ (0.13) −0.20∗∗ (0.09)
Other employment status −0.34∗∗ (0.07) −0.13 (0.09)
Income 0.10∗∗ (0.03) 0.11∗∗ (0.02)
University degree 0.80∗∗ (0.15) 0.73∗∗ (0.14)
Age range (base: 18-29)
Aged 30-49 −0.03 (0.07) −0.06 (0.10)
Aged 50 and over 0.14 (0.11) −0.03 (0.13)
Gender (female) −0.20∗ (0.08) −0.19∗ (0.08)
Postmaterialist (12-item) 0.12∗∗ (0.04) 0.19∗∗ (0.03)
Married 0.00 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07)
Trust 0.36∗∗ (0.08) 0.47∗∗ (0.08)
Religious 0.83∗∗ (0.08) 0.73∗∗ (0.09)
Constant −1.73∗ (0.67) −0.18 (0.57)
N (countries) 18 18
N (respondents) 17,936 20,576
ICC 0.11 0.08
Note: Hierarchical negative binomial regression with random intercepts produced using Stata’s
menbreg command. The dependent variable is the civic engagement scale ranging from 0 to
18. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Sources: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b), with country level indicators
from the World Bank (2015a, 2015b) and Norris (2015).
is positively associated with civic engagement, though only reaches significance be-
fore the crisis. A country’s level of unemployment is negatively associated with civic
engagement before and after the crisis, while being historically Protestant is posi-
tively associated with civic engagement before and after the crisis. As confidence
intervals overlap for the coefficients from the two survey waves, we cannot be confi-
dent that the effect has changed following the crisis (see Figure 7.7). The greatest
change would seem to be a weakening of the effect of democratic experience. These
findings underscore the importance of economic conditions at the country level, with
GDP growth positively associated with civic engagement, and unemployment neg-
atively associated. This supports the retreat hypothesis (H2.1), as poor economic
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Figure 5.5: Predicting Civic Engagement – Coefficient Plot
Note: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for a hierarchical neg-
ative binomial regression with random intercepts produced using the Stata menbreg
command. The dependent variable is the civic engagement scale ranging from 0–18. The
base category for age is 18–29. The base category for employment status is labor force
participants.
Sources: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015), with country level
indicators from the World Bank (2015a, 2015b) and Norris (2015).
conditions are shown to play a demobilizing rather than a mobilizing role in civic
engagement.
At the individual level the results show the unemployed participate in civic as-
sociations less than those in the labor force, controlling for other factors. Similarly
women are significantly less likely to participate than men. Those with higher in-
comes, and higher levels of education participate more, alongside those who are
more trusting, religious, and postmaterialist respectively. There are no significant
differences based on age group, or marital status. These results are largely con-
sistent with previous research findings, though other studies have found significant
differences between age groups (Curtis, et al., 1992; Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas,
2001), and have found married people participate more (Knoke and Thomson, 1977;
Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001; Scott, 1957). Between the two time points
we see little change in these relationships, both in terms of direction and magnitude.
This echoes the findings of recent work on the financial crisis that examines other
dimensions of political engagement, including protest, and voting, where the pattern
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of political behavior and opinion is one of continuation, with ‘surprisingly muted and
moderate’ responses, rather than considerable change (Bermeo and Bartels, 2014,
p. 31).
That these relationships remain similar before and after the crisis does have con-
sequences for political behavior during times of crisis. The data does not support
the mobilization hypothesis (H2.4), that the unemployed and other relatively disad-
vantaged groups, such as young people and women, were mobilized to participate in
civic associations as a result of the crisis. Rather, the data supports the hypothesis
that those more vulnerable would remain less likely participants in civic associa-
tions (H2.2). These findings are consistent with the results at the country level
which showed a greater decline in civic engagement in countries harder hit by the
crisis, in line with the retreat hypothesis (H2.1). To the extent that crisis leads to
lower incomes and higher levels of unemployment, and that those groups participate
less in voluntary associations than those more privileged, one would expect a decline
in civic engagement overall during times of crisis, even though the socio-economic
profile of participants has not changed.
5.3 Membership by Type of Association
The above analysis examined civic engagement across all measured voluntary asso-
ciation types. This included a wide range of associations, and there may be reasons
to expect that some types of associations may be affected by the crisis in different
ways to others. The previous literature makes distinctions between old and new
social movement organizations (see Norris, 2002; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas,
2001; Wessels, 1997). Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001), using the WVS
question battery employed here, categorize unions, political parties and professional
associations as old social movement organizations, and humanitarian and environ-
mental organizations as new social movement organizations. Beyond those organi-
zations seeking to have an influence in the political sphere, the WVS also asks about
membership in more recreational organizations, including membership in a ‘sport
or recreational organization’ and ‘art, music or educational organization’. Though
these groups serve no direct political purpose, Putnam (2000) has made the argu-
ment that these civic associations are vital to the lifeblood of democracy, providing
citizens with the skills and networks to be active participants in democratic society.
Given the different roles of distinct types of associations, it might be expected
that, to the extent that civic engagement is affected by the economic crisis, it may
vary by the type of association. If people are mobilized to participate in the political
process, either through old or new social movement organizations, then it would be
expected that memberships would increase in these types of associations, but not
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others (H2.5). Even in the context of a political mobilization, it would be fair to
expect that greater levels of resource constraints would lead to a reduction in recre-
ational association memberships. Association memberships typically require both
time and money (Wessels, 1997, p. 203), which are in shorter supply during a crisis,
and for recreational groups participation within them serves no direct political pur-
pose. Alternatively, it may be found that the resource constraints take effect on all
types of association memberships, with no mobilization trends evident in those or-
ganizations that serve political purposes during a crisis. Wessels for instance found
that human capital resources, including income and education, matter for partic-
ipation in both old and new social movement organizations (1997, pp. 206–208),
so any reduction in these resources could foreseeably impact membership levels. In
that case it would be expected that membership declines would be observed across
all types of association (H2.6).
H2.5: After the crisis, membership in politically oriented voluntary associations
would increase, while it would decrease in recreational associations.
H2.6: After the crisis, voluntary association membership would decline across
all types of associations.
The first area to investigate concerns different types of associations in the po-
litical sphere. To test whether there was a mobilization or demobilization in par-
ticular types of memberships, Table 5.5 presents the trends for old social move-
ment organizations—unions, political parties, and professional associations, and new
social movement organizations—humanitarian and environmental organizations re-
spectively, using Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas’ classification (2001). This shows
similar trends across the different types of civic associations. In 14 of the 18 countries
the trend for old social movement organizations is negative, and there is a significant
decline in eight of these countries. Only Romania experienced a significant increase
in old social movement memberships, and it did so from the lowest start point of
all 18 countries. Similarly for new social movement organizations, 11 of the 18 show
a negative trend, with eight countries experiencing a significant drop. Only two
countries experience a significant increase in membership, including Romania again,
which is once more starting from the lowest point within the sample of countries (a
mean of 0.03 in the pre-crisis survey), and Germany, a country considered to have
fared well during the economic crisis.
Two observations can be made from the organizational membership trends de-
scribed in Table 5.5. First, countries that did not go into recession mostly avoided
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Table 5.5: Membership Trends in Old and New Social Movement Organizations
Old Social Movement membership New Social Movement membership
Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change
Ghana 1.22 0.94 −0.29∗∗ 0.65 0.33 −0.32∗∗
Netherlands 0.58 0.40 −0.18∗∗ 0.46 0.31 −0.15∗∗
Chile 0.54 0.40 −0.15∗∗ 0.44 0.29 −0.15∗∗
Cyprus 0.77 0.62 −0.14∗ 0.27 0.30 0.02
Sweden 1.09 0.96 −0.13∗∗ 0.55 0.52 −0.03
Peru 0.37 0.25 −0.12∗∗ 0.35 0.23 −0.12∗∗
Trinidad and Tobago 0.74 0.65 −0.09 0.60 0.50 −0.11∗
Spain 0.26 0.17 −0.08∗∗ 0.20 0.14 −0.07∗∗
Slovenia 0.57 0.48 −0.08 0.35 0.32 −0.02
Japan 0.39 0.32 −0.07∗ 0.13 0.09 −0.04∗
Poland 0.38 0.32 −0.06 0.22 0.18 −0.05
United States 1.25 1.20 −0.05 0.65 0.68 0.02
South Korea 0.31 0.28 −0.02 0.20 0.23 0.03
Uruguay 0.26 0.25 −0.01 0.19 0.12 −0.07∗∗
Germany 0.35 0.38 0.03 0.21 0.28 0.06∗
Australia 0.77 0.82 0.06 0.61 0.67 0.06
New Zealand 0.88 0.96 0.08 0.82 0.83 0.01
Romania 0.20 0.30 0.11∗∗ 0.03 0.11 0.09∗∗
Total 0.61 0.54 −0.07∗∗ 0.38 0.34 −0.05∗∗
Note: Old Social Movement organization membership is measured on a scale of 0-6, reflecting membership in either a union, a political party,
or a professional association, with each active membership counting two points towards the scale, each inactive membership, one point. New
Social Movement organization membership is measured on a scale of 0-4, reflecting membership in either an environmental organization or a
humanitarian/charitable organization, with each active membership counting two points towards the scale, each inactive membership, one point.
Shaded countries experienced a recession during the global financial crisis.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015).
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significant declines in old or new social movement membership.11 Second, countries
that experienced a decline in one type of association, typically saw a decline in the
other type of association also. This is demonstrated in Figure 5.6 which plots the
change in old social movement organization memberships against the change in new
social movement organization memberships between the two survey waves. There is
a strong positive relationship between these two indicators (r=0.84, n=18, p<0.01).
Where one type of associational membership increased/decreased, in most cases the
same trend was observed in the other membership type. The overall trend is one of
decline in both new and old social movement organizations. This means that we can
reject the hypothesis that membership in politically oriented voluntary associations
would increase after the crisis (H2.5).
Figure 5.6: Change in Old and New Social Movement Membership
Note: Old Social Movement Membership incorporates unions, political parties, and pro-
fessional associations (Scale 0-6). New Social Movement Membership incorporates en-
vironmental organizations and humanitarian/charitable organizations (Scale 0-4). Each
active membership contributes two points towards the scale, each inactive membership,
one point. The change is the difference in the country means between Wave 5 and Wave
6 of the World Values Survey.
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
The analysis so far covers the more politically oriented civic associations. What
about civic groups that serve no particular purpose in the political arena, though
11Ghana is the exception, though whilst the country did not go into recession GDP growth
declined by 4.3 percent from 2008 to 2009, and at the household level the effects were felt, including
a reduction in household purchasing power, falling remittances, fewer jobs, and higher food prices
(World Food Programme, 2010).
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nevertheless contribute to a healthy civic life? These sport, recreation, music and
art groups, according to Putnam’s argument, enhance the functioning of democracy
(2000; 1993). Both hypotheses predicted a decline in recreational memberships after
the crisis. From the above analysis we know that there was a decline in politically
oriented memberships, so the question is now whether recreational memberships
followed the same trend.
From the question battery in the WVS, an index is created of the more recre-
ational associations. This includes the items ‘sport or recreational organization’ and
‘art, music or educational organization’. Similar to the other scales, active member-
ships count two points, inactive memberships, one point, leading to a scale from 0
to 4. An analysis of the trends from the survey waves fielded before and after the
crisis respectively, showed in 13 of the 18 countries there was a downward trend,
which is statistically significant in 5 of these cases (table excluded for parsimony).
Once again it is only in Romania that there was a significant increase from the
lowest starting point. Overall the scale decreases from an average of 0.80 to 0.74,
a statistically significant decline (p<0.01). To assess how this change relates to
that of other associations, the change in the mean of this scale for each of the 18
countries is correlated against the change in the scales for old and new social move-
ment organization memberships respectively. The associated correlation matrix is
presented in Table 5.6. This reveals a strong and significant positive correlation
between the change in the various association types from before and after the crisis.
If membership in one type of association increased, chances are the same trend was
observed in other types of associations. On the whole the pattern is one of decline,
or demobilization, rather than mobilization.
Table 5.6: Change in Association Memberships Correlation Matrix
Change REC Change OSM
Change OSM 0.83∗∗
Change NSM 0.71∗∗ 0.84∗∗
Note: Table shows Pearson’s r.
OSM: Old Social Movement Organization membership.
NSM: New Social Movement Organization membership.
REC: Sport, recreational, art, music, or educational organiza-
tion membership.
∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015).
This section has tested whether the trends observed in the overall civic engage-
ment scale were driven by particular types of associations. The results show firstly
that the overall trend across association types is negative, with around half of the
countries showing a significant decline since the pre-crisis survey, and only one or
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two outliers showing the opposite trend. Second, the results show that the trends
in each country are closely correlated across association types. Membership in very
different types of associations, including old social movement organizations, new
social movement organizations, and recreational associations, were affected in much
the same way. These results align with Wessels (1997, p. 216) who found that indi-
cators of modernity, including income and education, mattered for civic engagement
overall though did not have particularized effects for different types of associations.
5.4 Conclusion
Civic engagement is widely considered to be crucial for democracy. Citizen in-
volvement in voluntary organizations helps establish networks of association and
participatory norms, which has positive flow-on effects for citizen engagement in
democratic politics. Previous research has established a relationship between eco-
nomic conditions and civic engagement (for example Curtis et al., 2001; Wessels,
1997), though this has not been explored in the context of a major economic crisis.
The global economic crisis which began in 2008—regarded as the most severe since
the depression of the 1930s—gives cause to further examine the relationship. This
chapter has examined the impact of the crisis on civic engagement with WVS data
from before and after the crisis began in 18 democratic countries.
The aggregate trends show civic engagement declined significantly after the crisis
in around half of the countries under study. In only two countries, Australia and
Romania, was there a significant increase. Both are unique: Australia was relatively
unaffected by the global crisis; and in Romania civic engagement increased from the
lowest starting point in the sample of 18 countries. There was a positive relationship
between GDP growth at the peak of the crisis and the change in civic engagement,
although this was only evident within the more developed countries in the dataset.
In other words, countries that were harder hit by the crisis were more likely to
see declines in civic engagement since the crisis. This finding is consistent with
the hypothesis that the crisis had a demobilizing effect on voluntary association
memberships. There is no evidence to suggest the crisis mobilized participation in
civic associations, rather, harsher impacts led to greater degrees of withdrawal from
civic participation.
The multilevel analysis of the WVS data provided further information on the
dynamics of participation in voluntary associations before and after the economic
crisis hit. National economic indicators were associated with civic engagement before
and after the crisis—unemployment levels were negatively associated with participa-
tion, whereas with GDP growth the relationship was positive (though falling short
of significance after the crisis), lending further support to the view that poor eco-
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nomic conditions depress civic involvement. Analysis at the individual level further
underscored this finding of retreat. Before and after the crisis, an individual’s re-
sources, including education, income level, labor force participation, and financial
satisfaction were associated with a greater degree of participation in civic associa-
tions. There were no significant changes in the nature of these relationships after
the crisis. This suggests those most vulnerable to the crisis remained just as unlikely
to join an association as before.
The final section explored how these trends played out across different types
of association. Distinguishing between old social movement organizations—unions,
political parties and professional associations, new social movement organizations—
environmental and humanitarian organizations, and also more recreational groups
including art, music, sport and educational groups, showed the decline in civic en-
gagement was not driven by a particular type of association, but was evident across
association types. This demonstrates that there was no mobilization within the
more politically oriented organizations, rather there was a significant decline across
the various organizational types in around half of the countries, with no significant
change in most of the remaining countries.
These results contribute to our understanding of how political engagement and
participation may be affected by economic shocks. Whilst existing work on voting
behavior suggests a major crisis may increase the inequality of participation (see
Karp and Milazzo, 2016), the results presented here find that not to be the case
for civic engagement. Individual level data shows the most vulnerable in society
did not participate to a greater or lesser extent than they would during ordinary
times. The aggregate level results suggest major economic shocks, in creating greater
levels of disadvantage in societies as a whole, may depress the level of participation
in voluntary associations. One implication of this is that during times of hardship
when the functions provided by voluntary associations may be of greater need, this
need will not necessarily be matched by greater degrees of voluntarism. The next
chapter will explore the impacts of the crisis on political protest, using a similar
approach with the data from the WVS in 18 countries.
134
Chapter 6
Political Protest
Joining in some kind of protest is one way citizens might respond to the crisis. While
opportunities to influence the government via elections only appear periodically,
citizens can initiate protest actions intended to influence the government at the
time of their choosing. Chapter 2 outlined four theoretical approaches that might
predict how citizen protest would be affected including grievances, resources, values,
and political opportunities. This chapter will test hypotheses derived from these
theories with WVS data from before and after the crisis, and with data on the
number of protest events from ICEWS.
The first two theoretical approaches to be tested, concerning grievances and re-
sources respectively, are juxtaposed against one another. According to grievance
theories it is those with grievances who would be expected to protest in the after-
math of a crisis (Gurr, 1968, 1970). Thus according to this approach, we would
expect those more vulnerable to the crisis, such as the unemployed, those on low
incomes, and those with lower levels of education, to be mobilized by the crisis.
Resource theories on the other hand, drawing upon the literature on the inequal-
ity of participation (Verba et al., 1995), would predict that it is those with greater
resources who would continue to be active in protest. With more individuals experi-
encing resource hardship after the crisis, it could be expected that there is a decline
in protest participation as those with characteristics typically negatively associated
with protest become more numerous.
The third area to be tested is Inglehart’s values approach (1979; 1997), regarding
the role of postmaterialist values in shaping protest behavior before and after the
crisis. Several predictions about the consequences of the crisis are identified. This
includes a predicted decline in postmaterialism in countries hard hit by the crisis,
that may have repercussions for protest participation. On the one hand, if it con-
tinues to be postmaterialists that protest and there is a decline in postmaterialism,
a decline in protest could also be expected. On the other hand, materialists could
be mobilized by the crisis, as their needs are less likely to be met during a crisis.
135
Finally, the political opportunities approach stemming from the social movement
literature posits that it is openings in the opportunities for citizens to engage in the
political process that would lead to protest (Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1998). This
body of theory led to the hypothesis that citizens may be mobilized to protest in
response to governments’ policy interventions seeking to address the crisis, rather
than the crisis in and of itself. Specifically, this hypothesis predicted that protest
may emerge in response to austerity policies including the IMF and European Union
bailouts that led to the imposition of harsh austerity measures in Europe. Govern-
ment policy responses provide a more specific target for protest actions than the
crisis more broadly, where numerous actors could have been blamed, including but
not limited to national governments (Stiglitz, 2010, pp. 6–12). This chapter will
test each of these theoretical areas in turn to investigate the effects of the crisis on
political protest.
6.1 Political Protest in 18 Societies
Political protest is measured using the battery of questions in the WVS concerning
participation in and potential to join various types of protest. The items include:
signing a petition; joining in boycotts; and attending peaceful demonstrations.1 For
each, the survey asks whether the respondent has either participated in that type of
protest before, might consider doing so, or would never do so. The question wording
is as follows:
I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take,
and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of
these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circum-
stances do it:
- signing a petition
- joining in boycotts
- attending peaceful demonstrations
(World Values Survey Association, 2012)
The frequencies across these protest items for Waves 5 and 6 of the WVS are
presented in Table 6.1. Signing a petition is the protest action that the most re-
spondents had done—40 percent had signed a petition in Wave 5, and 35 percent
had in Wave 6 of the WVS. Another third of respondents said they might sign a
petition, while the remaining 30 percent (29 percent in Wave 5) said that they would
1Although the WVS has asked at times about other forms of protest, including joining strikes,
these three items were asked in both the fifth and sixth waves of the survey, enabling a comparison
of the same measures over time.
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never sign a petition. As for joining a peaceful demonstration, 19 percent said they
had done so in Wave 5, this declined to 15 percent in Wave 6. The remaining 80
to 85 percent of the sample were roughly split as to whether they might join a
demonstration or would never do so. Joining a boycott was the item that the fewest
respondents had done, at less than 10 percent in both waves of the survey. Over 50
percent of respondents said that they would never join a boycott.
Table 6.1: Protest Potential and Participation
Would never do Might do Have done
W5 W6 W5 W6 W5 W6
Petitions 29.1 30.8 31.2 34.0 39.8 35.2
Boycotts 54.4 56.8 36.5 35.0 9.1 8.1
Demonstrations 41.1 40.5 40.0 44.6 18.9 14.9
Note: Percentages are drawn from the 18 country sample, weighted to a pop-
ulation of 1000 observations in each country survey (weight variable S018).
Source: Wave 5 (W5) and Wave 6 (W6) World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
From these question items, several measures of protest participation and poten-
tial can be constructed. Three different measures are presented in Table 6.2. The
first shows the percentage within each country that have participated in one or more
of the three types of protest, either a petition, a boycott, or a demonstration. A
large degree of variation is present in the sample, with 85 percent of New Zealan-
ders reporting that they had participated in some form of protest, while only 7
percent of Ghanaians had done so. Overall, the older democracies including New
Zealand, Sweden, Australia, the United States and Germany have higher levels of
protest participation than do the newer democracies in the sample, such as Ro-
mania and Uruguay. The second measure provides the average number of protest
items respondents ‘had done’ in each country. This ranges from 0.08 in Ghana, to
1.28 in New Zealand. In only three countries in the sample—New Zealand, Sweden
and Australia—the average number of protest types respondents had participated
in reached over 1.0.
The final measure is the mean of the political protest scale that incorporates
both protest participation and potential. It has been constructed by adding up the
number of protest items the respondent said they had done, each contributing one
point to the scale, and protest items the respondents said they might do, contributing
0.5 points each to the scale. This measure, which incorporates protest potential
alongside participation reveals a similar picture to the other two. Between the
different measures, there are few differences in the overall rankings of countries. The
final measure will be included in the analyses in this chapter as it takes account of
the entirety of information provided by respondents, providing the greatest variation
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between individuals’ potential for and participation in protest.2,3
Table 6.2: Measures of Political Protest
Participated in
protest (%)
Mean number of
protest types
participated in
Mean Political
Protest Scale
New Zealand 85 1.28 1.81
Sweden 70 1.12 1.76
Australia 73 1.04 1.68
United States 63 0.90 1.60
Germany 51 0.78 1.35
Netherlands 39 0.55 1.28
Trinidad and Tobago 29 0.46 1.22
South Korea 28 0.41 1.15
Spain 34 0.56 1.12
Cyprus 33 0.50 1.08
Poland 36 0.44 1.01
Slovenia 34 0.46 1.01
Japan 32 0.37 0.98
Peru 24 0.32 0.87
Chile 32 0.50 0.82
Uruguay 28 0.40 0.73
Romania 16 0.23 0.66
Ghana 7 0.08 0.44
Overall 40 0.58 1.14
Note: Political protest scale ranges from zero to 3, incorporating both protest participation and
potential across the three types of protest—petitions, boycotts and peaceful demonstrations.
Source: Wave 6 World Values Survey (2015b).
In addition to the differences across countries, there are changes over time within
each country. Figure 6.1 presents the trends in political protest over time in each
of the 18 countries selected for this study. The charts plot the mean values on the
protest scale, combining protest participation and potential for petitions, boycotts,
and demonstrations. The data is sourced from the World Values Survey (waves 1 to
6) and where available, the European Values Study (waves 1 to 4). In some cases
the data goes back to the early 1980s, whereas in others the data is only available
from the mid 2000s.
Whilst the nature of the trends in political protest differs according to the specific
circumstances of each country, there are some general trends evident cross-nationally.
Firstly, countries that have been democratic for a longer period of time, such as
2Barnes and Kaase (1979, pp. 57–96) have advocated for the inclusion of protest potential as
participation tends to be influenced by local political opportunities.
3A Cronbach’s alpha reliability test for the political protest scale has been conducted, indicating
that the scale has high reliability (α=0.75) (see Hinton et al., 2004, p. 363).
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Figure 6.1: Trends in Political Protest over Time
Notes: Charts plot the mean protest scale for each country over time. The scale is constructed
from questions worded identically in each survey on protest potential and participation, covering
petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations. Surveys were fielded in some countries on more occasions
than others.
Sources: World Values Surveys waves 1 to 6 (2014; 2015b); European Values Study waves 1 to 4
(2015).
Australia, the United States, and Sweden have much higher levels of political protest
than those that democratized more recently, for instance Spain and Chile. Second,
from the 1980s to the 2000s there was in most cases a gradual rise in protest activity.
Third, in recent years since the late 2000s in many countries there has been a slight
reversal in these long-term trends, for example in Spain, Sweden and Japan. This
decline is primarily evident in those countries with a high base of protest activity—
economically developed countries with a longer democratic history. This chapter
will investigate whether and how these trends have been influenced by the economic
shock of the global financial crisis.
It was evident in the above graphs and tables that countries that had been
democratic for a longer period of time had higher levels of protest participation
than newer democracies. To further highlight this, Figure 6.2 plots the years each
country has been democratic against each country’s average score on the political
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Figure 6.2: Relationship between Democratic Experience and Political Protest
Sources: Political Protest Scale constructed from Wave 6 World Values Survey (2015b).
Years of democratic experience is calculated as the difference between the survey year,
and the variable ‘PolityIV-durable’ from Norris’ Democracy Cross-National Data, which
represents the latest regime transition date (2015).
protest scale in Wave 6 of the WVS.4 A Pearson’s correlation test confirms a strong
positive relationship between democratic experience and political protest (r=0.84,
n=19, p<0.01). This is consistent with existing research which demonstrates that
countries with a history of active citizenship have higher levels of protest (see Norris,
2002, pp. 195–197). The reasons for this are similar to those discussed in the
previous chapter with respect to civic engagement. Democracies allow for freedom
of association and expression, and it takes time after a democratic transition for
democratic attitudes and behaviors to emerge (Linz and Stepan, 1996b). Political
protest is also linked to a flourishing civic life, discussed in Chapter 5, as voluntary
associations are often involved in organizing protest actions (Norris, 2007, 637–638).
This section has provided an overview of the dependent variable, political protest.
The discussion has included participation levels across the different types of protest,
including petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations. Trends in protest across coun-
tries, and over time were explored, alongside the relationship between political
protest and democratic support. The subsequent sections will test the hypothe-
ses identified in Chapter 2 regarding the effects of the crisis on political protest.
4Democratic experience has been log-transformed to reflect a non-linear relationship with po-
litical protest.
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The political protest scale discussed in this section, combining protest potential
and participation for petitions, boycotts and demonstrations, will be used in the
analyses for sections 6.2 and 6.3. The final section on political opportunities, 6.4,
will supplement these analyses of individual level data with protest event data from
ICEWS.
6.2 Grievances and Resources
The first area of theory to be tested is the role of grievances in predicting protest
participation. Under this theory it would be assumed that those experiencing fi-
nancial hardship would be mobilized to participate in protest. Competing against
grievance theories are resource approaches, which are based on the premise that it is
those with resources who are more likely to engage in protest (Dalton, 2014; Norris
et al., 2006). These competing theories can be explored in the context of the global
financial crisis in terms of both aggregated participation in political protest within
countries, as well as an individual’s likelihood to participate in protest.
Looking first at the country level, according to the grievance hypothesis we could
expect political protest to increase in countries affected by the crisis to a greater
extent as economic grievances become more widespread (H3.1). According to the
resources hypothesis on the other hand, we would expect the reverse to be true,
with political protest more likely to decline in countries more affected by the crisis
as greater hardship means fewer citizens have the resources typically associated with
protest participation (H3.3).
H3.1: In countries hit harder by the crisis, political protest will be more likely to
increase after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H3.3: In countries hit harder by the crisis, political protest will be more likely to
decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
The data from the WVS fielded before and after the financial crisis in 18 demo-
cratic countries enables these competing hypotheses to be tested. Table 6.3 presents
the mean protest scale in each country in the survey waves fielded before and after
the crisis respectively, in addition to the change between the two time points. In-
dependent samples t-tests have been conducted to determine whether the level of
protest after the crisis can be considered significantly different to the level before
the crisis in each country. 8 of the 18 countries experienced a significant decline in
the political protest scale between the two survey waves, whereas only 3 countries
showed a significant increase, for the remaining 7 countries there was no significant
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change.
Table 6.3: Trends in Political Protest
Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change
Japan 1.30 0.98 −0.31∗∗
Ghana 0.71 0.44 −0.26∗∗
Sweden 1.95 1.76 −0.19∗∗
Peru 1.05 0.87 −0.19∗∗
Spain 1.25 1.12 −0.14∗∗
Slovenia 1.14 1.01 −0.13∗∗
United States 1.71 1.60 −0.11∗∗
Netherlands 1.38 1.28 −0.10∗∗
Germany 1.44 1.35 −0.09∗
Cyprus 1.17 1.08 −0.09∗
South Korea 1.21 1.15 −0.07
Uruguay 0.78 0.73 −0.06
Trinidad and Tobago 1.27 1.22 −0.05
New Zealand 1.85 1.81 −0.04
Australia 1.70 1.68 −0.02
Romania 0.47 0.66 0.19∗∗
Chile 0.61 0.82 0.21∗∗
Poland 0.78 1.01 0.24∗∗
Total 1.21 1.14 −0.06∗∗
Note: The table presents means of the political protest scale, which is constructed
using weighted responses to the questions regarding protest potential and participation
across three types of activity—petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations. Scale ranges
from 0-3, with each type of activity the respondent has done contributing one point
to the scale, and each the respondent ‘might do’ contributing half a point. Shaded
countries experienced a recession during the global financial crisis.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015).
There are a few things worth noting about these trends. Firstly, newer democra-
cies that had lower levels of protest to begin with were more likely to see an increase
in protest, including Chile, Romania, and Poland—the only three countries where
protest significantly increased. Secondly, countries that did not experience a reces-
sion were mostly among those that did not experience a drop in protest, including
Australia, South Korea and Poland.5 Germany, a country that did go into recession
along with most of Europe, though was considered to have fared well in comparison
to other European countries (Funk, 2012), also avoided a decline in protest activ-
5Ghana is the exception to both of these trends as protest declined considerably from an
already low base, though the country did not experience a recession. The GDP growth rate did
drop however, from 9.15 percent in 2008 to 4.85 in 2009 (World Bank, 2015a). Ghana is an outlier
in the dataset in terms of being the least developed country incorporated in this study, and one of
the newest democracies (alongside Peru).
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ity. Meanwhile Spain, the United States and Japan, all countries that were badly
affected by the crisis, albeit in different ways, are among those that experienced
significant declines in political protest. These results lend some support to the re-
sources hypothesis. There is no evidence of a mobilization amongst countries hard
hit by the crisis, and more countries show demobilization which is consistent with
the resources based model of protest, as protest has declined contemporaneously
with a decline in societal wealth.
Figure 6.3: GDP Growth and Change in Political Protest
Note: Change in Political Protest measures the difference in the political protest scale
country means (0–3) between WVS wave 5 (2004–2007) and wave 6 (2010–2013).
Sources: Political protest from the wave 5 and 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b);
GDP growth from the World Bank (2015a); Human Development Index (HDI) catego-
rizations from the United Nations Development Programme (2016).
To provide another way of looking at these trends which takes account of the
extent of the crisis in each society, Figure 6.3 plots the average GDP growth rate
over 2008 to 2009 in each country, against the change in the aggregated political
protest scale which captures protest potential and participation.6 GDP growth
over 2008 to 2009, the peak of the crisis, provides a measure of the crisis depth,
while the change in political protest measure provides an indication of whether
protest has increased or declined since the previous wave of the WVS preceding
the crisis. The Pearson correlation between these two variables incorporating all
6The protest scale incorporates petitions, boycotts, and public demonstrations on a seven-point
scale ranging from 0 to 3.
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countries is positive though does not reach statistical significance so it is not possible
to reject the null hypothesis (r=0.18, n=18, p=0.47). Looking at the pattern of
observations in Figure 6.3 reveals a more nuanced picture however, with different
trends across different types of countries. By classifying countries according to the
Human Development Index either as ‘very high human development countries’ or
into the lower categories, including ‘high human development’ (Uruguay, Trinidad
and Tobago, and Peru) and ‘medium human development’ (Ghana), a different
picture emerges. Amongst the very high human development countries, there is a
strong positive significant relationship between GDP growth over 2008 to 2009 and
the change in political protest from before and after the economic crisis hit, also
indicated by the line of fit in Figure 6.3 (r=0.74, n=14, p<0.01). There are too few
of the less developed countries in the data set to provide an indication as to what
the true relationship would be in those cases.
These results lend support to the resources model of protest (H3.3). In coun-
tries that experienced greater hardship during the crisis, citizens became less active
in political protest, whereas in those that fared relatively well, such as Australia,
political protest was more likely to either stay the same or increase. There is no
evidence of protest mobilization amongst those countries hit hard by the crisis, and
thus the grievance hypothesis (H3.1) is not supported. These trends could perhaps
be explained by people’s changing priorities during a crisis. During prosperous times
being politically active may be a priority, whereas in a crisis when citizens affected
would be disproportionately focussed on just getting by, protesting on political issues
could become a lower priority.
The resources and grievance hypotheses can also be applied at the individual
level. According to the grievance hypothesis we would expect that individuals more
vulnerable to the crisis, such as the unemployed, those on low incomes, and those
with a lower level of education, will be more likely to participate in political protest
after the crisis (H3.2). According to the resources hypothesis on the other hand, it
would be expected that after the crisis, much as before, it will be those with greater
resources, including university education and higher incomes, that will be most likely
to participate (H3.4). These competing hypotheses can be tested through regression
analysis.
H3.2: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be more likely
to participate in political protest after the crisis.
H3.4: Individuals with greater resources, such as those on higher incomes and
those with higher levels of education, will be more likely to participate in political
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protest, before and after the crisis.
Figure 6.4: Effects of Resources on Political Protest
Notes: Charts plot coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for linear bivariate
regression models before and after the crisis. The models regress university degree,
income, unemployment, and financial satisfaction respectively on the political protest
scale (0-3). University degree is dichotomous. The unemployed are compared against
labor force participants. Income and financial satisfaction are on ten-point scales.
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
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To test these hypotheses, linear bivariate regression models are run separately
in each country on the WVS data from before and after the crisis. Four socio-
economic predictors are tested: education—measured dichotomously as those with
a university degree compared to everyone else; income—measured on a scale of 1
to 10; employment status—comparing the unemployed against a base category of
labor force participants; and financial satisfaction—also measured on a scale of 1
to 10. In each model the dependent variable is the political protest scale ranging
from 0 to 3. The results are presented in Figure 6.4 which plots the coefficients
and 95 percent confidence bars for the regression models in each country, and for a
multi-level model which incorporates the data from all 18 countries.
The results essentially show a pattern of continuity rather than change. Looking
first at the effect of having a university degree on political protest, the effect is
positive, and in the vast majority of cases statistically significant as the confidence
bars do not cross zero. Comparing the regressions from before and after the crisis
enables an assessment of whether things have changed. In each country, and in the
pooled multilevel model, the confidence bars for education overlap indicating that
the effect after the crisis cannot be considered significantly different from the effect
before the crisis. In the multilevel model the coefficient for education is slightly
greater after the crisis, though not significantly different from before the crisis. In
sum, education matters for protest potential and participation, though it matters
in much the same way before and after the crisis.
Income similarly has a positive effect on protest before and after the crisis, albeit
does not reach significance in all cases. In the multilevel model incorporating all 18
countries the effect of income is less after the crisis, although not significantly differ-
ent from before the crisis. For unemployment the trend is almost always negative,
though the effect is not particularly strong. For many country cases the difference
between unemployed people and labor force participants does not reach statistical
significance, although it does so in the multilevel model which combines the data for
all countries. The effect of employment status on political protest is much smaller
than that of education.
Finally, financial satisfaction is also explored to assess the degree to which sub-
jective economic perceptions matter, as opposed to one’s actual economic circum-
stances as indicated by the income variable. Financial satisfaction trends positive
though in many country cases has no significant effect on protest. In the multilevel
model the effect is positive though falls just short of significance at the 0.05 level,
indicating that in this case at least, actual income has a greater effect on one’s
likelihood of participating in protest than one’s perception of economic well-being.
Similar to the analysis pertaining to protest trends at the country level, this
analysis of individual level predictors also lends support to the resources hypothesis
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(H3.4). We do not see those likely to be most vulnerable to the crisis, including those
without a degree, those on lower incomes, the unemployed, or those less financially
satisfied mobilized to protest by the crisis. Rather, it continues to be those with
resources that are more likely to participate. The nature of who participates does
not significantly change in any of the areas of resources examined for the multilevel
models combining data from all 18 countries.
These findings are interesting in light of the country level findings discussed
above. At the country level we see a decline in protest activity in countries harder
hit by the crisis, whereas the individual level data shows it is the same type of person
that participates. This raises the question, if it is the same people protesting, how
is is that protest behavior is in decline? One explanation consistent with these
findings would be that those with fewer resources become more numerous during
a crisis, given that they participate less—protest activity as a whole would decline
during an economic crisis. The data presented here is insufficient to be confident in
that explanation, though it would be consistent with the data shown here.
The above analysis focuses on bivariate relationships between resources and
protest. A model that incorporates various control variables and accounts for vari-
ation at both the individual and country levels simultaneously will provide a more
robust test of these hypotheses. Table 6.4 and Figure 6.5 present the results of
a multilevel model which incorporates country and individual level predictors of
protest.7 The chart (Figure 6.5) provides the same information as the table though
eases comparison of coefficients from before and after the crisis. The blue and red
dots are the regression coefficients from before and after the crisis respectively, and
the bars show 95 percent confidence intervals. When the bars overlap the coefficients
cannot be considered significantly different from one another.8
At the country level democratic experience, GDP growth, and unemployment
are incorporated as predictors that may have an effect on protest. Due to the
small number of cases at the country level, it is difficult for these variables to reach
statistical significance. Democratic experience is positively associated with protest
before and after the crisis though not significantly so. The effect is stronger before
the crisis, falling just short of significance at the 0.05 level (β=0.16, p=0.06). GDP
growth is negatively associated with protest after the crisis.9 Societal unemployment
7The regression has been run using Stata’s mixed command, with random intercepts. The
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) reported in Table 6.4 provides a measure of how much
variation is explained by country level factors, in this case 9 percent in the pre-crisis wave and 10
percent in the post-crisis wave, indicating the difference between countries has not changed much
between the two survey waves. Variation between groups of around 10 percent can be considered
non-trivial, underscoring the need for multi-level modelling (Lee, 2000).
8Coefficients are not standardized so the relative distance from zero on the x-axis should not
be interpreted as the strength of the variable in relation to other variables in the model.
9GDP growth is taken as the average from from the two years before each survey wave, 2003–
2004 and 2008–2009 respectively.
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Table 6.4: Predicting Political Protest Before and After the Crisis
Pre-crisis (2004-2007) Post-crisis (2010-2013)
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Country level predictors
Log of years democracy 0.16 (0.09) 0.06 (0.12)
GDP growth −0.03 (0.03) −0.06∗ (0.03)
Unemployment −0.02∗∗ (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Individual level predictors
Employment status (base labor force participants)
Unemployed −0.05 (0.05) −0.07∗ 0.03
Other employment status −0.12∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.13∗∗∗ (0.03)
Income 0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
University degree 0.26∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.03)
Age range (base 18–29)
Aged 30–49 0.04 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03)
Aged 50 and over −0.02 (0.05) −0.01 (0.05)
Gender (female) −0.11∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.07∗∗∗ (0.02)
Postmaterialist (12-item) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.02)
Constant 0.62 (0.39) 0.73 (0.47)
N (countries) 18 18
N (respondents) 17,822 20,310
ICC 0.09 0.10
Note: Multilevel model with random intercepts produced using the Stata mixed command.
The dependent variable is the seven-point protest scale ranging from 0-3.
Sources: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015), with country level indicators
from the World Bank (2015a, 2015b) and Norris (2015).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
is also negative, reaching significance before the crisis. Figure 6.5 shows that whilst
the coefficents differ slightly and may reach significance in one wave but not the
other, as the confidence bars overlap these variables cannot be considered as having
a significantly different impact following the crisis.
At the individual level the various indicators of resources are incorporated in the
model alongside controls for age group, gender, and postmaterialism. The results
show that unemployed people are less likely to protest than those in the labor force,
significantly so after the crisis. Income is positively associated with protest before
and after the crisis, though the effect is smaller after the crisis, falling just short
of statistical significance (β=0.01, p=0.07). This change indicates that less well-off
people were a bit more likely to protest after the crisis. Education has a large positive
significant effect both before and after the crisis. The effect is greater following the
crisis though not significantly so. Compared to the base category of 18 to 29 year
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Figure 6.5: Predicting Political Protest – Coefficient Plot
Note: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for a linear multilevel
model with random intercepts produced using the Stata mixed command. The dependent
variable is the seven-point protest scale ranging from 0–3. The base category for age is
18–29. The base category for employment status is labor force participants.
Sources: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015), with country level
indicators from the World Bank (2015a, 2015b) and Norris (2015).
olds, the coefficient for 30 to 49 year olds is positive both before and after the crisis
although in neither case does it reach significance. There is no difference between
young people and those 50 and over. Women are significantly less likely to protest
both before and after the crisis, though the effect is smaller after the crisis which
could be reflective of trends towards gender equality over time including generational
replacement.10 Postmaterialism is positively associated with protest before and after
the crisis, and will be discussed further in the subsequent section.
The multilevel model, alongside the bivariate analyses presented above, provides
further support for a resources model of protest behavior that changes little from
before and after the crisis. Resources including education, income, and to a lesser
extent employment status matter, and they matter in much the same way before
and after the crisis. If anything, the multilevel model shows that education may
matter more after the crisis, with the coefficient increasing from 0.25 (.03) to 0.32
10In support of the generational replacement argument the World Values Survey data shows
the correlation between gender(female) and protest for those aged 50 and over has decreased from
-0.095 to -0.088 between the two survey waves (2014; 2015b).
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(.03), and income matters a little less, with the coefficient decreasing from 0.03 (.01)
to 0.01 (.01). With regards to the grievances and resources hypotheses, this suggests
a more nuanced finding in that some resources may matter more than others, with
education being a more important factor than income in explaining protest after the
crisis.
6.3 Values
The second theoretical area to be investigated concerns the role of postmaterialist
values in predicting political protest before and after the crisis. Before proceeding to
test each of the hypotheses identified, Figure 6.6 presents the trends in postmateri-
alism over time in each country, alongside the trends in protest, to provide a picture
of how these two measures fit together. As with Figure 6.1 above, this data comes
from waves 1 to 6 of the WVS, and in some countries is supplemented with data
from waves 1 to 4 of the EVS. The chart shows the percentage of postmaterialists in
each society at various time points (from the 4-item index), alongside the percentage
that had participated in some form of protest, either signing a petition, taking part
in a boycott, joining in a demonstration, or some combination of the three.11
There are a few features of the data worth highlighting. Firstly, trends in post-
materialism and protest often go together, this is clear for example in Germany, the
Netherlands, Peru, Slovenia, Chile, and the United States. Second, while the gap
differs between countries, the proportion of citizens that have participated in some
form of protest is in all cases higher than the proportion of postmaterialists. This is
driven by the prevalence of signing a petition which is so common it can no longer
be accurately described as an unconventional form of political behavior (Dalton,
2014). Third, levels of postmaterialism, and protest, tend to be higher in countries
that have a longer history of democracy, such as Sweden and the United States.
Finally, the long term trend tends to be upwards (as per the findings of Inglehart
and Abramson, 1999; Scarbrough, 1995; Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995), although
as with protest in many countries there is a dip in recent years.12
The first hypothesis regarding values relates to the potential affect of the crisis
on the levels of postmaterialism within each country. Specifically it was supposed
11The 4-item postmaterialism index is used in this instance as when looking at percentages, the
12-item scale results in a very low proportion of pure postmaterialists.
12It has been debated whether the steep downward trend in postmaterialism in Australia is an
artefact of survey timing (see Figure 6.6). The Australian Election Study which also includes the
postmaterialism index shows, in contrast to the WVS data, fewer postmaterialists, but also the
proportion of postmaterialists increasing over time (Tranter, 2015; Cameron and McAllister, 2016,
p. 102). Tranter (2015) argues the timing of surveys is influencing responses depending on whether
it is an election year.
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Figure 6.6: Trends in Political Protest and Postmaterialism over Time
Note: Charts plot the percent of respondents in each country who said they had participated in
some form of protest (petitions, boycotts, or demonstrations), and the percent of postmaterialists
(4-item scale).
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
that in countries hit harder by the crisis, postmaterialism would be more likely to
decline (H3.6).
H3.6: In countries hit harder by the crisis, postmaterialism will be more likely to
decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
To investigate the change in postmaterialism since the crisis began, Table 6.5
presents the differences between the country means on the postmaterialism index
(12-item) from before and after the crisis. In 12 of the 18 countries the differ-
ence between the survey waves is negative, significantly so in 7 of these cases. The
remaining 6 countries show an increase in postmaterialism. Countries that experi-
enced a recession during the economic crisis of 2008 to 2009 are shaded, indicating
no particular trend, with the few countries that avoided recession found among both
those that experienced a significant decline in postmaterialism and those that ex-
perienced a significant increase. To account for variation in crisis impacts beyond
the dichotomous characterisation between countries that did and did not go into
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recession, a pairwise correlation is conducted between the change in the mean score
on the 12-item postmaterialist index and the average GDP growth rate over 2008 to
2009 at the peak of the crisis. This shows no relationship between the two variables
(r=-0.20, n=18, p=0.43).13 Plotting the observations on a scatterplot, unlike polit-
ical protest, reveals no particular trend among country sub-groups.14 Thus, whilst
there has been a significant decline in postmaterialism in 7 of 18 countries after the
crisis, there is no evidence that postmaterialism declined more in countries harder
hit by the crisis.
Table 6.5: Trends in Postmaterialism
Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change
Australia 2.36 1.91 −0.45∗∗
Peru 2.27 1.97 −0.30∗∗
Netherlands 2.58 2.34 −0.25∗∗
Cyprus 1.90 1.68 −0.22∗∗
Uruguay 2.51 2.38 −0.13∗
Slovenia 2.39 2.28 −0.11∗
Trinidad and Tobago 1.85 1.74 −0.11∗
United States 2.00 1.93 −0.07
Ghana 1.72 1.67 −0.05
Spain 2.26 2.22 −0.04
New Zealand 2.22 2.19 −0.03
Japan 2.11 2.09 −0.01
Sweden 2.75 2.82 0.07
Germany 2.66 2.74 0.08
Poland 2.01 2.20 0.20∗∗
South Korea 1.85 2.05 0.20∗∗
Chile 2.31 2.53 0.23∗∗
Romania 1.60 1.97 0.37∗∗
Total 2.18 2.14 −0.04∗∗
Note: The table presents means of the 12-item postmaterialism index (0–5). Higher
values reflect more postmaterialist values. See Appendix A for index construction.
Shaded countries experienced a recession during the global financial crisis.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015).
One remaining area to test with regard to the change in postmaterialist values af-
ter the crisis, is whether declines in postmaterialism took place across all age groups,
or just amongst the youngest cohort. In assessing the affects of economic decline
on postmaterialism, Inglehart tested a socialization hypothesis which supposed that
postmaterialism would decline amongst young people in times of economic down-
13Testing this with the 4-item postmaterialism index makes no difference to this finding.
14Scatterplot not presented here for parsimony.
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turn as he argued values are formed during the socialization period of youth and
then stay relatively stable throughout the life course (1981). Inglehart (1981) found
support for the socialization hypothesis, though Duch and Taylor (1993) did not
find support for the same hypothesis in their study of Western European countries
over the 1970s and 1980s. To test this in the context of the global financial cri-
sis, Table 6.6 presents trends in postmaterialism before and after the crisis broken
down by age group incorporating data from all 18 countries. This lends support to
the socialization hypothesis as postmaterialism significantly declined amongst the
youngest group of 18-29 year olds, though there was no significant change among
the older groups.15
Table 6.6: Age and Postmaterialism
Age Group Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change
18-29 years 2.29 2.20 −0.08∗∗
30-49 years 2.20 2.17 −0.03
50 and over 2.11 2.09 −0.02
Note: The table presents means of the 12-item postmaterialism index (0–5)
for each age group in the pooled data for 18 countries.
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
The next hypothesis suggested that the decline in postmaterialism would be
linked to a drop in protest in countries hard hit by the crisis (H3.8).
H3.8: In countries hit harder by the crisis, protest would be more likely to decline
after the crisis as a function of a decline in postmaterialism.
To test this, the scatterplot in Figure 6.7 shows the relationship between the
change in postmaterialism and the change in political protest between the two sur-
vey waves. Countries are differentiated according to those that did and did not
experience a recession during the global financial crisis, with the line of fit cover-
ing those that did. The chart shows that change in the postmaterialism index is
positively associated with a change in protest. The correlation between the two
variables amongst countries that went into recession is strong and statistically sig-
nificant (r=0.64, n=13, p=0.02).16 These results support the hypothesis that the
decline in protest is related to changes in postmaterialism, particularly in countries
15This result also holds if the age category is broken down into deciles beginning with 18-24
year olds, with only the youngest group seeing a decline between the two survey waves, albeit in
that case falls just short of significance (p=0.08).
16In the full sample of 18 countries the relationship is also positive and significant though not
as strong (r=0.50, n=18, p=0.04).
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Figure 6.7: Change in Postmaterialism and Political Protest
Note: The axes respectively represent the change in the postmaterialism index (12-item)
and the political protest scale (0–3) in each country between the surveys before the crisis
(2004–2007) and after the crisis (2010–2013).
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
hard hit by the crisis. Australia is a notable outlier, which may have to do with
measurement issues associated with the postmaterialist index in the Australian con-
text (Tranter, 2015), furthermore Australia was largely immune from the effects of
the global financial crisis. The scatterplot shows a concentration of newer democra-
cies, Poland, Romania, and Chile, in the top right hand corner of the chart. These
countries all started with lower levels of postmaterialism and protest and thus have
further to go along the process of modernization outlined by Inglehart (1997). It is
thus unsurprising that postmaterialism and protest would be rising from a low base
in these countries.
The next aspect of values to consider within the context of the crisis concerns
the role of postmaterialist values in predicting an individual’s position on the po-
litical protest scale. Two hypotheses in this area were identified. On the one hand
it was hypothesized that those with postmaterialist values would remain similarly
predisposed to participate in protest relative to materialists before and after the cri-
sis (H3.7). On the other hand one could suppose that those with materialist values
would be more likely to protest after the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period
(H3.9), as materialist priorities were under greater threat during the crisis and of
greater salience.
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H3.7: Those with postmaterialist values will be more likely to participate in
protest, before and after the crisis.
H3.9: Those with materialist values will be more likely to participate in protest
after the crisis, compared to before the crisis.
Figure 6.8: Effect of Postmaterialism on Political Protest
Notes: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for a linear bivariate
regression model for each country before and after the financial crisis. The model re-
gresses the postmaterialism index (12-item) on the political protest scale (0-3).
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
The values of protesters are investigated using the same approach that was used
to test other characteristics of protesters, including education and income. Figure 6.8
plots the coefficients for postmaterialism as a predictor of political protest before
and after the crisis in bivariate linear regressions run separately for each country,
and in a multilevel model factoring in data from all 18 countries. The data shows
that postmaterialism is similarly related to political protest before and after the
crisis, lending support to hypothesis 3.7. In the multilevel model (both the bivariate
model in Figure 6.8, and the full model with controls in Table 6.4 or Figure 6.5)
postmaterialism has a positive significant effect on political protest both before and
after the crisis, the coefficient is greater after the crisis, though as the 95 percent
confidence intervals overlap, it can not be considered significantly different after the
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crisis.
The single country regressions in Figure 6.8 also show that in almost all coun-
tries postmaterialism had a similar effect before and after the crisis, as indicated
by similar coefficients and overlapping confidence intervals. Spain—the site of large
protest events directly related to the crisis, particularly the indignados movement of
2011 (see Castan˜eda, 2012)—is exceptional here as postmaterialism became signifi-
cantly more strongly associated with political protest after the crisis. In the USA,
also the site of big protest events related to the crisis, notably Occupy Wall St, the
coefficient is also more positive after the crisis, though not significantly greater than
before the crisis. These cases, both countries that were particularly hard hit by the
crisis, would suggest if there is any change at all, the effect of postmaterialism may
increase as a result of a major economic crisis.17 There is no evidence to support the
competing hypothesis (H3.9), that those with materialist values would be mobilized
to protest by the crisis at time when materialist issues were under threat.
H3.10: In countries hit harder by the crisis, political protest will be more likely to
increase after the crisis as result of those with materialist values protesting more.
The final hypothesis regarding postmaterialist values suggested that political
protest may increase after the crisis as a result of those with materialist values
protesting more (3.10). As the existing results have shown firstly that political
protest decreased, rather than increased, and secondly that those with materialist
values were not mobilized by the crisis, this hypothesis can be rejected.
6.4 Political Opportunities
Within the political opportunities approach, outbreaks of protest are explained by
openings in the political opportunity structures. In Chapter 2 it was hypothe-
sised that the introduction of austerity policies may trigger protest mobilizations
(H3.5). Previous work lends support to this hypothesis, including Kriesi’s (2014)
analysis of four East and West European case studies during the Great Recession,
and Beissinger and Sasse’s study of Eastern European countries in the same volume,
which found protests on economic issues increased during the Great Recession, while
other forms of protest decreased (2014). To test this hypothesis, the WVS data is
not ideal. As austerity policies were instituted in later years rather than amidst the
peak of the crisis in 2008 to 2009, the WVS field dates beginning in 2010 and 2011
are in most cases too early to investigate the impact of austerity policies. Moreover,
17The United States was the epicentre of the crisis while Spain experienced dramatic increases
in youth unemployment among other impacts (World Bank, 2016c).
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the World Values Survey data does not include key countries that received bailouts
from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union leading to the im-
position of harsh austerity measures, such as Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Thus
another solution is warranted to investigate the role of austerity policies in protest
mobilization.
H3.5: In countries that introduced austerity policies, political protest will be more
likely to increase.
In order to investigate this question, data from ICEWS is used (see Boschee
et al., 2015). ICEWS, produced for the United States’ Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) and Office of Naval Research (ONR), uses the BBN
ACCENT event coder to automatically code events worldwide from newspapers into
a range of event types.18 The data has been created to enable the US government
to predict international crises by tracking protest, violence, insurgencies and other
events. Machine coding enables event data to be collected on a scale that simply
would not be feasible with human coders, and still achieves similar levels of accuracy
to human coding (Schrodt and Van Brackle, 2013). ICEWS reports an accuracy level
of over 80 percent of events coded correctly (Lockheed Martin, 2017). In comparison
to GDELT, another large dataset of events, ICEWS is less prone to false positives
and thus provides a more conservative assessment of protest levels (Ward et al.,
2013).
To investigate protest using this data, the number of events coded as ‘demon-
strate or rally’ within each year in each country are counted, enabling an investi-
gation of trends in the number of demonstrations over time, cross-nationally. This
measure is distinct from protest measures included in the WVS in several ways.
First, it tracks the number of demonstration events rather than the level of indi-
vidual participation in protest. Second, this item in the ICEWS data focusses on
demonstrations and rallies, whereas the WVS data used in this thesis is broader, in-
corporating petitions and boycotts in addition to demonstrations. Finally, ICEWS
tracks the number of demonstrations worldwide on an ongoing basis, whereas WVS
fields cross-sectional surveys periodically, approximately every 5 years or so in coun-
tries that are incorporated.
As a test of the hypothesis regarding the relationship between austerity and
protest, I take the example of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain),
countries which were affected by the sovereign debt crisis and implemented severe
austerity policies in response, and compare protest trends in these countries to
the rest of the European Union. Figure 6.9 presents the data on the number of
18For further information on ICEWS see Boschee et al. (2015) and Lockheed Martin (2017).
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demonstrations in each country, or group of countries for the rest of the EU. Amongst
the PIIGS, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal all received bailout funds from the troika—
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC), and the
European Central Bank (ECB). Spain received a bailout for its banks from the
European Union in 2012. Italy managed to narrowly avoid needing a bailout though
came dangerously close and implemented severe austerity measures. The timelines
of each case will be briefly discussed alongside the demonstration trends revealed by
the ICEWS data, to assess how austerity policies may have affected protest.
For Portugal austerity measures began in 2010 in an effort to meet EU deficit tar-
gets, incorporating tax increases and public sector salary reductions (Accornero and
Ramos Pinto, 2015, p. 498; CNN, 2017). By early 2011 the Socialist government’s
proposals for further austerity cuts were defeated and in May Portugal agreed on
a bailout from the IMF and the EU to a total of e78 billion. A new government
came in following elections in June 2011 and it was under this right-wing Coalition
government that more severe austerity measures were introduced (Accornero and
Ramos Pinto, 2015). Portugal exited the bailout program in early 2014.
Figure 6.9: Bailouts, Austerity and the Number of Demonstrations
Source: ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015).
The ICEWS data reflects the cycle of austerity in Portugal. Whereas demon-
strations in other countries considered here reached a peak in the year that bailouts
were agreed (see Figure 6.9), in Portugal the number of demonstrations peaks later.
The data shows the number of demonstrations rising from 2010 when austerity poli-
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cies were first introduced, but by 2012 the number of demonstrations had more
than doubled from the previous year. The total rises substantially again to reach
a peak in 2013 reflecting the increasing severity of austerity measures in Portu-
gal. As Accornero and Ramos Pinto detail, 2012 and 2013 saw some of the largest
demonstrations in Portugal’s history (2015, p. 500). The number of demonstrations
declines from 2014 when Portugal exits the bailout program.
Ireland was the first EU country to slide into recession and by early 2009 was
implementing cuts to public services while continuing to provide bailouts to the
beleaguered Anglo Irish Bank. By late 2010 Ireland agreed on a e67.5 billion loan
from the IMF and EU. The ICEWS data shows the number of demonstrations rising
rapidly in 2009, reaching a local peak in 2010 – the year of the bailout. After that,
protest levels dropped from 2011 through to 2013. O’Connor (2017) attributes
this muted response to austerity, relative to other countries faced with severe cuts
in Southern Europe, to Ireland’s conservative political culture. The introduction of
water charges in 2014, part of Ireland’s austerity agreement with the troika, provided
a mobilizing force, with the ICEWS data showing a peak of 81 demonstrations in
2014 when anti-water charge protests were held throughout the country (O’Connor,
2017; Power et al., 2016).
Italy is the sole country in this group to have avoided needing a bailout from
the European Union or International Monetary Fund, though the country came
close. In 2010 Italy, facing a deficit of 5.5 percent, double that permitted within the
eurozone, implemented a e24 billion austerity program to reduce the deficit (Verney
and Bosco, 2013, p. 401). The number of demonstrations peaked in 2010, the year
austerity policies were introduced, and remained high in 2011 as another austerity
package of $40 billion was brought in.19 Though Italy did not get bailed out by
the troika, concern regarding the country’s fiscal situation was sufficiently high to
warrant Prime Minister Berlusconi agreeing to IMF supervision over the country’s
reform program during the G20 Summit in November 2011 (Verney and Bosco, 2013,
p. 404). The ICEWS data shows the number of demonstrations returning to lower
levels from 2012, with an uptick in 2013 when Italy held elections, where it took
an unprecedented 63 days from the first election to form a government (Verney and
Bosco, 2013, p. 398).
Greece has been the epicentre of the eurozone crisis, requiring not one but three
bailouts from the troika. The Greek government first announced austerity measures
in early 2010 including cutting public sector salaries and raising taxes. By May of
2010 the troika finalized an aid package of e110 billion, loans were provided alongside
19The ICEWS data, which provides specific dates of demonstrations, shows the spike in protest
in Italy in 2001 was centered around the G8 summit held in Genoa, Italy over July 21–22, 2001
(Boschee et al., 2015, see also Niwot, 2011).
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the requirement to implement harsh austerity measures. The ICEWS data shows the
number of demonstrations more than doubles between 2009 and 2010 (from 114 to
310), coinciding with the IMF–EU bailout and the introduction of austerity policies.
In subsequent years levels of protest remain high as the crisis in Greece continued.
Second and third bailout packages were approved in 2012 and 2015 respectively, and
the ICEWS data shows higher numbers of demonstrations in these years.
In Spain austerity measures began in 2010. In 2011, as youth unemployment
reached 46 percent (up from 18 percent in 2007) (World Bank, 2016c), there was a
mobilization of youth in the form of the 15M movement, whose participants were
described as los indignados, or the indignants (Castan˜eda, 2012). The mobilization
came just before the elections to be held the following week. In 2012 the country
sought and received a bailout from the European Union for the country’s troubled
banks. Once again the ICEWS data does show higher levels of protest reflecting
the introduction of austerity policies and the EU bailout in 2012. The number of
demonstrations almost doubled from 2010 to 2011, and rose higher still to a peak
in 2012 coinciding with the EU bailout.20
This data does show support for the role of political opportunities in triggering
protest mobilization (H3.5). In each of these cases protest is higher in the year
the country receives a bailout and/or implements austerity policies, and in the years
thereafter. Demonstrations do not spike around 2008 to 2009 when the crisis initially
hit, supporting the proposition that it was the government policy responses that
mobilized protest. Comparing the PIIGS to other countries in the European Union
in Figure 6.9, we can see that in the rest of Europe there was no spike in protest
around the time of the bailouts and controversial austerity policies, lending support
to the view that the spikes in protest observed in the PIIGS cannot be dismissed
due to some factor affecting other European countries as well.21
These findings regarding political opportunities are interesting in light of the
results from the WVS above. If the ICEWS data shows protest mobilization follow-
ing the introduction of austerity policies, but the WVS data shows demobilization
following the crisis, how can these results be squared? This is where it is important
to consider the differences in the type of data collected. The WVS provides a mea-
sure of individual participation across societies, whereas ICEWS tracks the number
of demonstrations. Moreover with the WVS there are limitations in the scope of
countries and frequency of surveys. It could be the case that a large number of
20A few factors contributed to higher levels of protest in Spain in 2007, as shown by the
ICEWS data in Figure 6.9, including protests in January linked to the Basque separatist movement
(Reuters, 2007b), and protests in March against the Iraq war (Reuters, 2007a).
21Note the spike in EU protest in 2015 is driven by specific events in France and Germany. In
France there were many protests related to the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference
in Paris; in Germany there were big protests in relation to the influx of refugees to Germany that
year, and also against the controversial Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
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demonstrations arise linked to the introduction of an austerity program, though it
could be drawing in the same suspects rather than mobilizing those who would not
ordinarily participate. In support of this argument, a survey by Ru¨dig and Karyotis
(2013) showed that in Greece anti-austerity demonstrations mobilized 29 percent of
respondents, but fewer than a fifth of these people were first-time protesters.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated how the financial crisis has affected citizen potential
for and participation in political protest. It has tested four theoretical approaches
in the context of the crisis, including grievances, resources, values and political
opportunities approaches. First, testing the competing influences of grievances and
resources in predicting political protest, the data revealed that resources continue
to play a critical role. At the country level, countries that were harder hit by
the crisis were more likely to experience a decline in protest activity, although this
relationship was only observed among the more developed countries incorporated in
the study. At the individual level it continued to be those with greater resources
in terms of education, income, financial satisfaction, and employment status that
were more likely to participate before and after the crisis. These findings both line
up with the resources hypotheses, as greater resources continued to be associated
with greater degrees of protest, whether measured at the societal or individual level.
There was no support for the grievances hypotheses which would have suggested the
opposite, that countries hardest hit by the crisis would see increases in protest, and
that individuals most vulnerable to the crisis, such as the unemployed, those on low
incomes, or those with lower levels of education would be mobilized to protest by
the crisis.
The next set of hypotheses explored the role of postmaterialist values in predict-
ing protest. Tested first was the hypothesis that postmaterialism would be more
likely to decline in countries hard hit by the crisis. Whilst postmaterialism did
decline significantly in 7 countries, with 5 countries experiencing an increase, the
change in postmaterialist values since the pre-crisis survey was unrelated to the
depth of the economic crisis, as measured by GDP growth over 2008 to 2009. That
said, amongst countries that went into recession during the crisis, the change in
postmaterialism was related to the change in protest over this time, those countries
that experienced a drop in postmaterialism were more likely to also experience a
drop in protest. Breaking the trends in postmaterialism down by age group, the
data showed young people became significantly more materialist while there was no
change amongst older groups, lending support to Inglehart’s socialization hypothesis
(1981).
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Beyond aggregate trends in postmaterialism over time, it was also explored
whether postmaterialist values would have a similar, positive effect on individual
protest participation before and after the crisis, or whether those with materialist
values would be mobilized by the crisis. The analysis found support for the former,
with postmaterialism playing a similar role in predicting protest before and after
the crisis. These findings on postmaterialist values, alongside those on resources
discussed above, all point to a pattern of continuity rather than change in the wake
of the crisis. Even amidst a major crisis where those experiencing the greatest
grievances have plenty of reasons to be protesting, it continues to be the same types
of people that join protest actions.
Finally, this chapter tested a hypothesis stemming from the literature on politi-
cal opportunities, which predicted that countries which introduced austerity policies
would experience increases in protest. To explore this, data from ICEWS was used
to show the number of demonstrations across societies over time. Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain, the so-called PIIGS, were taken as examples that had im-
plemented harsh austerity policies, in most cases as conditions for receiving bailout
loans from the IMF and the EU, and then compared with the pooled data for the rest
of the EU. The ICEWS data showed there was an increase in the number of demon-
strations coinciding with the imposition of austerity policies in these cases, which
was absent in the pooled data for the rest of the European Union, lending support
to the hypothesis that political opportunities matter. There was no spike in protest
around the time of the recession when it hit in 2008, supporting the argument that
it was government policy responses to the crisis, rather than the crisis itself that
mobilized protest, echoing existing research which took a different approach though
identified similar results (Beissinger and Sasse, 2014; Kriesi, 2014).
These findings, taken together, reveal a nuanced picture of the dynamics of
protest behavior amidst a major crisis, where a crisis may mobilize in some ways
and demobilize in others. The ICEWS data demonstrated that austerity led to a
greater number of protest demonstrations in the PIIGS, though it does not show us
who demonstrated. Individual level data from the WVS shows declines in protest
potential and participation in countries hard hit by the crisis. It is possible then,
that crises may lead to an outbreak of protest events that mobilize a limited subset
of the population comprised of the usual suspects. Meanwhile protest participation
as a whole may go down, as citizens become preoccupied with survival needs and less
oriented towards political activism than they would be in ordinary times. Research
from Beissinger and Sasse (2014) supports this proposition, finding the financial
crisis in Eastern Europe led certain types of economic protest to increase while
other types of protest became less prevalent.
This chapter and the two preceding chapters have covered the three aspects of
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citizen participation—voting behavior, civic engagement, and protest. All of these
aspects of political behavior reflect the health of democracy, and in this study test
the resiliency of participatory publics to a major economic crisis. The next chapter
turns to investigate how the crisis may have affected citizen attitudes that underpin
a healthy democratic system, namely support for a democratic political system.
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Chapter 7
Democratic Support
The previous three chapters have investigated dimensions of participation in demo-
cratic political life including voting, civic engagement and political protest. Whether
through conventional or unconventional channels, participation is considered a major
indicator of the health of democratic societies. Nevertheless, a healthy democracy
is not just signified by a citizenry that is actively involved in politics, democratic
attitudes also play an important role.
Public support for democracy lends legitimacy to democratic regimes and helps
to ensure their survival (Linz and Stepan, 1996a). Previous research suggests that
economic performance is conducive to the development of democratic support, and
on the flip side that democratic support can be fragile to economic shocks, partic-
ularly in newer democracies (McAllister, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 1999). Given the
unprecedented scale of the global financial crisis, this poses questions regarding the
crisis’ impacts on support for a democratic political system.
Chapter 2 identified six hypotheses that predict how democratic support might
be affected by a major economic crisis. This chapter will test these hypotheses with
the WVS data across 18 countries, supplemented with data from the European Social
Survey (ESS). The first set of hypotheses identified relate to old and new democ-
racies and how support for democracy might be more fragile to economic shocks
in the latter. This draws upon work by Linz and Stepan (1996b) on democratic
consolidation, the process by which democratic behaviors, attitudes, and institu-
tions become embedded in a society to the extent that democratic reversals become
highly unlikely. They argue that support for a democratic political system forms the
attitudinal dimension of democratic consolidation, and that this support should be
resilient to economic shocks in consolidated democracies, but not in newer democ-
racies where democracy cannot yet be considered ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and
Stepan, 1996b, p. 15).
When a major economic crisis hits in an established democracy, the expecta-
tion would be for citizens to blame the incumbent government, as citizens have no
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experience of any other political system (McAllister and White, 2011). In newer
democracies on the other hand, citizens, particularly older generations, may still
have memories of the former regime, and if government performance is poor in the
new regime, rather than blaming the incumbents, they might look back fondly on
the previous regime (McAllister and White, 2011; Mishler and Rose, 1999). Accord-
ing to these theories it might be expected that the global financial crisis would have
affected democratic support in the newer democracies but not older democracies.
One should consider however, that the magnitude of the global financial crisis is
unprecedented since the Great Depression of the 1930s, at which time the nature of
democratic governance around the world was starkly different. So, whilst the demo-
cratic consolidation literature would suggest that support for democracy would be
resilient to a major crisis in the established democracies, this argument has not been
tested in the context of an economic crisis on this scale. An alternative hypothesis
then suggests that democracy might decline in both new and old democracies.
Beyond the distinction between old and new democracies, other predictions can
be made based on grievances at the country and individual level. The crisis did not
affect countries uniformly, Australia largely avoided the crisis, whereas Spain saw
unemployment rise above 25 percent (World Bank, 2015b), and many countries fell
somewhere in between these two extremes. Existing studies have demonstrated that
economic performance has an effect on democratic support, although its influence is
less important than democratic experience (Huang et al., 2008; McAllister, 1999).
If the crisis did have a negative effect on democratic support, it would be expected
that the effect would be greater in countries affected by the crisis to a greater extent.
Moreover, it could be expected that individual resources matter. Those with greater
resources, in terms of income, education or employment, could be expected to be
more supportive of democracy than those who have fewer resources and are thus
more vulnerable to the crisis (Haerpfer and Kizilova, 2014, p. 179).
The final set of hypotheses concerns the role of IMF and EU bailouts in the
European Union. These bailouts, which were received under the condition to im-
plement austerity programs, constrained the agency of democratic governments in
recipient countries. This interference could on one hand reduce support for democ-
racy, although an alternative argument put forward by Cordero and Simo´n (2016)
suggests that the saliency of democracy would increase when democratic gover-
nance is under threat. Studies by Armingeon and Guthmann (2014), and Cordero
and Simo´n (2016), investigated democratic support in the context of the European
sovereign debt crisis and put forward different conclusions. Whilst Armingeon and
Guthmann (2014) found that international organizations interfering in democracy
at the national level depressed support for democracy, Cordero and Simo´n (2016)
argued that support for democracy was greater in countries that received bailouts.
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These competing findings will be discussed in depth, and further investigated with
European Social Survey data on democratic satisfaction and democratic support.
These hypotheses will be tested across four sections. The first introduces the
dependent variable, support for democracy, including different operationalizations of
the concept, and how these are distributed across the 18 country sample. The second
section tests the hypotheses regarding new and old democracies. The third explores
how grievances at the country and individual level shaped democratic support before
and after the crisis. Fourth, the effect of the IMF and EU bailouts on democratic
support will be explored through a discussion of existing research findings, and
supplementary data analysis.
7.1 Democratic Support in 18 Societies
Existing studies of democratic support operationalize the concept in a range of
different ways. Easton distinguished between specific and diffuse support, the for-
mer incorporating confidence in specific institutions, that latter referring to support
for the political regime (1975). This chapter focusses on the diffuse end of the
spectrum—support for a democratic political system. In operationalizing the con-
cept, some conflate democratic satisfaction with democratic support (Anderson and
Guillory, 1997, p. 70; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014), though others have ar-
gued that these are distinct concepts that are not closely correlated to one another
(Cordero and Simo´n, 2016; Huang et al., 2008; Klingemann, 1999, 2014).1 This
chapter takes the latter approach, considering satisfaction with democracy further
towards the specific end of the continuum than democratic support (Norris, 1999b,
p. 10). Support for the political regime is investigated as it tends to be more endur-
ing over time (Easton, 1975), and is thus a more stable measure to assess whether
and how political support has been affected by the crisis.
In operationalizing democratic support this chapter uses a measure that reflects
both support for a democratic political system and rejection of anti-democratic
alternatives (see McAllister and White, 2011; Rose and Mishler, 1996; Shin and
Wells, 2005). As discussed in Chapter 3, previous research has demonstrated that
this provides a more robust measure of democratic support (Shin and Wells, 2005).
Specifically, support for democracy is measured using the four-item battery in the
World Values Survey, which asks respondents to evaluate different ways of governing
the country, including a democratic political system, but also alternatives to democ-
racy such as having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament
1There are further debates as to what satisfaction with democracy actually measures, for
instance Anderson and Guillory (1997) find that the measure reflects one’s support for incumbents
rather than satisfaction with democracy in a more generalized sense.
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and elections, having experts make decisions rather than government, and having
the army rule. The exact question wording is as follows:
I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what
you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one,
would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way
of governing this country?
– Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament
and elections
– Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they
think is best for the country
– Having the army rule
– Having a democratic political system
(World Values Survey Association, 2012)
The frequencies across these items for the previous two waves of the WVS are
presented in Table 7.1. The categories ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ have been
combined, as have ‘very bad’ and ‘fairly bad’. As we would expect, support for a
democratic political system is the highest, with around 90 percent of respondents
providing positive assessments. Support for ‘having experts, not government make
decisions according to what they think is best for the country’ is surprisingly high,
at 57 percent in the most recent wave. Support for ‘having a strong leader who does
not have to bother with parliament and elections’ attracts the support of around
one third of respondents. Army rule receives support from an average of 12 percent
of respondents. The changes between the two survey waves are small, though the
trend is away from support for a democratic political system. In the survey wave
after the crisis (W6) an additional 2.0 percent of respondents view expert rule fa-
vorably, and an additional 1.7 percent view a strong leader favourably. This rise in
support for non-democratic forms of governance goes alongside a drop in support
for a democratic political system.
Support for a democratic political system is high cross-nationally, it is in the
other measures that differences emerge. Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of re-
sponses across countries. Support for having experts, not government, making de-
cisions reaches over 80 percent in the three post-communist countries – Romania,
Slovenia, and Poland. Expert rule is also reasonably high in many established
democracies, sitting between 50 and 60 percent in Australia, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United States. Support for a strong leader who does
not have to bother with parliament and elections is highest in Romania (74 percent)
and Peru (60 percent), and lowest in Ghana (14 percent), followed by New Zealand
(20 percent). Army rule, as would be expected, is the least favourable option in
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Table 7.1: Support for Different Types of Political System
Very good /
fairly good
Very bad /
fairly bad
W5 W6 W5 W6
Strong leader 33.2 34.9 66.8 65.1
Experts 55.0 57.0 45.0 43.0
Army rule 12.1 12.2 87.9 87.8
Democratic political system 90.9 90.2 9.1 9.8
Note: World Values Survey responses to the question worded, ‘I’m going to
describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as
a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good,
fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?’ Percentages
are drawn from the 18 country sample, weighted to a population of 1000 obser-
vations in each country survey (weight variable S018).
Source: Wave 5 (W5) and Wave 6 (W6) World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
all countries, though still attracts a surprisingly high degree of support in some
countries. Though it is highest in the newer democracies, at 31 percent in Romania
and 28 percent in Peru, in the United States 17 percent responded that having the
army rule would be a very good or fairly good political system for their country.
This analysis shows that high levels of support for democracy go alongside lingering
attachment to other forms of governance in many countries, particularly in those
that underwent democratic transitions during the third wave (Huntington 1991).
From these questions covering support for expert rule, a strong leader, army
rule, and a democratic political system, three measures of democratic support are
constructed to investigate trends across countries, presented in Table 7.2. The first
measure looks at the percentage of respondents in each country who think having
a democratic political system is a very good or fairly good way of governing. The
other measures attempt to capture both democratic support and rejection of its
alternatives, drawing upon the work of Shin and Wells (2005). The second assesses
for each country the percentage of respondents who both support democracy and
reject its alternatives, by evaluating democracy as a ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ way
of governing the country, and the alternatives as ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’. The final
measure, which will be used throughout the analyses in this chapter, is a 13-point
scale of the combined responses to all four questions, where higher scores represent
greater support for democracy (adopted from McAllister and White, 2014).2
The first measure, the percentage who evaluate democracy positively, shows high
scores cross-nationally. Averaging 90 percent in the overall sample, it is highest
2All four items in the 13-point scale are positively correlated with one another when coded so
that higher values represent greater democratic support. A Cronbach’s alpha reliability test for
the scale has been conducted, indicating that the scale is of moderate reliability (α=0.56). See
Hinton et al. for a discussion of reliability scores (2004, p. 363).
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Figure 7.1: Support for Political Systems by Country
Note: Charts plot the percentage in each country who evaluated the various types of political
system as either ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’.
Source: World Values Survey wave 6 (2015b). Surveys were fielded between 2010 and 2013.
in Sweden, Ghana, Chile and Spain (at 96 percent) and lowest in Slovenia and
the United States (at 82 percent). There is very little variation overall, and not
much difference between old and new democracies, for example one of the oldest
democracies, Sweden, shares a score with the newest democracy in the sample,
Ghana. This measure only considers the favorability of democracy and does not
take into account whether citizens also reject non-democratic forms of governance.
The second measure reveals a more nuanced picture, showing the percentage of
citizens who support democracy and reject the alternatives. Across all countries an
average of 32 percent view democracy favourably and army rule, expert rule, and
a strong leader unfavourably. Whilst there was little variation in the first measure,
here differences become apparent between countries. A handful of countries attract
democratic support levels of over 40 percent, including Sweden and New Zealand at
the top of the scale. At the other end of the spectrum there are a handful of newer
democracies with support levels lower than 25 percent. It is the post-communist
countries in the sample that have the lowest levels of democratic support—Romania
(4 percent), Poland (9 percent), and Slovenia (11 percent). This demonstrates that
in many nations widespread public support for a democratic political system has not
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Table 7.2: Measures of Democratic Support
Supports
democracy (%)
Supports
democracy and
rejects
alternatives (%)
Mean
democratic
support scale
New Zealand 91 51 9.46
Sweden 96 51 9.09
Ghana 96 39 9.04
Trinidad and Tobago 88 43 9.04
Germany 95 35 9.01
Cyprus 96 39 8.75
Australia 89 37 8.68
Netherlands 94 32 8.45
Japan 88 29 8.39
Spain 96 37 8.35
Chile 96 42 8.25
Uruguay 95 44 8.23
United States 82 33 8.04
Slovenia 82 11 7.82
South Korea 75 23 7.32
Poland 83 9 7.27
Peru 95 14 6.93
Romania 87 4 5.98
Overall 90 32 8.24
Note: Democratic support scale ranges from zero to 12, combining responses to all four polit-
ical support questions regarding a strong leader, experts, army rule, and having a democratic
political system, respectively. Higher values reflect greater support for democracy and rejection
of alternatives.
Source: Wave 6 World Values Survey (2015b).
translated into a rejection of non-democratic alternatives such as expert rule or army
rule. Even in advanced democracies such as the United States, two in three citizens
have not fully rejected non-democratic forms of governance. Evidently there are still
a range of countries within this sample where democracy cannot yet be considered
consolidated, as democratic mindsets have not entirely replaced authoritarian ones
(Shin and Wells, 2005). However, this classification does raise questions as to where
one draws the line, given that even in advanced democracies a good number of
citizens support non-democratic forms of governance.
The third measure is the scale from zero to 12, with higher values indicating
greater support for democracy. This measure takes full account of the responses to
the WVS question battery, with favourable attitudes towards a democratic political
system, and negative views of anti-democratic alternatives, contributing to the 13-
point scale. On the whole this measure correlates with each country’s experience of
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democracy; countries with a longer history of democracy, such as New Zealand and
Sweden, generally have higher average positions on the scale than the newer democ-
racies, such as Romania. There are some interesting exceptions though: Ghana
has a high level of democratic support despite being the newest democracy in the
sample; while the United States falls below newer democracies including Chile and
Uruguay.
Figure 7.2: Trends in Democratic Support over Time
Note: Charts plot the mean democratic support scale for each country over time. The scale com-
bines responses to all four political support questions regarding a strong leader, experts, army rule,
and having a democratic political system, respectively. Higher values reflect greater support for
democracy and rejection of alternatives. Surveys were fielded in some countries on more occasions
than others.
Sources: World Values Surveys waves 1 to 6 (2015a); European Values Study waves 1 to 4 (2015).
In addition to the differences in democratic support between countries discussed
above, we can expect that there would be differences over time. Figure 7.2 tracks
the trends over time on the mean democratic support scale (the third measure in
Table 7.2). The chart plots the average score for each year the question was fielded
in the WVS; for some countries additional data points are included from waves of
the EVS which fielded the same question set. As surveys were fielded on different
occasions in each country, there is more data available for some countries than oth-
ers. No clear pattern is evident from these trends. For example, some countries
experienced increases over time, such as Chile, whereas others including the United
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States and Korea have experienced decreases. In countries including Australia and
Uruguay support has remained stable. This aligns with Norris’ findings that there
was no particular trend in political support over time, contrary to the established
wisdom, ‘public support for the political system has not eroded consistently in es-
tablished democracies, not across a wide range of countries around the world’ (2011,
p. 241). In a few countries we see a reversal of the long-term trends following the
crisis. In Sweden, Spain, and to a lesser extent Japan, democratic support had been
gradually rising over time, and then fell after the crisis.
Figure 7.3: Relationship between Democratic Experience and Democratic Support
Sources: Democratic Support Scale constructed from Wave 6 World Values Survey
(2015b). Years of democratic experience is calculated as the difference between the
survey year, and the variable ‘PolityIV-durable’ from Norris’ Democracy Cross-national
Data, which represents the latest regime transition date (2015).
One other important aspect of democratic support to discuss is its relationship
with democratic experience. Table 7.2 showed that the established democracies had
higher scores on the democratic support scale. To further explore this, Figure 7.3
shows the relationship between democratic experience and democratic support. The
x-axis plots the years of democratic experience (log transformed) and the y-axis
plots the mean of the democratic support scale, revealing a strong and significant
relationship between the two (r=0.51, n=19, p=0.03).3 This is consistent with
the existing literature which highlights that a country’s experience with democracy
3The log of democratic experience is taken to reflect a non-linear relationship between demo-
cratic experience and democratic support.
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is a major influence on democratic support (for example see Huang et al., 2008;
Klingemann, 2014; McAllister, 1999).
This section has provided an overview of the dependent variable, including dif-
ferent operationalizations of democratic support, and the trends across countries
and over time. It has also touched on the positive relationship between a country’s
experience with democracy and citizens’ support for a democratic political system.
The subsequent sections will test hypotheses which seek to explain how democratic
support is influenced by a major economic shock. These analyses will use the demo-
cratic support scale that has been discussed in this section, which factors in both
support for democracy and rejection of alternatives on a scale from zero to 12.
7.2 Change in New and Old Democracies
The first set of hypotheses to be tested concerns the differences between old and
new democracies. According to Linz and Stepan (1996a), democracy should be
more fragile to economic shocks in the newer democracies where democracy is yet
to become fully consolidated. If that were the case, support for democracy would
be more likely to decline in the newer democracies after the crisis (H4.1). How-
ever, the resiliency of democratic support to a major economic shock has not really
been tested previously in the older democracies given the unprecedented scale of
the global financial crisis, the greatest since the Great Depression of the 1930s. If
democratic support is not as strong in the older democracies as Linz and Stepan’s
theory supposed then we could expect democratic support to decline across both
old and new democracies after the crisis (H4.2).
H4.1: After the crisis support for democracy would be more likely to decline in
newer democracies.
H4.2: After the crisis support for democracy declines across both new and old
democracies.
Before testing these hypotheses, it must first be defined which countries are old,
and which are new democracies. To explore this, Table 7.3 presents information on
the democratic experience in each country, beginning with the democratic transition
date. This in itself is a contentious measure, as there is a considerable degree of dis-
agreement as to the exact democratic transition dates in a range of countries (see for
instance Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1959; Muller, 1988; Paxton, 2000; Rueschemeyer
et al., 1992).4 The transition dates used in the table are calculated from Polity
4Paxton, for instance, found a lot of the transition dates commonly used reflected male suffrage,
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Table 7.3: Democratic Experience within the WVS Sample
Year of
democratic
transition
Polity score at
time of
transition
Polity score in
2015
United States 1809 9 10
New Zealand 1877 9 10
Australia 1901 10 10
Sweden 1917 10 10
Netherlands 1945 10 10
West Germany 1949 10 10
Japan 1952 10 10
Trinidad and Tobago 1962 8 10
Cyprus 1975 10 10
Spain 1978 9 10
Uruguay 1985 9 10
South Korea 1988 6 8
Chile 1989 8 10
East Germany 1990 10 10
Slovenia 1991 10 10
Poland 1991 8 10
Romania 1996 8 9
Peru 2001 9 9
Ghana 2001 6 8
Note: The polity score is a measure of how democratic each country is, ranging from −10
(strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), and is composed by subtracting the
dataset’s autoc score from the democ score, measures of autocracy and democracy respectively.
Shaded countries can be classified as ‘new democracies’.
Source: Polity IV Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions dataset (Marshall et al.,
2016a).
IV’s measure of regime durability (durable), which provides ‘the number of years
since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the polity
score)’ (Marshall et al., 2016b, p. 17). As this does not necessarily entail that each
country had fulfilled all the requirements of democracy, the polity scores are also
listed for the time of transition, and at the latest release of the PolityIV dataset
which measures up to 2015.5 There are many indicators of democracy, whether di-
chotomous classifications or continuous measures (for an overview see Norris, 2008,
Chapter 3). Polity IV is used here as it is one of the most commonly used in political
science, and as it is strongly correlated with other measures of democracy (Jaggers
rather than universal suffrage, which goes against most definitions of what constitutes a democratic
society (2000).
5The polity score is a measure of how democratic each country is, ranging from −10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), and is composed by subtracting the dataset’s autoc
score from the democ score, measures of autocracy and democracy respectively.
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and Gurr, 1995; Norris, 2008, pp. 61, 71). All 18 countries are also classified as
‘free’ according to Freedom House (2016).
Using this information on transition dates, new democracies are classified as
those that democratized during or after what Huntington (1991) described as the
‘third wave’ of democratization, from 1974 onwards. As indicated by the shading in
Table 7.3 this includes 10 countries, plus East Germany, and 7 older democracies,
plus West Germany.6
One simple way to test whether the crisis had different effects on democratic
support in new and old democracies is to consider the change in means on the
democratic support scale from before and after the crisis. Table 7.4 shows the mean
level of democratic support in new and old democracies, and the change between the
two survey waves. An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess whether
there were significant changes over time. This shows a significant decline of 0.10
on the democratic support scale in the old democracies, and a significant decline of
0.12 in the new democracies. The 95 percent confidence intervals for each estimate
overlap indicating that we cannot say one set of countries experienced greater or
lesser declines than the other. This result does not support the hypothesis that
newer democracies, faced with an economic shock, would suffer greater setbacks in
democratic support (H4.1), though it does support the competing hypothesis that
after the crisis support for democracy would decline in both new and old democracies
(H4.2).
Table 7.4: Democratic Support in Old and New Democracies
Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change
Old Democracies 8.87 8.77 −0.10∗∗
New Democracies 7.94 7.83 −0.12∗∗
Note: The table presents means of the democratic support scale, which combines
responses to all four political support questions regarding a strong leader, experts,
army rule, and having a democratic political system, respectively. Higher values
reflect greater support for democracy and rejection of alternatives. Scale ranges
from 0–12.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015).
A more nuanced way to investigate democratic support in new and old democ-
racies would take account of the degree of crisis impact, as not all countries were
affected equally. Figure 7.4 plots the measure of the crisis depth, GDP growth over
2008 to 2009, against the change in democratic support between the two survey
waves. Old democracies are shown in blue, and new democracies in red, with a
6East and West Germany are kept separate here due to the different democratic transition
dates.
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Figure 7.4: GDP Growth and Democratic Support in Old and New Democracies
Note: Change in Democratic Support measures the difference in the democratic support
scale country means (0–12) between WVS wave 5 (2004–2007) and wave 6 (2010–2013).
Sources: Democratic support from the wave 5 and 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b);
GDP growth from the World Bank (2015a).
line of fit plotted for each group of countries. In both cases the slope of the line is
positive, indicating that at higher levels of growth countries were more likely to see
increases in democratic support, and at lower levels of growth, declines in demo-
cratic support were more likely. Neither relationship is particularly strong, with
both falling well short of statistical significance (new democracies: r=0.34, n=11,
p=0.31; old democracies: r=0.35, n=8, p=0.40). Although the sample sizes are very
small (n=8 and n=11) so this data does not necessarily discount a relationship. The
slopes of the line are similar, indicating that newer democracies did not experience
greater losses in democratic support than the older democracies.7
While the results presented here are not definitive, they go against the con-
ventional wisdom that democratic support should be resilient to economic shocks in
consolidated democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1996b, p. 16). Since the global financial
crisis similar declines in democratic support were observed in new and old democ-
racies. In both cases, countries that were harder hit by the crisis were more likely
to experience declines in democratic support. This lends support to the hypothesis
that the magnitude of the crisis was sufficient to affect democratic support in both
7Further research should seek to investigate differences in democratic support between old and
new democracies over time with a larger sample size.
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new and old democracies (H4.2).
7.3 Grievances
Similar to discussions in the previous chapters, the grievances experienced in rela-
tion to the crisis, whether at the country level or at the individual level, could be
expected to have an impact on democratic support. To the extent that the crisis has
a negative impact on democratic support, we would expect this effect to be present
in countries that were harder hit by the crisis, though not necessarily in those that
were relatively unaffected (H4.3). At the individual level those with fewer resources,
in terms of education, income, or employment could be expected to be less sup-
portive of democracy, than those who are doing better for themselves within the
democratic system (H4.4).
H4.3: In countries harder hit by the crisis, support for democracy will be more
likely to decline after the crisis than in countries that were less hard hit.
H4.4: Individuals more vulnerable to the financial crisis, such as the unemployed,
those on low incomes, and those with a lower level of education, will be less sup-
portive of democracy after the crisis.
To investigate how democratic support changed between the survey waves before
and after the crisis hit, Table 7.5 presents the mean score on the democratic support
scale for each country, and overall, across the two waves. The final column shows
the change over time alongside the results of independent samples t-tests to assess
whether the level of democratic support after the crisis was significantly different
to what it was before. Overall democratic support has declined significantly from
an average of 8.34 to 8.24 on the scale that ranges from zero to 12. In two thirds
of the countries the trend is negative, significantly so in eight of those countries.
Meanwhile four countries experienced a significant increase in democratic support
over the same period of time. For the most part, countries that avoided a recession
during the financial crisis did not experience significant declines in democratic sup-
port. Australia is the exception, although data from the Australian Election Study
suggests this decline is related to domestic political factors.8 The greatest declines
8Declining support for and satisfaction with democracy in Australia has gone alongside up-
heaval in the major party leaderships, including several changes of Prime Minister outside of the
electoral cycle, the first of which occurred in 2010, in advance of the WVS Wave 6 being fielded (on
declining satisfaction with democracy see Cameron and McAllister, 2016, p. 74). The Australian
Election Study data shows a majority of Australians disapproved of the 2010 change of Prime
Minister (McAllister et al., 2010). This may have affected evaluations of democracy; given the
economic crisis barely affected Australia it would be more reasonable to presume this shift was
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were in two of the post-communist countries, Romania and Slovenia, followed by
Sweden and Spain, all countries that were affected by the Great Recession.
Table 7.5: Trends in Democratic Support
Mean (2004-2007) Mean (2010-2013) Change
Romania 6.56 5.98 −0.57∗∗
Slovenia 8.30 7.82 −0.48∗∗
Sweden 9.57 9.09 −0.48∗∗
Spain 8.81 8.35 −0.46∗∗
Japan 8.74 8.39 −0.35∗∗
Peru 7.16 6.93 −0.23∗∗
United States 8.26 8.04 −0.23∗
Australia 8.90 8.68 −0.21∗
New Zealand 9.66 9.46 −0.20
South Korea 7.40 7.32 −0.08
Germany 9.08 9.01 −0.08
Uruguay 8.26 8.23 −0.03
Netherlands 8.34 8.45 0.11
Chile 8.09 8.25 0.16
Ghana 8.86 9.04 0.17∗
Poland 7.03 7.27 0.24∗∗
Cyprus 8.27 8.75 0.48∗∗
Trinidad and Tobago 8.43 9.04 0.61∗∗
Total 8.34 8.24 −0.10∗∗
Note: The table presents means of the democratic support scale, which combines
responses to all four political support questions regarding a strong leader, experts,
army rule, and having a democratic political system, respectively. Higher values reflect
greater support for democracy and rejection of alternatives. Scale ranges from 0–12.
Shaded countries experienced a recession during the global financial crisis.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015).
Table 7.5 enables a comparison to be made between countries that did and did
not experience recession. A more nuanced analysis will take account of variation
in crisis impacts across the sample. To investigate how these trends are affected
by the degree of crisis impact, the change in democratic support over time can be
plotted against GDP growth at the peak of the crisis, 2008 to 2009. Figure 7.5
shows this relationship, which is positive, though incorporating all countries there is
considerable variation and the relationship falls short of significance (r=0.35, n=18,
p=0.16). As in the previous chapters, the less developed countries in the dataset
appear to be outliers, and if we exclude these countries a stronger relationship
emerges within the more developed countries in the dataset.9 In this smaller sample
related to other political factors.
9Countries are classified according to the Human Development Index either as ‘very high
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Figure 7.5: GDP Growth and Change in Democratic Support
Note: Change in Democratic Support measures the difference in the democratic support
scale country means (0–12) between WVS wave 5 (2004–2007) and wave 6 (2010–2013).
Sources: Democratic support from the wave 5 and 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b);
GDP growth from the World Bank (2015a); Human Development Index (HDI) catego-
rizations from the United Nations Development Programme (2016).
the relationship between growth and the change in democractic support, highlighted
by the blue line of fit, is positive and reasonably strong, falling just narrowly short
of significance at the 0.05 level (r=0.53, n=14, p=0.05). This shows that countries
that had the lowest growth rates during 2008 to 2009 also experienced some of the
biggest drops in support for democracy, including Japan, Sweden, Slovenia, and
Spain. GDP growth during the crisis does not explain all the variation between
countries, though it does seem to have an effect. This builds upon the findings of
Armingeon and Guthmann (2014) who found the crisis resulted in lower levels of
satisfaction with democracy, a specific measure of support, by showing that diffuse
support for a democratic political system was also affected by the crisis.
In addition to investigating the effect of grievances at the country level, the effects
of the crisis can also be explored at the individual level. It could be expected that
those most affected by the crisis would be less likely to support democracy than those
who are still doing well for themselves within the democratic system (McAllister and
human development countries’ or into the lower categories, including ‘high human development’
(Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru) and ‘medium human development’ (Ghana) (United
Nations Development Programme, 2016).
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White, 2011, p. 482). The existing research shows that those with fewer resources,
particularly education, but also income, are already less supportive of democracy
during ordinary times (Magalha˜es, 2014, p. 90; Shafiq, 2010). The question is then
whether these disadvantaged groups remain less supportive of democracy after the
crisis to a similar degree as before, or whether the gap widens between the haves
and the have nots.
To explore the effect of individual resources on democratic support, linear bivari-
ate regression models are estimated within each country sample, and in the pooled
data. The same models are estimated on the WVS data from before and after the
crisis respectively, to assess whether the relationships between resources and demo-
cratic support have changed since the crisis. As in the previous chapters, the effects
of having a university degree, income level (measured in deciles), being unemployed
(compared against a base category of labor force participants), and financial satis-
faction (measured on a ten point scale) are each tested for their effects on democratic
support, operationalized as the democratic support scale, ranging from zero to 12.
The results are presented in Figure 7.6.
As would be expected from the previous literature, education has a positive effect
on democratic support (Magalha˜es, 2014, p. 90). In all but one case the coefficient
is positive, and in the majority of cases education has a statistically significant
effect. In the multilevel model the effect is positive and significant before and after
the crisis. The effect size is bigger after the crisis, although as the confidence bars
overlap it cannot be said that education is having a significantly greater effect after
the crisis. Income also has a positive effect on democratic support and reaches
statistical significance across many countries. Spain is an exception, before the crisis
those with higher incomes were less supportive of democracy, though the relationship
switched after the crisis. In the multilevel model on the pooled sample the effect is
positive, statistically significant, and much the same after the crisis as it was before.
The effect of unemployment on the whole trends negative though there is a lot
more variation. In many countries there is no significant difference between the
unemployed and labor force participants. In a few cases there are big differences
between the effect of unemployment before and after the crisis, specifically in Aus-
tralia, Sweden and Trinidad the unemployed are a lot less supportive of democracy
compared to those in the labor force after the crisis, than they were in the wave of
the survey that was fielded before the crisis. The multilevel model incorporating all
countries shows a negative effect in both survey waves, the effect is significant after
the crisis, though falls narrowly short of significance at the 0.05 level before the crisis
(p=0.08). It cannot be said that the unemployed are significantly less supportive of
democracy after the crisis than they were before as the confidence intervals overlap.
However, the more negative effect following the crisis is consistent with the idea that
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Figure 7.6: Effects of Resources on Democratic Support
Notes: Charts plot coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for linear bivariate
regression models before and after the crisis. The models regress university degree,
income, unemployment, and financial satisfaction respectively on the democratic support
scale (0-12). University degree is dichotomous. The unemployed are compared against
labor force participants. Income and financial satisfaction are on ten-point scales.
Source: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b).
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those most affected by the crisis would be least satisfied with democracy, and thus
less supportive of it as the ideal political system for their country.
Looking finally at financial satisfaction, with a few exceptions this predictor
has a positive effect. Whilst the effect does not reach statistical significance in all
countries, in more than half of the sample it has a significant positive effect either
before or after the crisis (or both), in many other cases falling narrowly short of
significance. The multilevel model shows that financial satisfaction has a positive
and significant affect before and after the crisis, with a similar effect size. These
results, alongside the effect of income, show that both objective and subjective
indicators of an individual’s financial well-being matter for democratic support.
Overall, this exploration of the effect of various resources on democratic sup-
port is consistent with the supposition that the winners of democracy will be more
supportive of it as a political system, aligning with performance based explanations
of political support (see Magalha˜es, 2014; McAllister, 1999). Those with degrees,
higher incomes, jobs, and those who are more financially satisfied tend to be more
supportive of democracy. The results support the hypothesis that those most vul-
nerable to the crisis would be the least supportive of democracy (H4.4). In most
cases the confidence intervals overlap between the surveys that took place before
and after the crisis respectively, so it cannot be said that grievances are having a
different effect to what they were before the crisis. However, the coefficient sizes for
education and unemployment increased after the crisis, suggesting that the gap in
democratic support may have widened between the haves and the have nots.
The regression models discussed above are bivariate models, so they do not take
account of various control variables. To provide a more robust test of the hypotheses,
factoring in both country and individual level factors simultaneously, the next step
of the analysis is a multilevel model incorporating all 18 countries and predictors
at two levels. The results are, as in the preceding chapters, presented in table and
diagram format (see Table 7.6 and Figure 7.7). The plot of coefficients in Figure 7.7
eases comparison of effect sizes and 95 percent confidence intervals from the waves
of the survey conducted before and after the crisis, respectively.
Three predictors at the country level are incorporated in the model. Democratic
experience, as the strongest predictor identified in the existing literature, is included.
Once again this is log transformed to reflect a non-linear relationship with the de-
pendent variable (see Figure 7.3). GDP growth and unemployment, both from 2008
to 2009 at the peak of the crisis, are incorporated to enable the effects of the crisis to
be tested. The inclusion of both economic and political macro-level variables enables
the economic performance hypothesis to be tested against democratic experience in
the crisis context (see Huang et al., 2008; McAllister, 1999). At the individual level,
employment status, income, education, age, gender and postmaterialist values are
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incorporated.10 The dependent variable is the democratic support scale ranging
from zero to 12, factoring in both support for a democratic political system, and
rejection of anti-democratic alternatives.
At the country level, as would be expected, democratic experience has a big effect
on democratic support. The effect size is much greater before the crisis, decreasing
by more than half from 0.69 to 0.31. When factored into the multilevel model, the
national economic indicators of GDP growth and unemployment have no effect on
democratic support. This aligns with existing studies that find economic perfor-
mance to have a minimal effect on democratic support in comparison to democratic
experience (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Huang et al., 2008; McAllister, 1999), and
suggests even a crisis of this magnitude was not enough to change the dynamics of
these relationships. Although whilst the impact, or lack thereof, of economic factors
does not change after the crisis, a country’s experience with democracy did become
less important after the crisis.
At the individual level, taking account of the suite of control variables, the
various measures of resources still trend in the same direction as the bivariate models
presented in Figure 7.6, though in some cases these relationships are no longer
significant. Comparing the unemployed against labor force participants, the effect
is negative in both survey waves though does not reach significance in either. The
effect of unemployment became more negative after the crisis (β=−0.18, p=0.10).
The coefficient for income is positive in both cases though only reaches significance
before the crisis. Having a university degree has a large significant effect before and
after the crisis, and the effect is a good deal greater after the crisis (increased from
β=0.47 to β=0.67). The effect of being female on democratic support is negative,
though insignificant in both survey waves. Postmaterialism is positive and significant
in both waves, and changes little between the two.
The findings for age show a widening gap between older and younger people.
Compared against a base category of 18 to 29 year olds, those in the middle age cat-
egory (30–49) became more supportive of democracy relative to the younger cohort.
Before the crisis, the effect of being in the middle age group was positive though not
significant, after the crisis the effect size had increased and the relationship became
significant (increase from β=0.09 to β=0.27). Those 50 and over were significantly
more supportive of democracy than younger people before the crisis, though the
effect size more than doubles after the crisis (from β=0.29 to β=0.61). These re-
sults suggest a widening gap between younger and older generations on views of
democracy.
The disproportionate effects of the crisis on young people have been well docu-
mented (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011). Unemployment rates rose highest amongst
10Inglehart (2003) demonstrated a relationship between postmaterial values and democracy.
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Table 7.6: Predicting Democratic Support Before and After the Crisis
Pre-crisis (2004-2007) Post-crisis (2010-2013)
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)
Country level predictors
Log of years democracy 0.69∗∗ (0.11) 0.31∗ (0.13)
GDP growth −0.04 (0.06) 0.01 (0.07)
Unemployment 0.00 (0.05) −0.01 (0.04)
Individual level predictors
Employment status (base: labor force participants)
Unemployed −0.06 (0.10) −0.18 (0.11)
Other employment status 0.00 (0.06) −0.06 (0.05)
Income 0.04∗∗ (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
University degree 0.47∗∗ (0.07) 0.67∗∗ (0.10)
Age range (base: 18-29)
Aged 30-49 0.09 (0.08) 0.27∗∗ (0.08)
Aged 50 and over 0.29∗∗ (0.10) 0.62∗∗ (0.14)
Gender (female) −0.03 (0.05) −0.05 (0.05)
Postmaterialist (12-item) 0.12∗ (0.05) 0.16∗∗ (0.06)
Constant 5.29∗∗ (0.58) 6.26∗∗ (0.66)
N (countries) 18 18
N (respondents) 16,840 19,093
ICC 0.09 0.13
Note: Multilevel model with random intercepts produced using Stata’s mixed command. The
dependent variable is the democratic support scale ranging from 0 to 12. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Sources: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014; 2015b), with country level indicators
from the World Bank (2015a; 2015b) and Norris (2015).
young people, and those finishing college degrees after the crisis hit faced starkly
different prospects to those who got their careers started a few years earlier (Bell
and Blanchflower, 2011; World Bank, 2016c). Moreover, as austerity policies kicked
in, for example the rising cost of higher education in the UK, younger people had
fewer opportunities to work or study (Dearden et al., 2011). These results suggest
the disproportionate effects of the crisis on the young have not been without con-
sequence for political attitudes, with young people increasingly less supportive of
democracy relative to the older cohorts.
How do these results relate back to the hypotheses on grievances? At the coun-
try level, the data shows a relationship between GDP growth and the change in
democratic support, with countries harder hit by the crisis experiencing greater de-
clines in democratic support. This lends support to the hypothesis that support for
democracy will be more likely to decline in countries harder hit (H4.3). Although in
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Figure 7.7: Predicting Democratic Support – Coefficient Plot
Note: Chart plots coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for a linear multilevel
model with random intercepts produced using the Stata mixed command. The dependent
variable is the democratic support scale ranging from 0–12. The base category for age is
18–29. The base category for employment status is labor force participants.
Sources: Wave 5 and Wave 6 World Values Surveys (2014, 2015), with country level
indicators from the World Bank (2015a, 2015b) and Norris (2015).
the multilevel model that controls for democratic experience, alongside individual
level variables, GDP growth and unemployment levels during the years preceding
the survey do not have an effect. At the individual level, resources, or the lack
thereof, have a similar effect on democratic support before and after the crisis, with
those more vulnerable in society less supportive of democracy (as per H4.4). What
has changed since the crisis is age, with young people having become less supportive
of democracy than the previous cohort. That younger generations are becoming less
supportive of democracy than older generations does not bode well for the future of
democracy, given the importance of democratic attitudes for sustaining democracy.
If the trend continues and the effect is lasting, processes of generational replacement
could lead to lower levels of democratic support in future.
7.4 Bailouts in the European Union
The final area to investigate concerns the role of bailouts by international orga-
nizations including the IMF and the EU. The role of non-state actors influencing
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domestic policies can be seen as an intrusion in the democratic process. There are
two arguments as to how this might have affected democratic support based on ex-
isting studies by Cordero and Simo´n (2016) and Armingeon and Guthmann (2014).
On the one hand, people could become less supportive of democracy as a result of
the intrusions of international organizations in the democratic process, this is the
argument advanced by Armingeon and Guthmann (2014). In this case we would
expect democratic support to decline in countries that received bailouts (H4.5). On
the other hand, Cordero and Simo´n (2016) make the argument that these intrusions
in policy making would increase the saliency of democracy, and thus increase sup-
port for democratic governance. In that case democratic support should increase in
the countries that received bailouts (H4.6).
H4.5: In countries that received conditional loans from the IMF or the EU after
the crisis, support for democracy will be more likely to decline.
H4.6: In countries that received conditional loans from the IMF or the EU after
the crisis, support for democracy will be more likely to increase.
As in the previous chapter on political protest, it is not ideal to test these hy-
potheses regarding the European sovereign debt crisis with data from the WVS. The
selection of countries does not include many that received bailouts from the IMF or
the European Union, just Spain and Cyprus, and in these countries the most recent
WVS survey wave preceded the bailouts making it impossible to investigate the ef-
fects of the bailouts. As an alternative approach to explore these hypotheses, first
the findings of Armingeon and Guthmann (2014) and Cordero and Simo´n (2016) will
be discussed in some depth, as both studies have investigated support for democracy
in the context of the bailouts in Europe. Their results have different implications for
the hypotheses above. To shed light on these competing propositions regarding the
effect of international interventions on support for national democracy, additional
analyses will be presented with data from the European Social Survey.
There are a number of ways in which the bailouts by international organizations
influenced the democratic political process within recipient countries. Domestic
governments were constrained in their policy making ability, as they had little choice
but to accept loans and sign Memorandums of Understandings which involved the
commitment to implement harsh austerity measures (Cordero and Simo´n, 2016).
This situation led to programmatic decline, with parties constrained to adopt the
same position on the bailouts (Cordero and Simo´n, 2016, p. 309). The implications
of this for citizens’ agency within the political process are considerable, as Armingeon
and Guthmann (2014, pp. 423–424) describe it:
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Whether the citizenry had voted the previous government out of office,
parliamentary parties cooperated or antagonised each other, social part-
ners cooperated or waged general strikes, or citizens demonstrated or
stayed at home, was of little importance for the structural, fiscal and so-
cial policies agreed upon in the memorandums of understanding between
the EU/IMF and national governments. In the end, the people simply
had to accept the deals. In other words, democratic discourse was inef-
fective.
Not only were citizens faced with the economic realities of the crisis, they were
also limited in their capacities to influence the course of government policy. It
could be expected that these constraints upon the democratic political process may
have implications for citizen support for democracy. The studies by Armingeon and
Guthmann (2014), and Cordero and Simo´n (2016) differ in the mechanism by which
this may affect support.
Armingeon and Guthmann (2014) seek to investigate the effect of the imposition
of austerity by the EU and IMF on support for democracy. They argue that citizens
distinguish between national and international levels of governance (see also Karp
et al., 2003), and in recognizing a ‘constrained room to manoeuvre’ at the national
level of politics they withdraw their support for democratic governance (Armingeon
and Guthmann, 2014, p. 424). They test this with data from the Eurobarometer
over 2007 to 2011, employing a combination of time-series cross-section analysis
with the aggregate data, and multilevel modelling which incorporates country and
individual level variables. They operationalize democratic support on the more
specific end of the continuum, incorporating satisfaction with democracy and trust
in the national parliament (Easton, 1975).
Firstly, the study finds that evaluations of economic performance are strongly
related to democratic support, more positive economic evaluations are associated
with higher support (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014, p. 439). Second, they find
that international factors, operationalized as IMF conditionality and interest rates
on government debt securities, have a negative effect on democratic support. This
relationship holds when controlling for austerity policies, as measured by changes
in government expenditures, suggesting that the effect is due to the international
interference, and not just a result of the austerity policies that followed from this
interference.
In evaluating Armingeon and Guthmann’s two main findings, it is important to
recognize that they have operationalized democratic support with specific measures
of political support (2014). That the interference of international and supranational
organizations in domestic politics has an effect on democratic satisfaction and trust
in parliament is an interesting finding, however, as Armingeon and Guthmann has-
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ten to add, this does not provide us with any information on how these interventions
have affected diffuse support for democracy (2014, p. 439). From existing work,
it could be expected that poor government performance would have some effect on
democratic satisfaction and institutional confidence (Anderson and Guillory, 1997;
McAllister, 1999; Norris, 2011, Chapter 10). Moreover, Norris’ work on critical cit-
izens and the democratic deficit has demonstrated that citizens can be dissatisfied
with the performance of democracy whilst supportive of democracy as a regime
(2011; 1999c). So Armingeon and Guthmann’s study (2014) leaves questions re-
garding the impact of the bailouts by international organizations on support for a
democratic regime.
Cordero and Simo´n (2016) seek to address this gap in Armingeon and Guth-
mann’s (2014) study by investigating both democratic satisfaction and democratic
support in the context of the bailouts in the European Union. They agree with
Armingeon and Guthmann (2014) in suggesting that negative economic evaluations
should be associated with declines in democratic satisfaction, though set out an al-
ternative mechanism by which the bailouts would be expected to affect the diffuse
element of democratic support. With international actors taking agency away from
national governments and their citizens, Cordero and Simo´n (2016) argue that this
should increase support for democracy, rather than reduce it. They hypothesize
that citizens ‘should increase their attachment to democracy as a reaction to these
external interventions, emphasising the saliency and importance of democratic rule’
(Cordero and Simo´n, 2016, p. 307).
To test this, Cordero and Simo´n (2016) use data from Round 6 of the ESS,
fielded in 2012. This is the only year that the survey fielded a question on diffuse
support for democracy, in this case by asking how important it is for respondents
to live in a democratic country, alongside a question on how satisfied they are with
the way democracy works in their country. They find that satisfaction with the
government has a positive effect on both democratic satisfaction and democratic
support; meanwhile positive economic evaluations have a positive impact on demo-
cratic satisfaction, but do not have an effect on democratic support (Cordero and
Simo´n, 2016, p. 317). Interactions in their model show that in countries that re-
ceived Troika bailouts, citizens more dissatisfied with the state of the economy were
more supportive of democracy, whereas in other Eurozone countries the opposite
was true (Cordero and Simo´n, 2016, p. 318).
Though the overarching arguments of the two studies seem to contradict one
another, when one distinguishes the specific and diffuse aspects of political support
as per Easton’s classification (1975), these results are not incompatible. Whilst
the bailouts negatively impacted democratic satisfaction according to both studies,
Cordero and Simo´n (2016) argued that in bailed-out countries those dissatisfied with
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the economy were more supportive of democracy. Though from their data, it is not
possible to say that the interventions increased democratic support as the data only
covers one point in time (2012).
In order to shed further light on these different interpretations of democratic
support in the context of the bailouts, data from the ESS can be explored. The
ESS has been fielded biennially from 2002 to 2014. Each wave has asked the same
question regarding democratic satisfaction, worded, ‘And on the whole, how satisfied
are you with the way democracy works in [country]?’, with responses on a scale from
zero to 10 where zero is ‘extremely dissatisfied’ and 10 is ‘extremely satisfied’. The
ESS has also asked a question on diffuse support for democracy, ‘How important is
it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?’, with responses also
on a scale from zero, ‘not at all important’, to 10, ‘extremely important’.11 Whilst
the question on satisfaction with democracy has been fielded in each of the waves
from 2002 to 2014 enabling an analysis of trends over time, the item tapping diffuse
support for democracy was only fielded in the 2012 wave.12 As more data is available
on democratic satisfaction, this shall be discussed first, before exploring democratic
support and satisfaction in the 2012 survey wave.
Figure 7.8 presents the trends in democratic satisfaction over time. To investigate
the effects of the bailouts on democratic satisfaction, the average level of democratic
satisfaction is calculated separately for countries that were affected by bailouts, and
for the remaining European countries in the sample.13 Cyprus, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain and Slovenia are incorporated in the group of countries considered
affected by bailouts.14 Of these countries Cyprus and Greece did not field the survey
in all seven rounds, so in those years averages do not incorporate the data from those
countries.15
The trend lines show that before the crisis democratic satisfaction was, on aver-
11The democratic support measure does not factor in rejection of non-democratic alternatives,
but as a continuous measure (0–10) it still captures more variation than dichotomous measures of
democratic support.
12Of the major public opinion surveys fielded in Europe, this seems to be the only one that asks
a question tapping diffuse support for democracy in the years since the European sovereign debt
crisis began.
13The sample of other European countries includes: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
As not every ESS country fielded a survey in each round, the sample is restricted to those that
fielded a national survey in each of the seven rounds.
14Cyprus, Ireland, Greece and Portugal received bailouts from the IMF and the EU. Spain
received an EU bailout for its banks. Slovenia is the only country that did not receive a Troika
bailout, though it came dangerously close in 2013, narrowly avoiding interventions of the IMF and
EU by bailing out their banking sector and implementing an austerity agenda. The interpretation
of the results is not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of Slovenia in the sample.
15Cyprus data is incorporated for 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Greece data is incorporated for
2002, 2004, 2008, and 2010. The exclusion of these countries in the later years is expected to lead
to more conservative estimates as the individual country trends show Greece and Cyprus exhibiting
the steepest declines.
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Figure 7.8: Democratic Satisfaction in Europe, 2002–2014
Note: Chart plots the average democratic satisfaction score (0–
10). Bailout affected countries includes Cyprus, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.
Source: European Social Survey Rounds 1 to 7 (2014).
age, similar in the countries that would later be affected by bailouts (5.1 in 2002),
to the rest of Europe (5.6 in 2002). From when the crisis hit in 2008 satisfaction
began to decline in those countries that would later be affected by bailouts from
international organizations. Democratic satisfaction dropped further still in sub-
sequent waves, while it remained high in other European countries. This finding
is consistent with Armingeon and Guthmann (2014, p. 432) who looked at trends
in democratic satisfaction with Eurobarometer data, though the data here shows
the trends over a longer period of time. These trends highlight that the decline
in satisfaction commenced at the onset of the economic crisis, before the bailouts
themselves, suggesting it was not just the bailouts and international interventions
that decreased democratic satisfaction, but the conditions that led to the bailouts as
well. The analysis uses the same data source as Cordero and Simo´n (2016) though
looks at trends over time, rather than just a single time point. The level of de-
cline shown from 2012 to 2014 is likely to underestimate the true level of decline, as
Greece and Cyprus, which showed the two steepest declines were no longer included
in the final surveys.16
The discussion above covers democratic satisfaction, but not diffuse support for
democracy. Figure 7.9 presents the average score for both democratic satisfaction
and democratic support in Eurozone countries fielded in 2012 (charts recreated from
Cordero and Simo´n, 2016, p. 313).17 The chart shows firstly that support for democ-
16Cyprus data is incorporated up to 2012, Greece data is incorporated up to 2010.
17The democratic support item was not asked in other waves, so it is not possible to look at
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racy is higher than satisfaction with democracy in all countries; both are measured
on scales of zero to ten. This is consistent with the critical citizens argument,
whereby citizens can support democracy in principle, but be dissatisfied with how it
works in practice (Norris, 2011, 1999c). The data also shows that countries affected
by bailouts were among those least satisfied with democracy. The bottom five (of
14) countries on the scale are Slovenia, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Cyprus, all of
which either received bailouts or, as in the case of Italy and Slovenia, were under
serious threat of requiring bailouts. However, countries affected by the bailouts are
quite varied in their degree of democratic support relative to the other European
countries in the sample. On average democratic support is highest in Cyprus; while
Italy and Spain are in the top half of the sample, Slovenia and Portugal are in the
bottom half. Countries with high levels of democratic dissatisfaction then, do not
necessarily have citizens that are unsupportive of democracy. To assess whether
democratic support had declined as a result of the crisis would require data over
time.
Figure 7.9: Democratic Satisfaction and Support in Eurozone countries, 2012
Note: Charts plot the mean values and 95 percent confidence intervals for democratic sat-
isfaction and democratic support in 2012, each measured on a scale from 0–10. Weighted
using the variable pspwght which adjusts for sampling error and non-response bias as
well as different selection probabilities.
Sources: Recreated from Cordero and Simo´n (2016, p. 313) using data from Round 6 of
the European Social Survey (2012).
trends over time.
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Overall from this discussion of results, the international interventions from the
IMF and the EU did have a negative effect on democratic satisfaction, as shown by
Armingeon and Guthmann (2014) and the time-series data from the ESS presented
above. The effects of the bailouts on the diffuse element of democratic support are
harder to assess due to a limited availability of data in the relevant countries over
time. Cordero and Simo´n (2016) found in countries that experienced bailouts, those
with more negative evaluations of the economy were more supportive of democracy,
suggesting international interventions in domestic politics may increase democratic
support. Future research should aim to investigate changes in democratic support
over time in the affected countries.
7.5 Conclusion
Public support for a democratic political system is what gives democratic regimes
legitimacy, and decreases the likelihood of democratic reversals. Support for democ-
racy can be divided into specific and diffuse components (Easton, 1975). Specific
support includes satisfaction with how democratic politics is working in practice,
whilst diffuse support includes support for democracy as a political regime. This
chapter has focussed primarily on the latter, support for a democratic political
system. Previous work on democratic consolidation suggests that democratic sup-
port should be resilient to economic shocks in the established democracies, but more
fragile in newer democracies where people may associate poor economic performance
with the political regime rather than incumbents (Linz and Stepan, 1996b). As the
global financial crisis is the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s, the resilience
of democratic support in the advanced democracies to a major economic shock has
not been tested in recent times. This chapter has investigated the impact of the
crisis on democratic support with WVS data from before and after the crisis in 18
countries, supplemented with data from the ESS.
First, the chapter investigated differences between old and new democracies.
Democratic support declined significantly, and to a similar extent, in both old and
new democracies. The hypothesis that democratic support would be resilient to
economic shocks in the established democracies but fragile in newer democracies
can be rejected. Rather, the data lends support to the competing hypothesis that
due to the unprecedented extent of the crisis democratic support would decline in
both old and new democracies. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom
that democratic support should be sufficiently strong to weather economic crises in
established democracies (Linz and Stepan, 1996b).
Next, the chapter explored how the degree of the crisis influenced democratic
support, both at the country and individual level. Countries that did not go into
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recession in most cases did not experience the significant drop in democratic sup-
port that was evident overall. Australia was the only exception, as a country that
avoided recession and lost democratic support, though that can likely be attributed
to domestic political factors evident in the national election study data (McAllister
et al., 2010). In a similar vein, GDP growth during the peak of the crisis was pos-
itively associated with the change in democratic support—as in previous chapters
this relationship was evident amongst the more developed countries in the dataset.
In countries that fared relatively well during the crisis, democratic support was
more likely to remain stable or increase, whereas the countries that were hardest hit
tended to experience declines in democratic support.
The individual level data showed that those with higher levels of education,
higher incomes, greater financial satisfaction, and those in the labor force were more
supportive of democracy. However, when factoring in a range of control variables
only education had a strong and significant effect on democratic support both before
and after the crisis. The effect of education also increased after the crisis suggesting
democratic support decreased amongst those with lower levels of education after the
crisis. Aside from the investigations of individual resources, age showed differences
before and after the crisis. Whilst older people were more supportive of democracy
than younger people both before and after the crisis, the gap widened considerably
after the crisis. There is a lot of evidence to suggest younger people were dispro-
portionately affected by the crisis (see Bell and Blanchflower, 2011). The WVS
data presented here suggests that this may have influenced young people’s attitudes
towards a democratic political system.
The final section investigated democratic support in the context of the European
sovereign debt crisis and bailouts by the EU and IMF. Existing studies by Armin-
geon and Guthmann (2014) and Cordero and Simo´n (2016) have explored this in
some depth with the data available. At first glance these studies would appear to
contradict one another, with Armingeon and Guthmann (2014) claiming that the
international interventions in domestic politics depressed support for democracy,
and Cordero and Simo´n (2016) suggesting the opposite to be the case. Differences
in operationalization may explain this result; Armingeon and Guthmann investigate
democratic satisfaction and trust in parliament, whereas Cordero and Simo´n looked
at support for democracy. Analysis of the ESS data added to this discussion, show-
ing that satisfaction with democracy decreased considerably in countries affected by
the bailouts compared to the rest of Europe. The impact of the bailouts on demo-
cratic support is inconclusive given data limitations, though the ESS data does show
that countries with the lowest levels of democratic satisfaction were varied in their
levels of democratic support. This reinforces the view of Cordero and Simo´n (2016)
that the effects of the bailouts on specific and diffuse support differed.
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This chapter contributes to our understanding of the effects of a major crisis on
democratic support in a number of ways. First, the analyses show that in the con-
text of a major economic crisis, support for a democratic political regime is fragile
in both old and new democracies. Second, the evidence shows that diffuse support
for a democratic political system is fragile to economic shocks, not just democratic
satisfaction (contrary to Huang et al., 2008, pp. 58–59). Third, it shows age dif-
ferences in democratic support widening, with the youngest generation becoming
less supportive of democracy. The next and final chapter discusses the implications
of these findings for democratic governance, and how this work contributes to our
understanding of how citizens respond to major economic crises.
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Chapter 8
Implications for Democracy
The global financial crisis has been the greatest economic crisis since the great de-
pression of the 1930s. This thesis has investigated how citizens responded to this
major economic shock, in terms of their political behaviors and attitudes. Three
dimensions of participation were examined—voting behavior, civic engagement and
political protest. In addition to participation, support for a democratic political
system was examined. The overall finding is that the crisis depressed political par-
ticipation and democratic support in countries affected to a greater extent by the
economic crisis. At the individual level, after the crisis there was little change in the
dynamics of who participates in politics. Those most vulnerable to the crisis were
no more or less likely to participate in politics than they were before. The evidence
does however point to young people’s increasing disillusionment with the political
system, after the crisis they became less supportive of democracy and less likely to
vote.
To examine political behavior and attitudes in the context of the crisis this thesis
has taken a comparative approach, drawing upon data from cross-national public
opinion surveys, alongside supplementary sources on aggregate participation trends.
The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems was used in Chapter 4 to investigate
voting behavior including turnout and vote choice. The analysis with the CSES
incorporated 45 elections within 13 democratic countries. Each country had fielded
at least one survey after the onset of the crisis in 2008 and two to three surveys
before 2008, enabling a comparison from before and after the crisis. The World
Values Survey was the primary dataset used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 to investigate
civic engagement, political protest and democratic support, respectively. Data was
drawn from Wave 5 (2004–2007) and Wave 6 (2010–2013) of the WVS to similarly
enable comparison from before and after the crisis. 18 democratic countries were
incorporated on the basis that surveys had been fielded in each of the two waves.
These cross-national surveys were analyzed by comparing the aggregated trends
over time, and through multilevel modelling to assess the influence of individual
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and contextual predictors on the dependent variables.
The primary analyses with the CSES and WVS were supplemented with data
from a range of other sources. The voting behavior chapter utilized aggregate
turnout data from International IDEA (2017) and data on electoral results from
the PARLINE database on national parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2014).
Chapter 6 used protest event data from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015) to investi-
gate the number of demonstrations during the Eurozone crisis. European Values
Study data was employed to supplement the WVS protest and democratic support
trends over time for the European countries within the sample in Chapters 6 and
7. European Social Survey data was analyzed in Chapter 7 to investigate demo-
cratic satisfaction and support in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis.
Further, aggregate level indicators on economic conditions and democratic expe-
rience were incorporated from the World Bank (2015a,b), the OECD (2016a,b,c),
the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme, 2016),
Pippa Norris’ Democracy Cross-National Data (2015) and Polity IV (Marshall et al.,
2016a). Incorporating data from a wide range of sources has strengthened the anal-
yses beyond what would have been possible with a single dataset, in terms of the
coverage of country contexts and time points, as well as providing different measures
of key concepts.
8.1 Overview of Findings
Two dimensions of voting behavior were explored in Chapter 4—voter turnout and
vote choice. Analyses of aggregate turnout data from International IDEA (2017)
showed that declines in turnout were associated with lower GDP growth in the
year preceding the election, suggesting that the crisis had a demobilizing effect on
electoral participation. The CSES data meanwhile showed that voters had similar
characteristics before and after the crisis compared to non-voters. Those more edu-
cated, with higher incomes, in the labor force, as well as older people were all more
likely to vote in elections preceding the crisis, and after the crisis hit. Young people
were somewhat less likely to vote after the crisis. The finding that turnout declined
overall in countries harder hit, without much change in the dynamics of who partic-
ipates, suggests that the crisis may have depressed participation by creating greater
levels of hardship in society as a whole.
Analyses of vote choice were conducted at the aggregate and individual level.
At the aggregate level, within the sample of 13 countries selected from the CSES,
governments were no more likely to lose office after the crisis than before. However,
after the crisis declines in vote shares and seats in parliament were observed for both
the party of the incumbent President or Prime Minister, as well as coalition partners.
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Governments on the left were better able to hold onto power after the crisis than
those on the right. After the crisis, GDP growth was positively and significantly
associated with the change in incumbent vote share since the preceding election,
lending support to the economic voting thesis (confirming the results of Bartels,
2013, p. 50). The multilevel model showed support for sociotropic economic voting,
though no evidence that citizens voted with their pocketbooks. This is consistent
with existing studies that have demonstrated voters are influenced to a greater extent
by the country’s economic circumstances than their own (Anderson, 2000; Kiewiet,
1983), and indicates that this still pertains during a major economic crisis..
The impact of the crisis on civic engagement was investigated in Chapter 5.
The inclusion of civic engagement as part of the political behavior spectrum draws
upon work that has espoused the virtues of citizens’ active involvement in civic
groups for the health of democratic society (see Diamond, 1994; Putnam et al.,
1993; Tocqueville, 1966). In this chapter, civic engagement was defined as partici-
pation in civic associations, including old social movement organizations—political
parties, unions, and professional associations, new social movement organizations—
humanitarian organizations and environmental groups, and other association types
oriented towards recreational activities. Overall there was a significant decline in
civic engagement between Waves 5 and 6 of the WVS. Moreover, countries that were
harder hit by the crisis were more likely to experience declines in civic engagement,
although this relationship only pertained to the more developed countries within
the dataset. The decline in civic engagement overall was not driven by a particular
type of association, rather it was evident across the different types of association,
with change in one type being strongly correlated with change in the others. The
individual level data showed that there was little change in who participated in civic
groups before and after the crisis. Those with greater resources, including education
and higher incomes, remained more likely to participate after the crisis.
Political protest in the context of the crisis was explored in Chapter 6. Protest
provides an important channel through which citizens can express grievances and
engage in the political process outside of the electoral process. Protest was oper-
ationalized as a measure combining protest potential and participation, including
signing petitions, boycotts, and peaceful demonstrations. Since the crisis protest
had declined significantly in just over half of the sample. Lower GDP growth during
the crisis was associated with greater declines in political protest, consistent with the
argument that the crisis had a demobilizing effect on participation. This relation-
ship was only evident in the most developed countries incorporated in the analysis.
There was also a significant decline in postmaterialism since the crisis, which was
positively associated with the change in protest over the same time peroid. Data
at the individual level showed it remained the same suspects who were more likely
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to get involved in protest, namely, those more educated, those with higher incomes,
and those with postmaterialist value orientations.
The finding that the crisis had a demobilizing effect on protest participation may
seem surprising, given the great deal of attention paid to protest mobilizations linked
to the crisis, particularly those in Europe during the sovereign debt crisis (see for
instance della Porta et al., 2017; Giugni and Grasso, 2015; Kriesi, 2014; Ru¨dig and
Karyotis, 2013). To investigate this seemingly contradictory finding, protest during
the Eurozone crisis was explored with ICEWS data on the number of demonstrations
in each country across Europe (Boschee et al., 2015). This confirmed that the
number of demonstrations increased dramatically in countries affected by IMF and
EU bailouts, particularly in the year that bailout agreements were reached and the
accompanying austerity measures introduced. The implications of the finding that
the crisis depressed participation overall, whilst leading to large mobilizations, will
be considered further in the discussion.
Support for a democratic political system was investigated in Chapter 7. The
analyses focussed primarily on diffuse support for democracy as a political regime as
per Easton’s classification between specific and diffuse support (1975). Democratic
support was assessed through a measure that captured support for democracy in
addition to the rejection of anti-democratic alternatives (see Shin and Wells, 2005).
Whilst previous literature has suggested that support for a democratic political sys-
tem should be resilient to economic shocks in consolidated democracies (Linz and
Stepan, 1996b), the WVS data revealed significant declines of similar magnitude in
both old and new democracies within the sample. This suggests a large economic
shock is sufficient to affect support for the political regime even in the older democ-
racies. Once again, when limiting the sample to the more developed countries in
the dataset, the change in democratic support between the two survey waves was
positively related to GDP growth during the peak of the crisis. In other words,
countries that were harder hit by the crisis were more likely to experience a loss
of democratic support. The individual level data showed that more educated and
older people were more supportive of democracy both before and after the crisis,
though the divide increased. After the crisis, young people became less supportive of
democracy in comparison to their older counterparts. Similarly, the gap in political
support between those with and without a university degree increased.
Democratic support was further investigated in the context of the IMF and
EU bailouts in Europe by discussing the findings of Armingeon and Guthmann
(2014) and Cordero and Simo´n (2016), and presenting supplementary data from the
European Social Survey. The ESS data showed that satisfaction with democracy
had declined steeply in European countries affected by the bailouts, whilst remaining
steady in the rest of Europe. There was no data over time on democratic support,
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the diffuse measure, though the 2012 ESS data showed that whilst bailout countries
scored lowest on democratic satisfaction, they were dispersed throughout the overall
Eurozone sample in terms of democratic support. This suggests that democratic
support did not follow the same downward trajectory as democratic satisfaction.
8.2 Discussion
This thesis has provided a comprehensive investigation of the effects of the cri-
sis across the spectrum of types of political participation, from the most to least
conventional. In doing so, the study has provided a snapshot of the dynamics of
participation after the crisis began, compared to the years beforehand. As much
of the existing work that explores economic conditions and political behavior has
taken place during relatively ordinary fluctuations in economic performance, there
is not much precedent to know how citizens would respond in the context of a ma-
jor economic crisis. Given the scale of the crisis, with millions losing homes, jobs,
retirement savings, or opportunities, and subsequent austerity cuts affecting pub-
lic service provision, it might be expected that citizens would rise up to express
their grievances. Indeed much of the existing work has focussed on mobilizations
surrounding the global financial crisis (e.g. Calhoun, 2013; Castan˜eda, 2012; Giugni
and Grasso, 2015), though few have systematically investigated participation trends
across societies as a whole. This study showed that, when looking at average trends
cross-nationally, the crisis had a demobilizing affect on participation rather than a
mobilizing one.
Whilst the aggregate data showed a demobilization linked to the crisis, the in-
dividual level data demonstrated that those who participate in various kinds of
political action have much the same characteristics after the onset of the crisis, as
they did before. A simple mechanism explains this result. During a crisis, those
with fewer resources make up a larger proportion of the population. The evidence
suggested that there was little change in the socio-demographic profiles of those
who participate in politics, those with fewer resources remained similarly inactive
in political life after the crisis. As a result, participation overall would be expected
to decline at a time of crisis. Put simply, when people are struggling to get by they
have less time, energy and other resources available for political activity—when more
people are struggling, participation declines. This rationale is consistent with the
evidence presented in this thesis.
The protest event data from ICEWS provided further insights into the dynamics
of protest mobilization during a crisis. Whilst the analyses with the WVS data
showed an overall decline in protest participation since the crisis began, the ICEWS
data demonstrated that the number of protest events in European countries affected
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by the IMF and EU bailouts rose rapidly in the year that bailouts were agreed. This
finding suggests some degree of nuance is required to understand how crises affect
protest. First, the results align with studies that have found that protest mobiliza-
tions occurred in response to the introduction of austerity policies, the government
policy responses to the crisis, rather than the crisis itself (Beissinger and Sasse, 2014;
Kriesi, 2014). Second, one can differentiate effects of the crisis on the level of partic-
ipation across societies, from the number of demonstrations. The crisis may depress
participation overall as more people are struggling with getting by, whilst mobilizing
‘the usual suspects’ to participate in large, highly visible protest events. Third, one
can distinguish the effects crises have on all types of protest, from protests specif-
ically linked to the crisis. For instance, the crisis and government responses to it
might lead to protests on austerity, whilst depressing mobilization on other causes,
such as the environment or development aid, as people are more focussed on getting
by than on political activism.1
The findings on support for democracy revise our understanding of political
support in times of crisis. The diffuse measure of democratic support is generally
considered to be more stable over time, and less subject to fluctuation according
to government performance than more specific measures of political support (Eas-
ton, 1975). Moreover, according to work on democratic consolidation, democratic
support is supposed to be resilient to economic shocks in the advanced democracies
(Linz and Stepan, 1996b). The data presented in this thesis shows that not to be the
case. Both old and new democracies experienced significant declines in democratic
support after the crisis. Given that support for a democratic political system is
considered an important component of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan,
1996b), that this support is more fragile to economic shocks than would have been
expected is not good news for the health of democracy. Although an area of further
research would be to assess whether this support bounces back after the economy
recovers.
What are the implications of these findings for democratic governance? One
major implication is that citizen political engagement may decline at times when it
is most needed. It could be argued that during a crisis there is a greater need for
citizens to hold their governments to account, whether by casting a vote, joining a
political party or union, or protesting against government policy. Yet the results
suggest all these forms of participation may be depressed by a crisis. Moreover,
due to increasing joblessness, poverty, and reduced social service provision by the
government if austerity cuts are made, the services provided by charitable voluntary
1The third item was not possible to test with the data used in this thesis though findings by
Beissinger and Sasse (2014) support this distinction. They found during the crisis economic protest
in Eastern Europe increased, while other types of protest decreased.
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associations are under greater demand during a crisis.2 The results of this thesis
suggest that in a time of crisis the public is not likely to increase their involvement
in voluntary activities to meet the greater demand for voluntary services.
Another implication concerns how citizens do and do not hold the government
to account for an economic crisis. Governments paid billions of dollars in bailouts
to financial institutions that continued to pay out large bonuses to their executives.
The taxpayer footed the bill, whilst many suffered from joblessness, homelessness,
a loss of retirement savings in the case of the old, and a loss of job opportuni-
ties for the young. In what ways did citizens hold governments to account? The
evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that people did hold governments ac-
countable for poor economic performance by voting against incumbents. Moreover,
citizens of European countries affected by the IMF and EU bailouts mobilized large
anti-austerity protests, confirming the findings of Bermeo and Bartels (2014) that
mobilizations were more likely to occur in response to government policy, than the
economic crisis itself. On the whole though, participation was depressed across the
various modes of political action in countries harder hit by the crisis. This suggests
most people were more focussed on getting by during the crisis than on holding the
government to account.
8.3 Contribution
This study has contributed to our understanding of citizen political behavior and
democratic attitudes in the context of a major economic crisis. It has provided
a comprehensive analysis of the different types of participation, from the most to
the least conventional, in cross-national comparison and over time. In the course
of preparing this thesis, a number of studies have been published on the effects of
the crisis on various aspects of political behavior and also democratic support (for
example Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Bermeo and Bartels, 2014; Cordero and
Simo´n, 2016; Giugni and Grasso, 2015). This study is unique in its comprehensive
coverage of different types of political participation from the most to least conven-
tional, in addition to the attitudinal measure of democratic support. It extends
beyond existing country case studies, by investigating impacts of the crisis in cross-
national comparison with individual level and country level data. It extends beyond
existing comparative studies, by focussing on a sample that extends beyond Europe.
This section will outline how the thesis contributes to the literature on each of the
dependent variables investigated.
A substantial body of research has emerged on economic voting in the context of
2For example, former UK prime minister David Cameron envisaged a ‘big society’ of increased
local level voluntarism whilst introducing large cuts to public services.
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the crisis.3 The bulk of this work is single country studies, though several compar-
ative studies have emerged. These studies have focused on economic voting in the
European context. Two have analysed aggregate data (Dassonneville and Lewis-
Beck, 2014a; Kriesi, 2014); one has analyzed electoral behavior in the context of
European Parliament elections (Okolikj and Quinlan, 2016). This study contributes
to this body of work by taking a comparative approach, using national election study
data, in a sample that extends beyond Europe.4 In terms of the voter turnout anal-
yses, the finding that economic crises can depress electoral participation confirms
the result of Karp and Milazzo (2016) across a different sample of countries and
using a different approach.
Many scholars have investigated protest behavior in response to the crisis, spurred
by highly visible mobilizations such as Occupy Wall St (Calhoun, 2013), and anti-
austerity protests in Europe (see for example della Porta et al., 2017; Giugni and
Grasso, 2015; Kriesi, 2014). This study complements the plethora of studies that
have investigated specific movements linked to the crisis, by assessing participation
trends across societies as a whole and in cross-national comparison, rather than fo-
cussed on a specific protest movement within a small number of cases, or in a single
country study. This study demonstrates that amidst visible protest mobilizations in
response to the crisis, participation in protest across populations as whole can be in
decline. As more people struggle to get by some will be mobilized, but many others
may become less active in politics. This adds to the finding of Bermeo and Bartel’s
edited collection that ‘in most countries, popular reactions to the Great Recession
were surprisingly muted and moderate’ (2014, p. 3).
Alongside the contributions to the work emerging on electoral and protest re-
sponses to the crisis, this study charts largely new ground in exploring the impact of
the crisis on civic engagement in comparative perspective. It builds on a policy brief
by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
which found that traditional forms of civic engagement that involve face to face in-
teraction were declining, consistent with the results of this thesis (Eurofound, 2013,
p. 13). The work on democratic support extends previous studies by Armingeon
and Guthmann (2014) and Cordero and Simo´n (2016) by looking at diffuse political
support over time, and with a sample than extends beyond Europe.
3In particular, a number of special issues have covered this topic (Dassonneville and Lewis-
Beck, 2014b; Lewis-Beck et al., 2012; Lewis-Beck and Whitten, 2013).
4Bartels, in his study of American politics in the wake of the Great Recession incorporates
descriptive outcomes for OECD countries, finding that, as in this study, incumbent vote share is
driven by economic performance (2013, p. 50).
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8.4 Study limitations and further research
This thesis has a number of limitations. There are often trade-offs to be made when
selecting a dataset for a study such as this one. Important considerations include
the selection of cases, the time-points covered, and whether measures for variables
of interest are included. The WVS and CSES were chosen as the best balance of all
three, though they are not without constraints. The analyses at the country level are
limited by a small sample size: 13 countries for the work on voting behavior using
CSES data; 18 countries for the chapters using the WVS. With a larger sample size
it would be possible to be more confident as to the impact of contextual factors.
Moreover, the selection of cases enabled by these datasets is very broad, which has
advantages as discussed above, though also challenges associated with a large degree
of variation within a reasonably small sample. Various interesting cases in Europe,
such as Greece, could not be included in the main analyses due to data limitations.
To compensate for these limitations data from additional sources was analysed where
feasible to do so.
There are strengths and weaknesses in the measures incorporated in this study.
For example, the WVS democratic support measure that taps support for democracy
and rejection of anti-democratic alternatives is more robust than measures that only
incorporate the former (see Shin and Wells, 2005). On the other hand, the CSES
did not include subjective economic evaluations in relevant modules, which would
have enabled a stronger test of the economic voting hypotheses. There is also some
degree of measurement error in public opinion surveys, particularly it is well known
that turnout is overreported (see Karp and Brockington, 2005; Selb and Munzert,
2013). This should have provided a more conservative test of the differences between
voters and non-voters, as some non-voters would have been coded as voters.
In an observational study like this there are also limitations in determining causal
mechanisms. In order to minimize this problem, the same cases were compared over
time, differences in crisis impacts between countries were incorporated, and various
controls such as democratic experience were taken into account. Nevertheless, one
can not be certain that the observed impacts were a definite result of the economic
crisis. As a large scale financial crisis of global reach is not something that be easily
recreated with an experimental approach, external validity considerations were con-
sidered paramount in determining the approach, though the research design was set
up to maximize internal validity within the constraints of working with observational
data.
To build upon this study a number of areas for future research have been iden-
tified. The findings regarding the impact of national economic conditions on ag-
gregate trends in participation and democratic support could be explored further
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with a larger number of cases, or for that matter a different set of cases, to test
whether these relationships hold outside of the sample tested here. Similarly, the
individual level results could be tested with different datasets and cases, including
further analyses with a European sample in the context of the Eurozone crisis. As
more data becomes available, it will be possible to explore the long term effects of
the crisis. There is also room to expand the work with the ICEWS protest event
data across a larger number of countries to assess the relationship between economic
conditions and the number of demonstrations cross-nationally. The proposed mech-
anisms to explain how economic crisis affects political behaviors and attitudes could
be explored in an experimental setting. An experimental approach would lack the
external validity of this study, though could provide an opportunity to confirm the
results and test causal mechanisms.
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Appendix A
Postmaterialism Index
People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be
for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which
different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one
of these you, yourself, consider the most important?
And which would be the next most important?
A. A high level of economic growth
B. Making sure this country has strong defense forces
C. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their
jobs and in their communities
D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful
If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say
is most important?
And which would be the next most important?
E. Maintaining order in the nation
F. Giving people more say in important government decisions
G. Fighting rising prices
H. Protecting freedom of speech
Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most impor-
tant?
And what would be the next most important?
I. A stable economy
J. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society
K. Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money
L. The fight against crime
(World Values Survey Association, 2012)
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A, B, E, G, I and L are said to be materialist priorities whereas C, D, F, H, J
and K are said to be postmaterialist priorities. Inglehart found ‘trying to make our
cities and countryside more beautiful’, whilst hypothesised to reflect postmaterialist
values, does not load strongly on either the materialist or postmaterialist dimensions,
so this item is usually dropped from scale construction (Inglehart, 1997, p. 111).
Thus this study will use Inglehart’s additive index ranging from 0 to 5, calculated
by adding priorities allocated to the five remaining postmaterialist items (Inglehart,
1997, p. 130).
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